The the Ottoman Caliphate

By: Dr. Muhammad Masjid-Jame‘i
The history of the thought of an Islamic government and the attempts to establish it within the Sunni territory goes back to the fall of the Ottoman caliphate. From the early days of the expansion of Islam to the fall of the Ottomans, the Islamic laws ruled the Muslim territories in practice. More importantly, the existence of a caliph in the following periods of the history of Islam was a great religious and spiritual support that calmed the Muslims and reminded to them that the Islamic rules and standards flow in all the aspects of their lives and that they have practiced their duties.
According to Suyuti, throughout the history of Islam before the fall of the Ottomans, Muslims lacked a caliph only for a period of three years.122 Other than this brief period, there was always a caliph in some part of the Muslim World. This in itself rejected the thought of lack of an Islamic government and no one, therefore, thought of establishing one. Apart from this, the existence of the caliph responded to the religious obligation of having a caliph, following his orders and swearing allegiance to him because, according to them, any Muslim had to be under an oath of allegiance to a caliph and imam. Otherwise, they would die as if before Islam.123
Here the problem was not political dependence. It was a form of religious obedience and allegiance. Otherwise, they had to live under the political control and influence of a caliph. Since the late 18th century, when the Ottoman caliphate descended to a weak position, Muslims in general did not have a caliph based in Istanbul. More importantly, he was not anymore considered the most powerful Islamic power to be proud of. However, despite lack of political hegemony, his religious position was recognized and the people had performed a great duty by paying or swearing allegiance to him.124

Fall of the Ottoman Caliphate
The Ottoman caliphate was overthrown in 1924 by the Young Turks. This was an unexpected dizzy blow. The Muslims everywhere felt that they lost their support and one of the most important divine duties had no longer been done. They could not imagine living without a caliph and at the same time being a true Muslim. To evaluate the excitement and emotion that the fall of the Ottomans entails, for example, see the poems of Shawqi, the prominent Egyptian poet of that time.125
It would be appropriate here to mention some of the developments following the termination of the caliphate in the Muslim World and especially in Egypt.
“One of the well-known events of Egypt at that time was the formation of a permanent assembly as ‘the General Islamic Assembly for Formation of Caliphate’, which published a magazine known as As-Khilafat al-Islamiyyah. The goal of the conference was to appoint one of the kings in the Islamic countries as the caliph.”126
Other than the activities of this assembly and its magazine, many scientific circles and newspapers contained the religious discussions relating to the imamate and the caliphate. As a result of these attempts, they mentioned or rather definitely said that, with the termination of the Ottoman caliphate by Ata Turk, Islam had been eliminated in Islamic countries and all Muslims are sinners until they pledge allegiance to another caliph. This sin would have worldly as well as otherworldly punishments which would soon occur… They also mentioned that, because of removal of the caliphate, they had returned to the Ignorance Period and those who die in such a state would die as if they had died in the pre-Islamic Ignorance Period.
Many magazines published numerous articles and fatwas in this respect, saying, “It is necessary for all to appoint an imam at this time as in the other times. All Muslims are sinners so long as they have not appointed an imam who can unify them and they will be punished in the world with what the people of insight know and, in the afterworld, they will be punished with what God knows… Those whom we have to follow are not Muslims, unless they have an imam whom has pledged allegiance been to voluntarily… The imam of Muslims heads their government and the Muslims have to serve his glory, power and splendor.”127
After the caliphate, some Muslim thinkers and clerics considered for a while to revive it, as Rashid Rida theorized, “As much as the Islamic forces of this time can”.128 However, they did not manage to do this for numerous reasons. Revival of caliphate at that time, despite in other times, that if the caliphate had been removed, it would have been restarted somewhere else, was not subject only to the decision of the Muslims. At that time, the foreigners had a critical and effective influence and would not remain indifferent to such a current.
