The Concept of Power and Justice in Islam

By: Dr. Muhammad Masjid-Jame‘i
In the previous chapters, we talked about two important principles of Sunni and Shi‘ite political thought and the theoretical differences between the two and the way they formed in practice the history and the psychological and social structures of their followers. In this Chapter, we study the third principle and then go back to the main discussion, i.e. the political movements within the Shi‘ite and Sunni territories in the contemporary history and their differences.
As we said in the previous chapter, the third basic factor in the development of Sunni political thought is that they are sensitive to power and security and the power that can provide and maintain security while Shi‘ites are sensitive to justice and the strict implementation of the Prophet’s (S) tradition the way it was at the time of the Prophet himself, rather than the way it was later interpreted. To them, what is important, obligatory, and sacred consists of a grand strong power in whose light security is provided either against the internal rebels or against the foreign threats and invaders.
Although this is approved by Shi‘ism to a certain extent, it has not attached a full value to be absolutely true. This neither agrees with their jurisprudential or theological foundations nor is approved by the practice of the Infallible Imams. Now let’s see why and how this principle appeared among Sunnis and what the factors by which it was affected are?
It shall be said in brief that three important factors were involved. The first factor is the concept of justice, which is unlike that of the concept of justice with Shi‘ites, both in jurisprudential and in theological and philosophical terms. The second factor is the concept and duties of the government in old times. Finally, the third factor relates to the historical realities and necessities, each of which will be discussed.

The Concept of Justice
The difference in the Shi‘ite and Sunni perception of justice is too clear to require any explanation here. Although the Mu‘tazilite perception and interpretation of justice were close to and in some cases similar to those of Shi‘ites, the Ash‘arite interpretation was far different. It was this school that was later dominant and influenced the development and organization of Sunni jurisprudential and theological foundations.
The important thing in the meantime was that the Ash‘arite interpretation of justice principally had a form that made it unimportant. The point was not that they considered it to be important and critical but offered another interpretation, rather, it was that they provided a meaning for it that made it loose its significance, which was perhaps desirable to them.
When they denied rational agreeableness or disagreeableness of something, in fact they reduced the concept of justice to a level that it would be compatible with any oppressive and tyrannical action. In other words, the thought and ideal of justice was reduced to reality and whatever that existed while the existing reality was made the criterion of judgment rather than a superior concept to be so. Because of this, it would not make sense anymore to evaluate and judge this reality based on its compatibility and incompatibility with that superior concept. When rational agreeableness or disagreeableness is ignored, in fact the concept and nature of justice has been ignored rather than that a new definition has been provided based on such denial.1
Such an interpretation of justice naturally provides the best ground for rejecting any ideal beyond the present reality, and it actually did so. Here, it is not a discussion of justice or whether it has been done or not. Principally, there is no situation superior to the present one, based on now to define justice and to evaluate the present situation.2
The author of the well-known book Al-Mawaqif, who is one of the greatest and most rationalist Ash‘arite theologians, concerning agreeableness or disagreeableness says, “Disagreeableness is what is prohibited by the shari‘ah and agreeable is contrary thereto. To the reason, nothing is judged as agreeable or disagreeable. These two do not return to another real and true matter within one’s action so that the shari‘ah would reveal it. Rather, it is the shari‘ah that creates agreeableness or disagreeableness and defines them. If it becomes the other way round and what it considers as offensive, it considers as good and what it considers to be good, it considers as offensive, this will be possible and the result would be reversed.
