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Fundamentals of Shi‘ite and Sunni Political Thought
By: Dr. Muhammad Masjid-Jame‘i
In the last decade, the Muslim world has been the most restless part of the world and most of the news has been related to it. This has included not only Iran but the entire Muslim world, although Iran has been the center or, rather, the source of inspiration for this movement and restlessness.
What is nowadays construed as the revival of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism encompasses the westernmost part of the Muslim world, i.e. Tunisia and the Arabic Morocco to its easternmost part, i.e. Indonesia and parts of the Philippines settled by Muslims. No doubt, all these countries and other places where Muslims, whether natives or not, constitute a minority compared to the entire population, are affected by this new wave although the degree to which they are affected is different throughout and varies according to the conditions.
Such developments and restlessness did not begin in the recent decade. Most likely, the restlessness in the Muslim world in the recent century has been elevated and more serious compared to the other parts of the world. At least one can say that, from among all the faiths that exist today, Islam as a religion and also as a civilization and culture—the civilization and culture that it has created and the protection of which it has undertaken—has witnessed more movements, struggle and conflicts than any other faith.
No other religion has reacted to such an extent against the full-fledged hegemony of the new culture. Although they may have conflicted or struggled with it positively or negatively, in the end they submitted to it and settled for a peaceful coexistence with it, i.e. they adapted themselves to the status quo at the cost of giving up their own principles and fundamentals since, contrary to doing so, they could not survive and could not stop their children and followers from abandonment.1
Among all religions, only Islam was firm on its principles and identity, was not absorbed into the modern civilization and supported a face-to-face conflict so as to maintain its sovereignty at least within its own territory, a sovereignty that had been denied or at least limited by the modern civilization and its advocates. The story of the struggles and conflicts of this religion in the last decade and even the last century is nothing but the sociopolitical realization of the insistence, conflict and confrontation; and this goes back to the very essence of this religion. The internal structure of this religion is so that it calls its believers to a constant attempt for realizing their own identity and rejecting all that is not part of this.
A Muslim, as long as he is a Muslim, is bound to abide by his/her own fundamentals and principles. This is an essential element of his/her belief and essential for his/her eternal salvation and worldly pride and dignity. This is a necessary religious and ideological necessity and an unchangeable, non-negotiable duty. Although, in practice, for a short or long period of time this duty may not be fulfilled for certain reasons, such as weak faith or inappropriate social conditions, it cannot be completely forgotten. As long as there is Islam or Muslimhood, this duty is to be performed and the religion is likely to adopt a position according to the present circumstances and based on the claim of coordinating itself with the same.
To put it in a few words, the conflict of this religion with whatever that is unknown goes back to its nature and essence rather than being a temporary or emotional condition that will soon go away and end. Although the entire external conditions have a basic role in its emergence and in the quality of the emergence, the main factor is from within and the external factors only provide the proper conditions. The history of Islam is the history of an endless constant fight between ‘tradition’ and ‘heresy’. History is a constant attempt for reinforcing the tradition and rejecting heresy.2
No matter what the form and dimensions of the heresy are, the fight will persist as long as it exists. Indeed, there has been no time without such heresy and, consequently, there will be no time without such struggle, although it may not have a severe political form. The form of the struggle determines the conditions but the substance is determined by religion. 3
Throughout the history of Islam and especially in the recent decades we have witnessed the struggle and strife between Shi‘ism and Sunnism. The struggle by the Shi‘ites and by Sunnis to consolidate and stabilize the laws and precepts of Islam and to reject anything other than these is similarly motivated while it originates in the very substance of Islam and cannot be two-pronged. This is why the story of religious struggles in a country like Iran is not essentially different from those in other countries such as Syria, Egypt and Pakistan. The contemporary history has narrated these stories in the same way.4
Despite all these, however, one should admit that there are differences and failing to take them into account may entail problems and misunderstandings. Unitive tendencies have prevented a proper understanding and evaluation of the differences. This is a great problem and can be solved only if dealt with impartially and bravely.
The differences relate to the different socioeconomic, political and historical conditions in Shi‘ite and Sunni territories on the one hand and to the ideological features of the two schools and the role that such features have played in forming the social, psychological and belief structure of their followers on the other. This is important point that should not be ignored. The problem is not just that these two differ from each other.