Apart from this, a generation of new educated people had risen who were in sensitive sociopolitical positions. They thought similarly to the Young Turks in this regard and, not only did they not intend to return to the caliphate, but they would also oppose it as much as possible. For example, Muhammad Hasanayn Hiykal, the well-known Egyptian politician writer was among them. At that time, he defended the thoughts of ‘Abdu’r-Razzaq, whose book was published immediately after fall of the caliphate, and attacked his critics and harshly criticized those who worked to revive the caliphate. He wrote in this regard, “What could one say about an Islamic cleric who seeks a caliphate for the Muslims at a time when any Muslim king wishes to be the caliph.”129
Smith, who studies the mutual relations of Islam and the contemporary developments in Egypt in the light of Muhammad Hasanayn Hiykal’s biography, says, “Everybody was under the influence of the political events and socioeconomic developments of Egypt of that time. Everybody was to a certain degree under the influence of the modernists of the 1920’s and wanted to limit Islam and the power of Muslim authorities. Such actions were reflected in ‘Abdu’r-Razzaq’s book, Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, and in Taha Husayn’s Ash-Shu‘ara’ li-Jahili.”130
Nevertheless, many, occasionally honest, attempts of many of the believers in the religious necessary of the caliphate failed. The caliphate was terminated and attempts to revive it were futile. The Muslims, despite their tendencies and beliefs, accepted that it was not possible to revive it although some of those in power at that time in Islamic countries were tempted to nominate themselves for the position, yet such temptations did not last long and were replaced by realism, and the thought was entirely forgotten.131
With the weakening of this trend, another trend appeared and grew, which was the thought of an Islamic government, which, to many clerics and religious intellectuals, meant nothing but the same Islamic caliphate and its continuation.132 Before the fall of the caliphate, this thought was not that comprehensible. The previous caliphs and sultans, although corrupt, were not against the religion as it existed among the people. Their interests on many occasions even required them to promote the religion. So long as there was no significant foreign or domestic factor against the religious reality of the society, everything was in a form of harmony with and in compatibility to the religion and the religious heritage.
However, in the modern history, everything had evolved. The scientific, intellectual and industrial developments, the opening of the closed religious society, the backward society, foreign hegemony, direct or indirect dependence of those in power and influential people on the colonialists created new conditions, as if the religion was under pressure and attack from all directions. The problem was not just that the Ottoman caliphate, as the last sociopolitical and military symbol of the Islamic society had collapsed. More importantly, the situation had entirely changed and the Muslims truly believed that all that they had was threatened by these events.133
In such conditions, eyes were directed towards a new concept, which was the Islamic government. Indeed, it was not a new concept but its realization, as it occurred in middle of the present century and its manifestation as a politico-religious ideal was a new issue. It soon had numerous supporters in different classes and, in the absence of an acceptable, deeply rooted and unanimously agreed on political ideal, it became the most important ideal of the Islamic societies. In the meanwhile, numerous other developments and events occurred, all of which contributed to the acceptability and expansion of this trend.134

Influence of Western Laws
Along with this trend, the western laws rapidly extended in Islamic countries. This had indeed nothing to do with the termination of the caliphate. Even if the Ottoman caliphate continued, the western laws would have entered Islamic countries and even to Turkey itself, as it had already done. This resulted from the entire conditions of those days not from the fall of the Ottoman caliphate, although some thought of these two as relevant.135
At this time, Muslims in all Islamic societies had crept into their closed society. The rapid pace of the developments and pressure of the time along with backwardness and desperation had put them in a passive position and pushed them towards passive resistance. Those who denied or opposed the religion or had claims for the western culture, laws and value system were, in practice, the only ones who ran the society without facing any opponent or opposition. No one could help resist the new trend and its advocates.136
In such conditions, it was natural that the legal system and even the constitution in Islamic countries would be formed and reconstructed in the light of western laws. As the entry of Islamic countries in general into modern history coincided with the expansion of liberal thoughts and tendencies, the first thing that attracted attention was to develop laws and a constitution. Where could the laws be adopted from other than western sources?137
This requires further explanation. Throughout their history, Muslims, like many other Third-Worlders, constantly suffered from the tyranny of their rulers. The most important aspect of tyrants is breaking laws and not bowing to or recognizing any rule or law. In such conditions, the new developments began and eyes and ears were opened. All of a sudden, they found out that they lived in the worst sociopolitical conditions and in the utmost decadent backward conditions.
Indeed the top intellectuals had an undeniable role in arousing this feeling and reinforcing it.