However, the Mu‘tazilites say, “The criterion for recognizing the agreeableness or disagreeableness of something is reason and one’s action is per se either good or bad while the shari‘ah only discovers and clarifies this reality. Then, it makes on sense to reverse the matter because goodness and badness relate to real things and are not contractual.”3
As we said, such an interpretation of good and bad and its criteria will leave no room for the concept of justice and basic reason. More importantly, the rational criteria of recognizing truth or falsehood of religious texts, and especially the sayings, will be eliminated while the intellectual, doctrinal and psychological background necessary for accepting them, with a religious and shari‘ah-based acceptance, will provide the ground for any oppressive and corrupt action and will ultimately give a good reason to those in power and the bad clerics to document their oppressions and violations with the religion in order to achieve their goals. More importantly, the religion will also be made liable to such exploitation and misuse.4
Unlawful exploitation of the religion, especially by those in power, has generally been done by falsifying the reason in the name of the religion. When reason is put aside with all its capabilities and limitations, especially as regards to religion, the oppression and superstitions will replace it. This has always been favored by the misusers of the religion. Thus, when reason is falsified in one of the most sensitive and important religious discussions, i.e. justice, such results will inevitably follow.

Results of the Two Different Interpretations
It should be added that the difference in the Mu‘tazilite and Shi‘ite perception and interpretation and those of the Ash‘arites of justice did not make them create the most just sociopolitical system through their history. They were in practice more or less the same and the belief in the principle of justice did not entail sociopolitical justice. There was essentially no difference between the Mu‘tazilites, who were at the service of Ma’mun, Mu‘tasim and Wathiq, and the Ash‘arites and Ash‘arite-like thinkers after and before them although these caliphs, especially Ma’mun, were considerably different from the caliphs before and after him; but this was mainly due to his better cultured and freethinking character rather than the advise or attention of the Mu‘tazilites around him.5
This applies to the Shi‘ites to a large extent as well. It is difficult to accept that Shi‘ite sultans throughout history were more just and democratic than their Sunni counterparts.6 The desire for justice and administering justice, especially in the Islamic east, which lacked the necessary sociopolitical institutions for the administration of affairs by considering the appropriate interests and requirements rather than personal decisions, was more than anything indebted to their own internal and personal tendencies and to the general conditions of the territories they ruled.
Nevertheless, despite all this, it cannot be denied that the two, i.e. the Mu‘tazilites and especially Shi‘ites and Ash‘arites, were and acted in two different ways in terms of guiding the ruling system to the right way, dethroning it or establishing a just system. In other words, the outcome of belief in justice and the way these two interpreted is shown when standing up against the ruler. One of the most important factors that called the Mu‘tazilites and Shi‘ites to stand up against the tyrants was their understanding of justice.7As such interpretation was principally not considered or believed in by the Ash‘arites, it would not make sense anymore to stand up against the sultan by relying on it. They denied rational agreeableness or disagreeableness and they did not have any criterion beyond the existing factors in order to evaluate what was there.
Therefore, in history, the Mu‘tazilite and especially Shi‘ites have had many justice-seeking movements while similar examples cannot be found with the Ash‘arites, Salafis or Traditionists. What they actually had and have was movements that, according to them, sought to reject heresy and to defend and establish the tradition.8
Indeed, their different understanding and interpretation of justice is not the only factor for this difference. There were other factors as well. Undoubtedly, however, this different perception has had and will have the greatest share. In other words, although the belief in the principle of justice actually did not bring about sociopolitical justice, its acceptance provided the best ground for justice-seeking movements.
The story of justice-seeking and liberal movements throughout the history of Islam is itself the best confirmation of this. Such movements did not exist within the Ash‘arite and Traditionist territories while they were abundant within the Shi‘ite and Mu‘tazilite territories. This relation was so strong and powerful that, in periods in which such tendencies appeared for any reason, the grounds were prepared for Mu‘tazilite thought and especially the Shi‘ite ideology. Although the Shi‘ite ideology was welcomed for reasons beyond its belief in the principle of justice, the belief in this principle had yet a basic role.