More important than this is that, in the light of their way of understanding and beliefs in the course of history, they have grown into two differing series of features. They have lived in two different social, political and cultural backgrounds and, therefore, they have two different psychologies, religious characters, religious thoughts and sensitivities.5
In order to study the ideological features that contribute to a better and deeper understanding of the present situation of the Islamic movement, a study of the political thought of these two schools are of the utmost importance, therefore we will first deal with there.6
Fundamentals of Shi‘ite and Sunni Political Thought
First, one has to see how these principles and factors, whether they are historical, jurisprudential or theological, have formed the religious political understanding of the Shi‘ites and Sunnis, why so and what reflections this way of thinking had on their religious political developments in the past and in the present. There is also the question of whether the courses of sociopolitical and even cultural developments of these two, when coming into conflict with religion, were the same or different and, if they were different, how far were they affected by their theoretical fundamentals in religion and the quality of such a relation; also, how did this understanding affect the psychosocial structures of the followers of these two schools.
It is important to carefully study this subject not because the past of the Shi‘ites and Sunnis would be better understood in the light of it. But rather, because, without paying due consideration to it, the present condition of the Islamic movement cannot be well understood. Although it may be said that the present Islamic movement has similarly covered the Shi‘ite and Sunni territories, it would be a mistake to presume that the movement was formed and went on based on similar theoretical backgrounds and fundamentals. The effect of the sociopolitical and economic conditions as well as the historical background and the more or less common colonial experience of the believers in these two schools were so strong and critical in forming the present conditions that it would be difficult in the beginning to evaluate the importance of the belief characteristics and the religious, political structures of the two based on two different realizations of the Islamic movement.
This indeed should not be interpreted as ignoring the numerous common grounds of the two in various fields such as the political thought. The problem is that there are important distinctive differences despite all the similarities and even the common grounds. Such differences have emerged because of the complex conditions that exist today. A proper impartial understanding of these misleading differences would help understand more deeply the other party and remove any problem and suspicion. Therefore, they have to be set forth for discussion rather than be hidden.
The fact is that the Shi‘ites and Sunnis have two different ways, especially in their political outlook, and religious political movements in their societies have occurred in two different ways. Is it not a fact that any sociopolitical movement is formed by the psychosocial facts and the historical experiences and beliefs in its territory? Now, if the facts become different, the movement will surely be affected. The psychologies of a typical Shi‘ite and a typical Sunni differ as their religious social structures do. When it is so, the results, inspired by the difference, will unavoidably be different as well.7
For example, there is a general tendency in Iran to consider the lack of a religious political leadership among the Sunnis as a great weak point in the contemporary Islamic movement. Such a belief is based on an undue comparison between the Shi‘ites and Sunnis, ignoring the fact that this arises from the jurisprudential and theological structure, the historical tradition and the psychosocial structure of their society and do not have to exist among the Sunnis as well.
The Shi‘ites, because they are the Shi‘ites and not because they are Iranians or live in the present time, have a tendency towards being guided by a leader and even being leader-makers, which is based on religious requirements while such requirements do not necessarily exist among Sunnis; neither the theoretical foundations nor the historical experience exist for it; neither their psychological structure has grown and been formed so that they would refer to a religious authority for any problem nor their religious social structure is so as to put such a person at the apex of the decision-making power.
Different Views
Because of the importance of this discussion, it would be better to quote part of the intelligent criticisms of the author of the book Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i from Muhammad Jawad Mughniyah. In his book ash-Shi‘ah wa’l-Hakimun, Mughniyah says, “The majority of the Sunnis necessitate obeying a tyrant sovereign and being patient upon his tyranny while denying the right to revolt against him. Shi‘ism, however, necessitates encounter and revolution against tyranny and corruption. In this respect, Shi‘ism opposes Sunnism and stands against it. According to the majority of Sunnis, revolting against the oppressive sovereign is revolting against the faith and against Islam while Shi‘ism provides that such revolt would be within the context of the faith and being patient with oppression is revolting against the faith. Here lies the basic reason and the true interpretation of what Ahmad Amin and others say, to the effect that, “Shi‘ism is an umbrella for he who seeks the destruction of Islam.”, because in the logic of Amin and his descendants, Islam is manifested by and personified in the person sovereign, no matter if he is an oppressor or a just person. Therefore, whoever stands against him has deserted Islam. However, in the logic of Shi‘ism, it is the tyrant who has deserted Islam… and, therefore, it is not surprising if he calls Shi‘ism ‘the destroyer’; true, but the destroyer of aberration and corruption.”