By formally comparing their society to the developed societies of that time, they had reached the conclusion that their backwardness was rooted in political tyranny and that it occured in the lack of a legal system. Therefore, they promoted liberalism as much as they could and they considered the developing of a constitution and the other laws as the only way to achieve it. The problem, in their opinion, was entirely due to the rule of tyranny and lack of freedom, and the cure was naturally the western laws.138
This was perhaps one of the most inappropriate choices that the Islamic societies could make, which would entail various complications. Right now, we do not intend to say why it was inappropriate. What matters is that a flood of new laws began to flow without there being proper grounds for them, while the Muslims, at least in this respect did not face any shortage. Although there were no well-compiled laws at that time, at least the sources were there, which are the same Islamic jurisprudence and laws, and they could easily get help from and be inspired by them for their various needs, as this happed in some Islamic countries.139
The first serious experience in modern history in Islamic countries, however, began through the modernization of the legal and legislative system. As we have already pointed out, this happened in the absence of committed Muslims. In those days, they were in a state of numbness and fear, had left the scene and, when they regained balance, they found out that they had to bow to new laws that were in many cases against their religious principles and fundamentals.
It would be appropriate here to quote part of the views of William Shepherd on how the Muslims entered the contemporary history, “It was through military events that for the first time the leaders of Muslim societies faced changes, such as the British conquests in the 18th and early 19th centuries in India and the defeats of the Ottomans by the Russians in the 1768-74 wars, although the Ottomans’ awareness of the westerners’ military superiority had made them take limited actions in order to westernize their society in the early periods of the same century. In a place such as the Ottoman Empire, it was the military issues that entailed reformist attempts. However, when these reforms began, they could not be limited to what the leaders had chosen them to be.”140
He goes on to say, “If Christian theology sought to understand God’s nature and actions in this world, the Muslim jurisprudents sought to understand God’s will and the divine laws and shari‘ah, which would define the behavioral duties of all people. It was because of this that modernization attempts are mainly in legal fields and for sociopolitical institutions rather than on issues concerning theology. In the Muslim world, one cannot see anything similar to the great doubts that Darwinism aroused in the Western World although the picture of the creation as provided by the Qur’an is similar to that provided by the Holy Book.141”
It is exactly from this point that the seed of the ideology of Islamic movements in the Sunni World was planted. As we have already said, Sunni jurisprudential and theological structure and historical experiences were not as if to allow opposing a Muslim ruler that pretended to believe in Islam. The ultimate apposition was not to bow to him in one’s heart, distance oneself from him and not to serve him. The most extreme form was to object in words about his vices and note his deviations, heresy or tyranny.
However, for various reasons, it was not allowed to stand up against the ruler and the ruling system and to take political or military action. From this point of view, the problem of objecting to the ruling system was not solvable. The new period, by offering laws other than those of Islam and by making them rule, opened a new door for objecting to the ruler and all the contemporary Sunni religious movements benefited from it. This was a way out and would allow them to live and go on with their activities.142

Conformity to the Shari‘ah
In their view, there was no place in an Islamic country for non-Islamic laws. Everyone had to accept Islamic laws and it was merely these laws that had to rule. Working for the promotion of this cause was a great undisputable and unchangeable duty. This is the concept that was later suggested as ‘the conformity to the shari‘ah’, which attracted the thoughts and minds of committed Sunni revolutionaries and justified the moves that had begun with this motivation.143
Genuine Sunni Islamic movements in the second half of the recent century in the Sunni World have all been formed with the same motive and goal. According to them, the Islamic government, i.e. a government in which Islamic laws rule, means Islamicizing, i.e. applying the Islamic laws in all aspects of individual and collective lives and making them rule in the society. This is a thought that is in itself a reform but not a revolution against the ruling system. It is one against the present laws. Its goal is to change laws not the ruler, and if the ruler does not accept this, he has to be obeyed. If he stands beside these laws and wants to defend them against the people, then a fatwa may be issued for countering such a person.144
The principle is to Islamicize the society by Islamicizing its legal system rather than by Islamicizing it by changing its political rule. The problem is that the ruler should accept such a change and, preferably, take such an action on his own. From this point of view, regimes such as the Sau‘dis or the other regimes in the 80’s, when the Islamic movements were at their peaks in the contemporary era, began to conform to the shari‘ah, as in Pakistan under Diya’ al-Haqq, Sudan under Numayri, Egypt under Sadat, and in many sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf.145