It was precisely because of this that the Mu‘tazilites and especially Shi‘ites were attacked by those in power, the clerics and their affiliate propagandists. The ruling oppression prepared the ground for the growth of justice-seeking movements. However, as the dominant religious thought, which was promoted and probably created by the rulers, could not fulfill this need because of its lack of belief in the principle of justice, the revolutionaries had to face and encourage religions that claimed to seek justice.9 As Shi‘ism and Mu‘tazilah were so, attempts were made to give them a bad reputation so as to divert the public opinion from them. This failed indeed. Part of the pessimism among Sunni masses about these two results from the same preventive and counter-propagandist actions.10
What has been said so far was about the theological concept of justice. Now we have to see what its jurisprudential concept was and what results it entailed. In this connection, contrary to the previous one, the Mu‘tazilites are like non-Mu‘tazilites and the difference is between Shi‘ites and non-Shi‘ites.

Jurisprudential Concept of Justice
The fact is that the concept of justice is not jurisprudentially very much different among Shi‘ites and Sunnis. The basic difference is in considering justice as a qualification, most importantly for the communal prayer leader and the Friday communal prayer leader as well as the ruler. Shi‘ites deem justice as a necessary for all of these while Sunnis do not define it as a qualification for the communal prayer leader and the Friday communal prayer leader and only some Sunnis consider the communal prayer leadership of a corrupt and heretic person as religiously undesirable11 as many of them do not consider justice to be a necessary qualification of the ruler either.
What is important in this discussion is the justice of the communal prayer leader and the Friday communal prayer leader because they have differing views on the ruler’s justice. Now let’s see what results this difference entailed.
Prior to entering the discussion, it is necessary to note the special and sensitive position of the communal prayer leader and the Friday communal prayer leader in early Islam. In that time, prayers or Friday communal prayers were socio-politically far more important than they are today. These two, especially the Friday communal prayer, were the key to maintaining Islam, unity, integrity and, finally, stability and security of the society. It indicated the health of thought and belief in the participants and their being on the religion agreed on by the Muslims.12 It showed that the society accepted the order of their emir and ruler and recognized him. It was through this prayer that the rulers, sultans and caliphs were recognized and their power and position would be stabilized and consolidated.
At that time, the cities and the other points of concentrated population were small and had small populations. All the people and especially the men considered it their duty to participate in the public and Friday communal prayers, while this participation was obligatory in many respects.13 Some Sunni jurisprudents consider communal prayers and all Sunni jurisprudents consider Friday communal prayers to be obligatory. Shi‘ite jurisprudents consider participation in Friday communal prayers during the presence of an infallible imam to be obligatory as well. Many of them consider it obligatory even in the absence of an infallible imam if the appropriate conditions are provided. It was, therefore, natural that these two prayers would have a high political value so far so as to become the most important indicator of belief in Islam and unity in the society.14
According to the above points and its sensitivity, who other than the most prominent person, at least apparently the most prominent, could lead it? It would not make sense to give the responsibility for this most important symbol of the community of the believers and the key to the unity and stability of the society to someone other than such a person. The people also did not expect anything other than this. Apart from this, the jurisprudential fundamentals would approve of and reinforce such a current. We had better say that the people’s perception of the communal prayer leader, the Friday communal prayer leader and imamate was in harmony with the appearances of the orders of the shari‘ah.15 The shari‘ah legislator required the most prominent person to be the prayer leader although the meaning of prominence and the application of the most prominent person changed in the later times under the pressure of sociopolitical necessities.