“It was Hasan Baṣri who said, “It is necessary to obey the Umayyad although they may be oppressors… I swear by God what they make good is more than their corruption.” Then, he adds, “The Shi‘ite Imams, faqihs (jurisprudents) and literary scholars have always stood against oppressive sovereigns and refused to cooperate with them, as they deemed this a sin to do so. Shi‘ism by nature advises standing up against the falsehood and altruism for achieving the truth. It would have not been wise for those in power to ignore this point, which is why they always kept the Shi‘ites followed and persecuted them anywhere. They bribed the wrongdoing clerics and these two united to kill the pure believers in God and the Prophet and the Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s Household). They welcomed the slaughter and issued a fatwa that the believers had deserted the faith.”8
What Mughniyah says is the general perception that the Shi‘ites have of their school as well as of the Sunni school and their clerics. Although this is in turn a right theory, it is not yet an inclusive one. It is part rather than all of the reality. One has to see why these are so and those are like that. Is all this due to personal and moral matters or is it far from these? To evaluate the position of each of these two groups, in the first place one has to take a look at the doctrinal, intellectual, social and historical backgrounds in which they have acted and figure out what the obligations and limitations of each of them have been.
They could, however, not go beyond their doctrinal, jurisprudential and theological frameworks. One who follows his/her doctrinal rules and obligations not only cannot be blamed but also has to be praised if he or she does it sincerely and with goodwill. If there is a criticism, it has to be directed towards the choices rather than towards commitment to the accepted principles and standards. Accordingly, expecting things beyond the principles and obligations is a vain, unreasonable expectation.
The critic, after quoting Mughniyah, says, “Without wanting to arouse prejudice in this respect and while appreciating Mughniyah, we have to say that we cannot agree with him in this analysis without considering his special romantic approach. One feels that he has a double standard when it comes to the attitudes of the Shi‘ites and the Sunnis towards the sovereigns. These two groups lived under different circumstances after the Prophet died and under the rule of the sovereigns.”
Then he adds, “The opinions issued by Islamic jurisprudents were personal as well as public. Fatwas issued were not limited to the issuing jurisprudent. They covered his followers, disciples and advocates as well. Therefore, no issue has to be considered in this way although it contains some traces of the truth as well. It is true that we have to be brave and straightforward in our stances, but we should not forget the limits and boundaries. It is a means rather than an end. Otherwise, the end will be the victim of the means. Nevertheless, the position of the Shi‘ites before the tyrant is based on some deep fundamentals, which are rooted in the attitude of the Infallible Imams towards the sovereigns, which is followed by the Shi‘ites.”9
Again, this is one side of the matter. The other side is the people. It is not that the jurisprudential and theological structures as well as the historical experience and consensus of the Sunnis have somehow entailed limitations for the sociopolitical activities of their clerics.
A cleric among the Sunnis is a pious believer who specializes in Islamic sciences and, therefore, referred to concerning religious problems.10
According to Shi‘ism, a cleric is far from this. He is a safe shelter for people. They refer to him in religious as well personal matters. They even ask his advice in various sociopolitical matters. The answer is not to be sought in the social environment. An important part of it, which is the source of the different social environment, has ideological reasons. One of the most important of such reasons is that Shi‘ism is open to interpretation by jurisprudents (‘ijtihad’ is open to further analysis) and Shi‘ites are bound to follow (imitate) a jurisprudent, which is quite contrary to Sunnism.
The natural and logical consequence of this is that the people have to update themselves with the religious obligation as to ‘incidents’ and whatever that happens for the first time in any matter, by seeking the Islamic legist’s (mutjahid’s) response and his personal opinion because that is valid and has to be obeyed. A Sunni cleric is at its best a speaker of the fatwa, and a fatwa of that which is older than a thousand years.
A Shi‘ite cleric either expresses his own opinion or that of a living Islamic legist. Both the psychological structure and the personality structure of one who has reached the level of the legist (ijtihad) or issuing fatwa are different from those who relate the fatwa at the highest level while also the psychological structure and the personality structure of those who refer to these also differ.
If in the past, because of the closed Islamic societies, especially the religious communities within Islamic countries and the slow pace of social, cultural and economic developments, this difference could not be dealt with, but it has now emerged. The point is that the difference is not new. It is a difference more or less as old as the two religious schools, but it has recently emerged from sociopolitical dormancy.