Such a way of thinking in the past four or five decades, when non-Islamic laws ruled absolutely, although a reformist thought was considered to be a revolutionary thought at that time. Now that the conditions have changed entirely and the psychology, wishes and religious ideals of the young people have changed, this thought cannot respond to their passion for change and struggle. They need something far beyond this limited and somehow conservative capacity. They require the rule of Islamic values in all aspects not the rule of Islamic laws in the appearances of the social life, which the shari‘ah deals with. The utter dead end of the present Islamic movement in the Sunni World is in this same point. The only door that was opened to them in their jurisprudential and theological thought is too limited to respond to the serious needs of the present generation.146
It is because of this limitation that thinkers of the new Islamic movements in general, from Sayyid Qutb to ‘Utaybi and ‘Abdu’s-Salam Faraj, have provided interpretations and justifications that are entirely strange to Sunni principles, beliefs and consensus. They have tried to resort to witnesses in the Qur’an, the tradition and fatwas of some clerics of the past, on the top of whom are Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim, to provide an ideology that can religiously legalize and even necessitate fighting the ruling system and even establishing a new system. If great Sunni scholars consider these thoughts and theories with doubt, so much so that they liken their founders, claimers and supporters to the Rebels, it is not because of conservatism or seeking a comfortable life. It is because of believing in the principles and foundations of Sunni jurisprudence and theology, unanimously agreed on.147
They truly say that, by considering the Qur’an, the tradition and the practice of the Companions and the good people of the past, which the Sunnis have understood and practiced in the past, one cannot accept such theories. These theories are far beyond the most extremist true interpretations of the Qur’an, the tradition and the practice of the Companions. Although there may be others in the meanwhile that say such a thing because of bad intentions and having certain dependences and may even promote that it is practically so—in which respect the Sau‘dis and the clerics supporting them are the great claimers of this thought at present—this is true without regard to who has said it and with what intentions.148
Apart from these issues, which are theoretical anyway, there are other issues as well. We have already said that the differences of Shi‘ite and Sunni movements, especially in contemporary history, are not ideological differences. There is also a difference in their sociopsychological structure, with each of them having created theoretical specifications of their own in a different sociopsychological structure. This difference is the product of centuries of differently experiencing two different ideologies. Any great extensive movement in any of the two would naturally be strongly influenced by these different structures. Because of this, one should not expect the manifestations and emergence of the two movements to be the same merely on the grounds that they are both Islamic. It is true that both are Islamic movements and seek to establish the rule of Islam, yet the problem is that two different interpretations of Islam have influenced their past and is still influencing them today.149
Sunni Islamic and revolutionary problems and dead ends are, on the one hand, rooted in the jurisprudential and theological limitations of this religious branch for fighting the ruling power and, on the other hand, in the rapid developments that have led the new Islamist generation in some Islamic countries to embrace challenging thoughts and methods. These limitations and this rapid pace made it impossible for Sunni religious clergies and intellectuals to move side by side with them.150
Indeed, a great part of this was due to the pressures of the ruling governments on scientific and religious centers, eliminating their dependence and employing them forcefully. Those in power in Sunni countries in general, especially in Arab countries which are the base for extensive self-motivated religious movements, from Tunisia and Morocco to Egypt, Syria, Arabia and Yemen, have constantly attempted in recent decades to take control of scientific and religious centers with such claims as modernizing the educational system. However, the result of these developments was not just their being put at their service. More important than that was that they gave up their scientific depth and comprehensiveness and religious authenticity while this was something contrary to the needs of the time. Responding to religious, scientific and moral needs requires living in the time and comprehending the time while also requiring depth and genuineness. Those who are strange to the great Islamic heritage in various grounds will certainly not be able to provide an appropriate response to the needs of the time.151
These problems showed themselves from the mid-60’s and were intensified by the proper conditions in the 70’s, while culminating after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The main problem was arriving in a new interpretation of Islam that would guide them in their struggle and tell them what to do in order to make an Islamic society and how to fight. They rose to action in the absence of a well-informed scientific and religious authority that they could trust. However, the problem was that, firstly, they knew little, and, secondly, they had already made their decision as to what they wanted and what they had to do. Their little knowledge served to respond to a question that had already been answered. The purpose was to get confirmation for the response.152
In such conditions, naturally the answer could not be completely Islamic. It was more Islamic-based than of an Islamic nature. However, as the responses were in general harmony to the psychological, intellectual and doctrinal needs of the young people and the students, they were rapidly and intensively absorbed and deemed as strictly Islamic solutions. This, however, had two basic problems and could not resist the ups and downs to survive. The resistance of an ideology, especially revolutionary and military ideologies, against the current of events depends on their commitment to the adopted principles, on their internal coherence and harmony and their ability in solving the new problems and dead ends, while the latter is indebted to the first two former characteristics. These newly-founded ideologies lacked such characteristics.