During the Prophet’s (S) time, he led both prayers in Medina or in any other part when he was present. Where he was absent, the prayers would be led by the representative, substitute, emir or ruler that he appointed. After the Prophet (S) passed away, the first caliph led the prayers. This specially helped him on the first days in gaining acceptance for and establishing his caliphate.16 This current continued in this way until the end of the period of the Senior Caliphs and also when the Umayyad took power. 17
For example, concerning the permission of the infallible imam or his special or general substitute for saying the Friday communal prayer and on how to appoint the Friday communal prayer, Muhaqqiq Karki says, “…The principle in this issue, before the consensus, is the agreement of the Muslims to the effect that the Prophet, in his own time, appointed the Friday communal prayers and judges. After the Prophet (S), the caliphs did so. As it is not right for one to be a judge with the imam’s permission, it is also not right to be the Friday communal prayer leader without such permission. This is not reasoning by analogy. It is referring to the continuous practice and opposing it is violating the consensus.”18
As quoted by Pederson, “From the early days of Islam, the ruler also led the prayers. He was the commander of war, head of government and leader of communal prayers. In the same manner, province governors were both in charge of prayers and taxes. He would lead prayers, especially the Friday communal prayers, in which he would deliver sermons. In his absence, the police chief would represent him. However, this changed in the time of the ‘Abbasids and the caliph would not regularly lead the prayers.”19
What existed in the time of the Senior Caliphs was not that problematic. The first two caliphs and their governors would keep the appearances of the shari‘ah although the conditions changed during ‘Uthman’s time, especially in the second half, and people such as Walid ibn ‘Aqabah was appointed as governor—governor of Kufah who stood to pray while drunk, saying four prayer units for the [2-unit] morning prayer, besmearing the altar with the effects of drunkenness.20 However, such cases were rare and ignorable. Imam ‘Ali’s (‘a) time is well-known. Basically, there could be and was no problem in this period.
The problem shows itself seriously from the time of the Umayyad, at which time the justice of the communal and Friday communal prayer leader is overshadowed, interpreted and justified by the realities and necessities. It is gradually reduced to a level that is forgotten.
The heritage of the Prophet (S) and the Senior Caliphs required that the caliph and his representatives and governors would lead the communal and Friday communal prayers. The caliphs would not be content with less than this, not because they sought to enforce the Prophet’s (S) tradition and that of the Senior Caliphs but because failing to do so would contradict their rule, establishment and legality. They wanted to be in power and to govern and this could be achieved if the one in power would lead the communal and Friday communal prayers as well. Thus, they led both of the prayers.
It was a necessity at this time. According to the history sources relating to those days, the Umayyads were not so willing to lead prayers, especially on Fridays because the Friday communal prayer leader had to give sermons while this was difficult for them to do. In this regard, Goldziher says, “Delivering sermons was not easy for Umayyad caliphs but they consented to do it so as to remind the people that they were in charge. ‘Abdu’l-Malik was asked, “Why do you have a white beard at this early age?” “How do you expect me not to,” he replied, “While I have to deliver a sermon once a week and expose my thoughts to be judged by the others.”21
Reluctance to deliver sermons was not limited to the Umayyad caliphs only. Their province governors did not like to do it either. Even an eloquent person such as ‘Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad would consider it as an impediment to the pleasure of governing.22 Another emir told the people, “Before becoming the emir, Friday was the best of my days while nowadays it is the worst because I have to deliver sermons.”23
On the other hand, the problem was that the Muslims had to take part in regular and Friday communal prayers. Both the previous customs required this and the religious texts recommended it. It was a shar‘i obligation. Indeed, it has to be added that, from the early days and even in the Prophet’s (S) time, the people were asked to take part in regular and Friday communal prayers and those who refused to do so would be severely punished.24 The point was not that an individual, by refusing to take part in a communal or Friday communal prayer would be a sinner by violating an obligation, the more important thing was that he could not do so. He was forced to do so because such non-participation would be deemed as an entire or partial rejection of the accepted religion by the believers or as rejection of the present government or denying its legality or compulsory obedience of it. No ruler, especially the oppressive Umayyad rulers, would bear such a thing.25

Denying the Justice Qualification
Considering these conditions, what way was there other than denying justice as a condition for qualification of communal and Friday communal prayer leaders. The most committed individual in the Umayyad dynasty, other than ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz, who was an exceptional person, was Mu‘awiyah himself. However, his behavior was different from the minimum consideration of which was necessary according to the shari‘ah legislator and was practiced by the earlier caliphs. He went so far as to say prayers different in form from what the Prophet (S) and the Senior Caliphs read—He is the first person to deliver a Friday sermon while sitting.26
The caliphs after him and his governors were in more inappropriate conditions, so much so as if they were absolutely unfamiliar with the religion and did not think of anything other than ruling and pleasures. They had the power and would lead the regular and Friday communal prayers and the people had to say their prayers with them. Now the problem was if such prayers were separate or not. This is other than if the regular and Friday communal prayer leaders were qualified to lead prayers and principally what such qualifications were. Is justice or not committing sins or at least not persisting on committing sins one of these qualifications or not? Is it possible to take as prayer leader a corrupt tyrant who commits any crime? If yes, is the prayer of those standing behind him accepted?