Apart from these, many affairs that the Sunnis think of as deserving to be dealt with only by the rulers and refer to the latter are referred in Shi‘ism to the faqih (Islamic jurisprudent). This is not merely for political reasons. Its social aspect is quite stronger and more important. Because of this, on the one hand the Shi‘ite cleric thinks of himself as having the necessary powers and, on the other hand, the people refer to him in their own affairs. Therefore, the cleric expects to be obeyed while the people also accept it as their religious duty to obey him. Such things have never been and could never be experienced by the Sunni society in history and also seem very unlikely to be experienced in the future.11
Religious Leadership
The concept of religious leadership and the need to follow the full-fledged religious legist [mujtahid jami‘ ash-shara’it] is one of the fundamentals of Shi‘ite jurisprudence and theology. These fundamentals, as they put the Shi‘ite legists at a top position, makes the people obey them as well. This is not just to say that the Shi‘ites refer to religious legists in their own problems. Basically, the Shi‘ite school is so that it can educate such legists. Again, the problem is not that, for example, the Shi‘ite clergies have throughout history been more struggling and braver than their Sunni counterparts; rather, it is that the theoretical fundamentals of Shi‘ism reinforces and even creates such characteristics.12
Emphasizing his beliefs, a Shi‘ite cleric can stand up, without any doubt or fear, against the ruling system in cases in which he thinks fit and proper while also calling the people to join him. However, based on what part of his beliefs can a Sunni scholar do so? It is true that the collection of Sunni jurisprudence and theology provides examples of struggles in which standing up against the oppressive Sultan is advised and even necessitated.
However, firstly these examples are not typical, i.e. there are more and more valid cases in opposition to such thought.13 Secondly, it can at least be said that the texts on Sunni jurisprudence and theology do not show such an attitude so clearly and explicitly as the texts in Shi‘ite jurisprudence and theology do, and this is the point. In such a background, how can one expect the emergence of clerics who have a defiant attitude and at the same time be committed to the jurisprudential, theological and ideological fundamentals?
Looked at from this angle, it is not a personal matter anymore and cannot be attributed only to the personal characteristics of Shi‘ite or Sunni clerics. It is the jurisprudential and theological structures of these two schools that nurture their clerics and followers in two different ways in terms of their stance in important political issues. Accordingly, these theoretical fundamentals have, throughout the history, resulted in the formation of psycho-sociopolitical foundations appropriate to their own characteristics and in practice put the Shi‘ites, the Sunnis and the clerics of these two schools on two historically, socially, intellectually and ideologically different paths.14
It would be a gross mistake if we want to compare these two without considering their differences. Indeed, a number of committed dynamic young Sunnis may gather together in such groups as Islamic parties and choose an individual as the political and religious leader. Yet, such an action can hardly succeed and last without any religious foundation or obligation and without it collapsing in confrontation with hard realities. Apart from this, such a limited action cannot be generalized to the entire society. Each society goes forward according to its own specifications rather than according to what a certain group desires.15
Nevertheless, it is not expected to fully explain the goal here. Rather, it should be considered that these differences exist and they have roots as deep as the history itself in the two schools. They have to be studied scientifically and without prejudice so that each can be studied better and we will not expect anything beyond the ideological capacities and characteristics of each other. The failure to do so has been the source of some problems, especially in recent years.
In order to find out what the effect of the political thought of the Shi‘ites and the Sunnis are on the Islamic movement, the characteristics of this movement have to be clarified. Much indeed has been said and written in this respect. Without a doubt, in the recent decade, nothing in the world has gained more attention than this movement. This book is not for repeating or evaluating these analyses. Rather, it is a study by considering the historical and social aspects in contemporary history throughout the Third World, part of which is the Muslim world.
From a more inclusive and comprehensive perspective, the present Islamic movement is the dawn of a new era in the history that has covered almost the entire Third World. Although the manifestations of this era are not the same throughout the Third World, they still exist anywhere and, for certain reasons, they have emerged in the Muslim World more strongly, but the strength with which they have emerged in the Muslim World varies depending on the historical conditions, the depth of religious influence, the degree of creativity brought about by Islam in that region throughout the history, and the volume of economic, industrial, social and political developments. It cannot be denied, however, that its scope has expanded to cover every where and has had a comprehensive influence. Now let’s see what the story is.