103. The fact is that, other than the mentioned factors, there was another religious factor that would bring the clergy closer to the Safavid. The Safavid themselves were Sufis and had Sufi attitudes. It was with their help and devotion that they took the power and, therefore, they appreciated the Prophet (S) and his family. Many Shi‘ite clerics in that time used this interest to convert them to Shi‘ism. Their approach was for carrying out this task. It appears that Shaykh Baha’i and his father were among these clerics.
104. The story of the persistence of this fatwa and its consequences can be found in the magazine Turathuna, no. 6, pp. 38-41, and in Al-Fusul al-Muhimmah fi Ta’lif al-Ummah, pp. 143-7. To find other examples, see the same magazine, pp. 32-61.
105. Turathuna, no. 6, p. 40.
106. Tahawwul wa Thubat (Development and Stability), pp. 161-5.
107. An example of the perception of the clerics about the intellectuals of those days, which indicates their reality as well, can be found in these words of Sayyid Jamaluddin, “These atheists are not like the atheists of Europe because one who abandons the religion in western countries will still remain a patriot and his zeal to defend his country against foreigners will not be affected and he will be ready to give his life for the interests of his country but Ahmad Khan and his advocates, along with their propaganda for the people to abandon their religion, have made the people indifferent to their country and prepare them to accept foreign domination and try to wipe off any religious or national determination… not for being highly rewarded but for having a mean life and mean benefits. This is how an eastern atheist can be identified from a western atheist, i.e. meanness and humiliation after heresy and infidelity.” Al-‘Urwah al-Wuthqa, pp. 572-5, quoted from Al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith Waslatuh bi’l-Isti‘mar al-Gharbi, p. 43. Al-Minar, issue of 13 April 1925, p. 31, quoting from Muhammad ‘Amarah’s introduction to Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, pp. 8-9. Concerning the excitement after the fall of caliphate and the supports for the assembly, see ibid., pp. 7-14.
108. Idi’uluzhi wa Inqilab (Ideology and Revolution), pp. 15-164.
109. Ibid., pp. 169-184.
110. In the sociopolitical developments of the Shi‘ite history, the epic of Ashura has been of the utmost importance. This is truer about our time. In the Shi‘ite World, at least in Iran, in the contemporary history there has always been a need for revolutionary thoughts and solutions for changing the political destiny.
For example, the unclear stance of Malik ibn Anas towards Muhammad Nafs Zakiyyah is very likely due to this same point. The people of Medina wanted to support Muhammad, but they had already sworn allegiance to Mansur. Malik said that an allegiance could not be achieved with reservations. Therefore, the Medina people surrounded Muhammad, as a result of which Malik was beaten on the orders of the emir of Medina, so badly that his shoulder blade was broken.
However, despite all these, when he was asked about the permission of rising up against the ruler, he said, “If it is an uprising against ‘Umar ibn ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz, it is not allowed.” In another citation, ‘it is not allowed’ has been replaced by ‘God kill them, and if it is not an uprising against a person like him, let God take revenge on him through another tyrant, and then both will be taken revenge on.” Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i, p. 321. To find other examples of the resistance of the cleric scholars against the wishes of the rulers, see Al-Islam bayn al-‘Ulama’ wa’l-Hakimun, pp. 104-222.
One of the people introduced by the author is Sa‘id ibn Musayyib. He resisted ‘Abdu’l-Malik, who wanted to take allegiance for both his children, Walid and Sulayman at the same time, saying, “The Prophet (S) had prohibited double allegiance.” He suffered much torture for this but did not submit. Adopting such positions against the sultan is essentially different from the position that, for example, Imam Husayn adopted against Yazid or Zayd ibn ‘Ali against Hisham. Almost none of the Sunni scholars have admitted unacceptability of rulers whose wishes they resisted. At the most, they would refuse to accept his demand.
111. For example, Al-Islam bayn al-‘Ulama’ wa’l-Hakimun, pp. 115-32. However, what mattered was that Shi‘ites and Sunnis have more or less different interpretations of the duty of a religious scholar. This difference is mainly or rather entirely due to their position against the ruler and that they should not remain silent against his tyranny and corruption. For example, compare the duties and responsibilities of a religious scholar the way they have been provided in the words of Imam Husayn. Tuhaf al-‘Uqul, pp. 171-2, and the way they have been defined by Ibn Hanbal. A‘lam al-Mawqi‘in, 1, p. 9, citing Ar-Radd ‘ala’z-Zanadiqah wa’l-Jahmiyyah by Ibn Hanbal.