The only solution was to deny the qualification of justice. Indeed, if a development had occurred at a time when the Umayyads entered the scene, no interrelation would have been established between the governance and legality of the ruler and the regular and Friday communal prayer leadership. Most probably, justice would have not been denied in this case, like in the case of the judge and witness. However, such a development did not occur and, therefore, they had to interpret and justify the issue to a certain extent as to the qualifications of regular and Friday communal prayer leaders, so as to deny the justice qualification in practice or at least reduce the issue to reluctance in saying prayers behind a corrupt tyrant.27
Indeed, Shi‘ites did not face such a problem. They considered the Umayyads to be illegal usurpers and did not have to accept those conditions and obligations. Consequently, they did not have to face such interpretations and justifications. Apart from this, the texts of the divine decrees they accepted, which had been passed to them through the Infallible Imams, explicitly defined justice as one of the qualifications of the regular and Friday communal prayer leaders;28 although this does not mean that the Shi‘ites never took part in regular and Friday communal prayers in the past. They took part in these prayers and generally deemed their prayers as accepted. In their view, in certain cases such prayers were accepted as well as worthy of being highly rewarded. 29 However, such religious rewards and such pious deeds had their own special reasons. It was not, for example, because they considered the justice qualification unnecessary for a regular or Friday communal prayer leader.
The fact is that Sunnis’ failure to accept the justice qualification and Shi‘ites’ accepting of it affected the development of the jurisprudential and theological structures of the two, their sociopsychological structure and ideological and religious sensitivities more than it seems in the beginning. Not accepting this condition meant recognizing the present condition and whatever related to it, although there were other factors involved. Yet, this was the most important, effective and finally the most critical factor.
Although the Sunni jurisprudential and theological structure is so that the ruler’s obedience is compulsory,30 the problem is if the Sunni masses throughout the history accepted the rulers as legal only because of these reasons. The complex theological discussions and the arguments in jurisprudence were and are far above the average level of culture of the masses. It was not through familiarity with these discussions that they accepted to obey the rulers. Principally, such discussions did not have a role in their religious perception and understanding. Their understanding and perception were too simple and limited to digest these ideas.

Importance of Denying the Justice Qualification
In other words, the problem is not simply what the natural and logical requirement of the Sunni jurisprudential and theological structure is. More importantly is which part of this large collection exists in their thought, mind, faith and belief, i.e. what the perception of the mass of the people is of this collection, what its limits are and what the interrelations of the various components are. What is living and effective is this understanding and perception and it is the same that play a role in the society and on the scene of the history. Although such religious perception changes to a certain extent in any time and condition depending on the conditions, there are generally fixed elements in the changes which are affected by the fixed principles and fundamentals of the religion itself.
The most tangible, understandable and routine part of the religious faith of a Muslim was and is the prayers. Considering the fact that, in the early periods, the Muslims said their prayers always communally and took part in Friday communal prayers and that these prayers were always led by the caliphs, their representatives or emirs, and, to the people, such leading symbolized the government, legality and religious acceptability of the caliph or ruler. Is it not that the justice qualification has the most important share in accepting the ruler and the present condition and in legalizing his position?