Since the Third World countries entered the modern era, while their entry varied depending on which part of the world they were in, a new historical period began that more or less continued to the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. This was the time that marked the beginning of a new period (both in terms of culture and sociopolitical tendencies) that differed from the previous period in some significant ways. It is quite natural if the latter period does not have the same origin in all countries. It begins earlier or later, strongly or weekly, depending on the historical, economic and political characteristics of the country.
From the early 1960’s to the late 1970’s and the early 1980’s, the new period is politically marked with unrest in the Third World and especially the Muslim World16 as the political manifestation of this new period, which is either entirely formed by the historical period or is under the influence of its characteristics.
The modern period for the Third Worlders began when they first came into contact with the modern civilization and history, whether through colonialism or by ordinary non-colonial contacts. Before such contacts took place, they lived their own way of life, from China and Japan to India, Iran, Egypt and other African countries—Latin American countries are outside the present discussion because of historical and demographic reasons. This discussion is about those countries that had a civilization and culture and lived according to them while they suddenly evolved by coming across the modern world, without the historical course to be suddenly cut off by massive immigration, as it happened to Latin America, where the immigrants had a sharply different culture with that of the native inhabitants, thus imposing the developments.17
Before contacts, changes and developments in such countries were limited to their historical and cultural characteristics. However, when contacts occurred and gradually expanded and deepened, the modern period began. This period had characteristics that will be mentioned as far as they relate to the present discussion.
Notes:
1. For what Christians did in this respect, see Vatican Council II, the Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents, pp. 903-911.
2. For further explanation, see Al-‘Aqidah wa’sh-Shari‘ah fi’l-Islam (The Belief and the Shari‘ah in Islam), pp. 250-260; Al-Bid‘ah: Tahdiduha wa Mawqif al-Islam minha (Heresy: Its Limits and Stance of Islam on It).
3. Further explanation can be found in chapters 3, 4.
4. For example, see Islamic Movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran, Asaf Hussain.
5. To clarify the discussion, one has to study the effect of Islam on the society and history and its role in social and historical developments as well as its other features as a faith. In this regard, see Idi’uluzhi wa Inqilab (Ideology and Revolution), pp. 111-149; Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i (Shi‘ite Political Thought), pp. 37-115; Al-‘Aqidah wa’sh-Shari‘ah fi’l-Islam (Belief and Shari‘ah in Islam), pp. 133-177.
6. To find out about the differences in the mutual impact of Shi‘ite and Sunni ideologies on the Shi‘ite and Sunni society throughout the history and in the contemporary era, see Faith and Power, pp. 31-55, and Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i (Shi‘ite Political Thought), pp. 37-180. The latter is one of the few best sources on the subject.
7. One of the best sources according to which one can find out about the differences in the intellectual, psychological and religious structures, the motivations and emotional sensitivities of Shi‘ites and Sunnis and their attitude towards history and especially the early history of Islam, are the books written by Sunnis who converted to Shi‘ism. An example is Muhakimeh-ye Tarikh-e Al Muhammad (Trial of the History of Muhammad’s Dynasty) by Qadi Bihjat Afandi, Li-Madha Ikhtartu Madhhab ash-Shi‘ah, by Amin al-Antaki, and especially Thumma Ihtadayta, by Muhammad at-Tijan as-Samawi, a Tunisian intellectual converted to Shi‘ism. Also see Nazariyyah al-Imamah ash-Shi‘ah al-Imamiyyah, by Ahmad Mahmud Subhi, pp. 15-68.
8. Ash-Shi‘ah wa’l-Ḥakimun (Shi‘ah and Rulers), pp. 26-7.
9. Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i (Shi‘ite Political Thought), pp. 64-5.
10. This is well explained by ‘Abdu’l-Karim al-Khatib in his Sadd Bab al-Ijtihad wa ma tarattaba ‘alayh, especially pp. 3-8.
11. The fact is that the clerics in both Sunnism and Shi‘ism develop under the influence of two different types of ideological, historical, intellectual and sociopolitical conditions. This is especially true of the last two centuries, particularly the contemporary period. The clerical institution in Shi‘ism is an independent institution. Some have said that, throughout the history, this institution has been recognized both by the people as well as the state as an independent institution and this is believed by the institution itself as well as the Shi‘ite society. At least in the Iranian society, this cannot be ignored.