This is truer especially in the early centuries when the people were obliged to take part in regular and Friday communal prayers and those in power and even the regular were more sensitive to the participation of the various walks of life and to the emirs who led the prayers, at least on Fridays. However, later, when such obligation and sensitivity were attenuated, the prayers were led by people other than the emirs, who were generally and rather entirely appointed directly or indirectly by them.31 However, the effects of this current, especially before such attenuation occurred, affected the jurisprudential and theological structure and the psycho religious structure of the Muslims.
It was not important here to accept the ruler’s governance when accepting his prayer leadership. More important than that was the thought based on which the leadership of the corrupt tyrant was allowed. Such a thought permeated the other aspects and resulted in deeming as acceptable saying prayers behind such individuals and even paying the alms and religious tax to them and going on hajj pilgrimages and jihads with them. Even a cautious pious person like Ibn Hanbal got to a point as to say, “Jihad along with emirs is allowed until the day of resurrection whether they are just or unjust and they may distribute the spoils of war and enforce punishments.
No one may make sarcastic remarks about or fight them. It is allowed to pay alms to them and one who gives alms to them, whether they are good people or not, has done his duty. It is allowed to say prayers behind them and one who violates this is heretic and has abandoned the tradition of the Prophet (S). If one does not believe that prayers behind emirs, whether the latter are just or corrupt, are religiously allowed, he has not understood the good aspects of Friday communal prayers. The tradition is that you have to say two units of prayer behind them and believe that it is a perfect prayer without having the smallest doubt about this.”32
Now we will examine what the thought was and where its root was. The main origin of this thought, which was relied on for verifying the truth of affairs, was that such things as prayer, religious tax and jihad are inherently good and desirable and the shari‘ah legislator has ordered them. The important thing is to perform them rather than the way in which they are performed. The important thing is that the obligated person has to fulfill his duties according to the rules defined by the shari‘ah legislator and it is not important with whom the act is performed.
The important thing is to say the regular and Friday communal prayers and for the Muslims to participate therein. It is not important who leads them. What is important is not to give up the duty of jihad, it does not matter under whose command and with what motivation it is done. What is important is to pay alms and religious tax as part of religious fees but it does not matter to whom they are given, whether the one to whom it is given is a corrupt roué or not, and for what purposes they are used.
This is thus explained by Hasan Basri where he intends to account for the acceptability of the prayer of one whose prayer is led by a hypocrite, “The believer’s prayer behind a hypocrite will not harm him and the hypocrite’s prayer behind a believer will not benefit him.”33 He expresses, more explicitly than ‘Abdullah bin ‘Umar, “Prayer is good. I do not mind who will be my partner in performing it.”34
Ibn Hazm says in this regard, “We do not know any Companion who refused to say his prayer behind Mukhtar, ‘Ubaydullah ibn Ziyad, Hajjaj or any person more corrupt than them. God says, ‘Cooperate on good deeds and do not cooperate on sin and enmity.’ There is no good thing better than the prayer and saying it in mosques. Then it is forbidden for us to help it. The same is true about fasting, hajj and jihad. We will accompany the one who calls us to them and we will not accept the invitation of and will not help the one who calls us to sin. These are the views of Abu Hanifah, Shafi‘i and Abu Sulayman.”35
Ibn Qudamah, who is one of the great Hanbalite jurisprudents, says, “It is obligatory for Muslims to participate in communal prayers on Friday and the Two Feasts even if the prayer leader is corrupt, a roué or heretic because the duties are Islamic rites that the rulers of Muslims perform. Then, failing to perform the prayers behind them will result in the prayers being abandoned.”36
1. A practical example of this way of thinking can be seen in Ibn ‘Arabi, Al-‘Awasim min al-Qawasim, and especially the footnotes of Muhibb ad-Din Khatib. These two provide a justification for and interpret the wrong actions of those whom they intend to defend. Actually, they consider only the reality and not anything beyond it as the criterion. According to them, justice is what existed rather than a superior concept according to which the existing situation has to be evaluated.
Compare with the way Mu‘awiyah is introduced by Ziyad and that his actions were political and for the maintenance of power; Al-Jawhar an-Nafis fi Siyasah ar-Ra’is, p. 73.
For example, while defending Mu‘awiyah on his ordering the killing of Hajar ibn ‘Uday—which aroused the objection of all even that of ‘A’ishah (‘Ali wa Banuh, p. 219)—Ibn ‘Arabi says, “If you say that his killing is injustice, unless it is proved to be right for a reason, we will say, ‘The principle is that the killing is right and the one who claims that it was wrong has to prove his claim. If it was wrong then all the people have to curse Mu‘awiyah while in Baghdad, which is the center of the ‘Abbasid caliphate, whose rivalry with the Umayyad is known to all, it is written on mosque doors, ‘The best of the people after the Prophet (S) is Abu Bakr and then ‘Umar and then ‘Uthman and then ‘Ali and then Mu‘awiyah.’” p. 213.
2. The theoretical example of this perception can be found in the works and views of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn Qayyim and Ibn Hanbal. As-Siyasah ash-Shar‘iyyah, pp. 10, 21; A‘lam al-Mawqi‘in, vol. 3, pp. 3-6; Al-Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah. Also see endnote 54 to the previous chapter.
3. Al-Mawaqif fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, p. 323.
4. For further explanations, see the introduction to Min al-‘Aqidah ila’th-Thawrah, vol. 1, pp. 3, 41.
5. See Amir H. Saddiqi, Caliphate and Kingship, pp. 2-5.
6. This is approved by Shi‘ites as well. See Ash-Shi‘ah wa’l-Ḥakimun, pp. 7-8, and also Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i, pp. 268-71.
7. For example, see the actions of Ghaylan Damashqi, who, based on a concept different from the Umayyad interpretation, called the people of Armenia to rise up. Dhikr Bab al-Mu‘tazilah, pp. 16-17, and also the justice-seeking risings of Shi‘ites and the Mu‘tayelites.; Al-Intifadat ash-Shi‘ah, pp. 97-110.
8. To find out about the sensitivities of dogmatic Sunnis concerning the ideal ruler and ruling system and that there was no place therein for justice, see Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, p. 438, and also Tabaqat al-Hanabilah, vol. 2, p. 31, and concerning how a hard-hearted tyrannical roué such as Mutawakkil is praised simply on the ground that, in their view, he resisted heresy. The praise is one like that given to the first caliph and ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz.
9. The fact is that the infleucne of Shi‘ite views on a pressurized and suffocated society like ours is more than the influence of Sunni views as the latter does not benefit anyone other than the existing ruling system. Min al-‘Aqidah ila’th-Thawrah, vol. 1, p. 26.
10. Concerning the blaming of the Mu‘tazilites and how the founders of Sunni belief view them, see Tabaqat al-Hnabilah, vol. 2, pp. 30-1, and also Al-Ibanah ‘an Usul ad-Diyanah, pp. 13-16.
11. Fiqh as-Sunnah, vol. 1, pp. 209-10, Al-Mahalli, vol. 4, pp. 213-4. You can find the elaborate account in Bidayah al-Mujtahid wa Nihayah al-Muqtasid, vol. 1, pp. 147-8.
12. For example, see how he sets forth and asks the questions from Imam Baqir concerning attending the communal prayers. Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 5, p. 381, saying no. 5 and also saying no. 8, p. 377; Ibid., and also Mustadrak Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 6, p. 457.
13. The Hanbalites consider it obligatory to take part in communal prayers. See Al-Fiqh ‘ala’l-Madhahib al-Arba‘ah, vol. 1, p. 375. The Formists consider communal prayer participation obligatory for those who have the relevant conditions. Bidayah al-Mujtahid, vol. 1, p. 143.