The Iranian society, at least from the Qajarid era onwards, especially where it relates to the mass of the people, has been formed as if it were constantly required to refer to this institution. One can go so far as to say that the people, for different reasons, needed this institution more than the latter needed the people. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the clergy as an institution is in fact the material realization of the affective, psychological and religious needs of our people. This is why the relation has endured to date, despite the many domestic and international problems. This institution has been the affective and moral support of the people for at least the last two or three centuries.
Not only were the people willing to refer to them for matters relating to their personal and private lives, but also they referred to them to seek solutions for their problems in times of hardship and disaster.
A complete study of these issues would be lengthy. However, when it comes to the Shi‘ite clergy and leadership, the aforementioned is true. Nevertheless, none of such facts and experiences can be and perhaps could not be seen amongst the Sunnites. They had other ideological fundamentals and different individual, collective and historical experiences. A cleric among them means a specialist in Islamic and jurisprudential issues, like with any other job in the society. Others had their own jobs and the clergy are busy with regular prayers and Friday communal prayers, and studied religious and jurisprudential issues, for which they could be referred.
Unfortunately, the recent developments and the reforms in their educational system have given them a more official governmental position and have westernized them and, consequently, the people.
In one of his sermons (on 19 April 1981), Shaykh Kashk, the most famous and the most popular preacher in the Arab World, thus addressed the clergy at al-Azhar: “In 1961, al-Azhar received such a strong blow under the name of ‘reforms’ that it was actually destroyed. O’, the members of al-Azhar, tell me, which part of the Qur’an and how many surahs can you quote verbatim when you graduate with your degree? Nowadays, al-Azhar graduates cannot even read the Qur’an. Al-Azhar has been hit so hard that its shaykh was a specialist in philosophy. When was it decided that the al-Azhar shaykh should be a specialist in philosophy? One shaykh had a PhD from Germany and his predecessor had one from France. Are Muslims so inefficient that they have to go to France to get a doctorate degree? I don’t know who is going to be the next shaykh. Perhaps an army general will take over al-Azhar.
Who knows? However, I know that, since the reforms, the al-Azhar leadership has abandoned serving Islam.” He adds, “The new approach of the parvenu thinkers is acquiring knowledge without an educator or shaykh. They directly refer to books but do not understand anything. Pious preachers who are typically of an old age of about 70 have now been substituted by adult boys who have read a couple of pages of Ibn Taymiyyah or ibn ‘Abdu’l-Wahhab and can protect the faith. What a funny show! Oh you, the Shaykh of al-Azhar and all those who have sunken into a deep sleep and turned Islam into a pasture where everyone can graze.” Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 219-222.
Despite all such criticisms and the other criticisms that have been and are being made, however, one has to say that they have unintentionally distanced themselves from the sociopolitical life, and this has brought about numerous problems, especially in Sunni religious societies and thus, being the main cause of the deviation of Islamic movements in these societies. Indeed, it must be emphasized that such distancing has been the inevitable natural consequence of their previous position rather than their conscious or irresponsible will. This is an issue of their history rather than their present and is rooted in distant pasts rather than in recent history.
It is interesting to know that a person like Rashid Riḍa, who has strong anti-Shi‘ite tendencies, openly appreciates the effective, active role of the Shi‘ite clergy and their efforts in maintaining the line of Islamism in the society. He even emphasizes to his fellow clergy on having a role similar to that of the Shi‘ite clergy. See Andisheh-ye Siyasi dar Islam-e Mu‘asir (Political Thought in the Contemporary Islam), pp. 141-2.
Concerning the position of the Sunni clergy and their role throughout the history of Islam, see the article ‘Ulama’ (the Clergy), in the book Islamic Society and the West, by Gibb and Bowen, pp. 81-113. Also see Al-Islam bayn al-‘Ulama’ wa’l-Hakimun (Islam among the Clergy and the Sovereigns), by ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz al-Badri.
For criticisms by modernists and progressivists against the clergy, for example take a look at the criticisms by one of the most influential religious thinkers in the Arab World, Khalid Muhammad Khalid, in the book Ash-Shi‘ah fi’l-Mizan (Shi‘ah in al-Mizan), by al-Mughniyah, pp. 375-8, and also those by one of the most accredited non-religious Arab thinkers in Al-Islam wa’l-Khilafah fi’l-‘Asr al-Ḥadith (Islam and Caliphate at the Age of Hadith), by Aḥmad Baha’uddin, pp. 18-34. For a more impartial and empathetic examination of the role of the clergy and especially their effective share in the protection of the Arab literary heritage, see Min Ḥaḍir al-Lughah al-‘Arabiyyah, pp. 24-5.