14. You can find the rejection of the arguments of opponents of permission of Friday communal prayers in the time of Occultation in Jami‘ al-Maqasid, vol. 2, pp. 74-380. Also see Salat al-Jumu‘ah by Haydar ibn al-Mawla Muhammad al-Dizfuli, as commented on by Shaykh Ansari, and Risalah Salat al-Jumu‘ah by Muhaqqiq Karki in Rasa’il Muhaqqiq Karki, vol. 1, pp. 117-40.
15. Kanz al-‘Ummal, vol. 7, pp. 581-2.
16. It was because of Abu Bakr’s leading the prayers that people like Hasan Basri, Ibn Hazm and a group of the Traditionists said that his caliphate had been explicitly advised by the Prophet (S). Ma‘alim al-Khilafah fi’l-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami, p. 133.
17. For further explanation, see Al-Badr az-Zahir fi Salat al-Jumu‘ah wa’l-Musafir, pp. 6-8.
18. Al-Muhaqqiq al-Karki, Rasail, vol. 1, p. 144.
19. Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 350.
20. Al-Imamah wa’s-Siyasah, vol. 1, p. 34; Fiqh as-Sunnah, vol. 1, p. 209.
21. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, p. 50.
22. ‘Uyun al-Akhbar, vol. 2, p. 282.
23. Ibid., p. 281.
24. That the Prophet (S) blamed and even threatened those who refused to attend regular and Friday communal prayers has been cited by Shi‘ites as well as Sunnis. See Kanz al-‘Ummal, vol. 7. For the necessity of attending the communal prayers, see pp. 581-2, for attending Friday communal prayers, see pp. 728-33. Similar to the contents of these sayings are sayings 6, 9, 10 in Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 5, pp. 376-7, and can also be found in Jami‘ al-Madarik, vol. 1, p. 489 cite from Ash-Shahadat in Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah.
25. In this respect, the ‘Abbasids were like the Umayyads. They had allocated exclusively to themselves all that concerned regular and Friday communal prayers. “One of the most important symbols of religious mastery of the ‘Abbasid caliph was that a drum was played in front of his house at the times of the five prayers so as to announce the time while no one else, even the crown princes, were allowed to have a drum beaten in front of their house, so that no body could share this symbol of mastery with the caliph.” Muhammad Safar az-Zahrani, Nizam al-Wizarah fi’d-Dawlah al-‘Abbasiyyah, p. 26, cited by Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, vol. 7, p. 92.
26. Fiqh as-Sunnah, vol. 1, p. 272. The author thus quotes Sha‘bi as saying, “At a time, Mu‘awiyah grew fat and had a protuberant belly, then he delivered the sermon while sitting.” Cf. Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 5, p. 31, saying 1.
27. Concerning the corrupt heretic imamate and the view of each of the four branches of the religion, see Al-Fiqh ‘ala’l-Madhahib al-Arba‘ah, vol. 1, p. 429.
28. See Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 5, chapter on non-permission of praying behind a corrupt person, pp. 392-5.
29. Wasa’il ash-Shi‘ah, vol. 5, pp. 381-2.
30. For example, see Al-Fasl fi’l-Milal wa’l-Hawa wa’l-Nihal, vol. 4, p. 87, and also A‘lam al-Mawqi‘in, vol. 1, p. 48.
31. Al-Badr az-Zahir, pp. 7-8, and also Min al-‘Aqidah ila’th-Thawrah, vol. 1, pp. 22-3, which critically studies how a regular or Friday communal prayer leader is appointed by the sultan and the mutual relations of the two.
32. Al-A’immah al-Arba‘ah, vol. 4, pp. 119-20.
33. Al-Mahalli, vol. 4, p. 214.
34. Ibid., p. 213.
35. Ibid., p. 214.
36. Mu‘jam al-Fiqh al-Hanbali, Part II, p. 575, and also Al-Ibanah ‘an Usul ad-Diyanah, p. 23.