12. A clear example of what was just said can be witnessed in the relations of Shaykh Ja‘far Kashif al-Ghata’ and Fath ‘Ali Shah. See Nokhostin Ruyaruyiha-ye Andisheh-garan-e Iran ba do Rawiyyeh-ye Tamaddun-e Burzhuwazi-ye Gharb (The First Encounters of Iranian Thinkers with the Two Sides of the Western Bourgeoisie Civilization), pp. 329-32. Numerous other examples are provided by Cole in Roots of North Indian Shi‘ism in Iran and Iraq, pp. 113-204.
13. See Ma‘alim al-Khilafah fi’l-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami (Worlds of Caliphate in the Islamic Political Thought), pp. 125-6, and also An-Nazariyyat as-Siyasiyyah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Political Theories), pp. 71-2.
14. McDonald thus quotes from Goldziher, “Among the Shi‘ites, absolute legists exist today. This is because they are considered to represent the Absent Imam [Imam-e Gha’ib]. Therefore, their position is completely different from that of the Sunni clerics among the Sunnis. They freely criticize and even control the Shah. However, the Sunni clerics in general are considered as individuals who follow the government.” Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 158.
15. In the absence of such an institution, the clergy and other institutions such as religious communities and missions, which have been protecting Islam in such countries as Iran, some religious Sunni intellectuals have suggested establishing Islamic political parties. Their primary goal in the first days of the formation of such an idea is to create legal and social institutions for protecting Islamic values and laws rather than resorting to political activities.
In the Iranian society, what controlled the central governments against the unbridled Western modernism, antireligious and antinationalist actions was the clergy as well as the socio-religious institutions and even the traditional economic institutions in the bazaar. However, these institutions either did not exist in other Islamic countries or they lacked sufficient ability and independence. In such countries, what controlled the regimes, or what the latter, was afraid of was the public opinion. However, this factor, firstly, could not react promptly and, secondly, was easily affected by propaganda and threats of the ruling regimes. Therefore, committed religious intellectuals and clerics thought of establishing Islamic political parties.
For Example, the author of Ma‘alim al-Khilafah fi’l-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami (Worlds of Caliphate in the Islamic Political Thought), thinks that the formation of political parties that “call to the goodness and prohibit the evil” is obligatory, saying, “Then, if a political party acts according to what has been mentioned in the verse, the remaining Muslims will not face the sin of omitting the action because it is an obligation for the community and the religion does not allow impeding the formation of other political parties. This would be impeding the action according to obligation and is unlawful according to the shari‘ah.” He then adds, “As acting according to obligation does not require the ruler’s permission and, rather, subjecting such action to the ruler’s permission is unlawful according to the shari‘ah, therefore, for the Muslims to form political parties, it is not necessary to obtain the ruler’s permission.” ibid., pp. 273-4.
According to another author, “The right to criticize is among the rights recognized by Islam for the citizens of the Islamic society. Therefore, if some people want to call the public to their thoughts and opinions by this means, they can form political parties and communities.”
Nizam al-Hukm fi’l-Islam (System of Order in Islam), p. 92. For further explanation, see Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa’l-Jama‘at al-Islamiyyah al-Ḥayat as-Siyasiyyah al-Misriyyah (Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Communities of the Egiptian Political Life), pp. 19-48, 31-132; and also Ma‘alim fi’t-Tariq (Worlds on the Way), p. 173.
16. See Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 283-95.
17. As to Latin American revolutionary thought and how much its characteristics are different from those of the revolutionary thoughts in many Third World countries and especially the Muslim World, see Fidel and Religion, by Ferri Betto, and especially the collection of views and speeches Che Guevara in Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolutionz to learn about Che Ghuevara’s left thought and, for example, its twin left thought in Iran, which is the policy of Fada’iyan-e Khalq (the People’s Devotees) before the Islamic Revolution of Iran.
Compare this book with the greatest books of the latter group’s theoretician, Bizhan Joz’i. For further explanation, see Idi’uluzhi wa Inqilab (Ideology and Revolution), pp. 214-20 and Iran, Dictaturi wa Pishraft (Iran: Dictatorship and Progress), pp. 37-243; also Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt, which studies the intellectual and sociopolitical developments of the Egyptian society in the light of the biography of one of the most important and most effective early 20th-century intellectuals, Muhammad Husayn Heykal.
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