112. Al-A’immah al-Arba‘ah, pp. 140-80, and Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, pp. 397-437.
113. The fact that one should not rise up against the sultan and has to be patient on his oppression is unanimously agreed on by Sunni jurisprudents. Shafi‘i, Malik and Ibn Hanbal have confirmed this. Intifadat ash-Shi‘ah ‘Ibar at-Tarikh, p. 98. In his Sharh al-‘Aqa’id, he cites this opinion from Abu Hanifah and then says, “After the Senior Caliphs, corruption and tyranny emerged from caliphs and rulers while [our] righteous ancestors followed them, standing behind them to say their regular and Friday communal prayers and did not rise up against them.” Ibid., p. 99. Those who in general do not allow such opposition have resorted to this argument. For further explanation, see ibid., pp. 97-107, and also Tabaqat al-Hanabilah, vol. 2, p. 22.
114. To find out about the urgent need of Muslim youth to a revolutionary Islamic ideology, for example see the various issues of magazines An-Nadhir, Ath-Thawrah al-Islamiyyah, Al-Muntaliq, Ad-Da‘wah and the other magazines and publications of Muslim armed groups.
115. Concerning the perception of Sunni revolutionary youth about the ruling regimes, see the criticisms of ‘Utaybi, who, on the 1st of Muharram 1400 A.H, seized the Ka‘bah house, about the Sa‘udi rulers and even the person of ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz Baz, who interceded to free him from jail in 1978 in Faith and Power, pp. 180-5.
116. Concerning the effects of modernization on Islamic societies, especially in big cities, and in general the thoughts and ideals of young people, see Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 273-95, and also the researches of Sa‘d ad-Din Ibrahim in this regard, and Idi’uluzhi wa Inqilab (Ideology and Revolution), pp. 169-178.
117. As to the quality and amount of pressure that Islam has borne in the 50’s and 60’s, especially in the Arab World and Egypt, see Al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith wa Silatih bi’l-Afkar al-Gharbi.
118. Concerning the differences of these two periods and these two experiences, for example see the story of the intellectual and doctrinal developments of one of the contemporary Muslim intellectuals, which he recounts honestly and frankly. Min al-‘Aqidah ila’th-Thawrah, pp. 46-8.
119. See the discussions and arguments of ‘Abdu’r-Razzaq in Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, where he seeks to remove caliphate as a religious principle or even a religious affair. He denies the consensus of scholars in this respect, and indirectly the partisans of consensus. His critics in general have relied on this and have rejected his opinions from this point of view. For example, see the seven criticisms that the al-Azhar Faculty made of him, based on them he was tried and then expellected from al-Azhar. Introduction by Muhammad ‘Amarah to Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, p. 21.
Also see the book Sadd Bab al-Ijtihad wa ma Tarattab ‘alayh by ‘Abdu’l-Karim al-Khatib, which makes similar criticisms of ‘Abdu’r-Razzaq from a different position. His main goal is defending the opening of the way for new interpreations, thereby overcoming the religious crisis, contributing to religious awareness of Muslims and helping further Islamicize the society. Ibid., p. 7.
120. Concering the views of ‘Utaybi, see Al-Harikah al-Islamiyyah fi’l-Jazirah al-‘Arabiyyah, pp. 119-30.
121. For example, see the fatherly sympathetic advices of Yusuf al-Qardawi in his book As-Sahawah al-Islamiyyah bayn al-Jumud wa’t-Tatarruf, in which he asks the youth to put aside extremist methods and interpretations in the religion and not to go beyond the principles and rules of the religion.
122. Tarikh al-Khulafa’, p. 77.
123. Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm with an introduction by Muhammad ‘Amarah, p. 9, citing Al-Minar, issue of 23 April 1925/29 Ramadan 1343 A.H., p. 31.
124. Majalleh-ye Daneshkadeh-ye Adabiyyat wa ‘Ulum-e Insani (Journal of Faculty of Literature and Humanities), Mashhad University, serial no. 57-8, pp. 4-8.
125. Ahmad Shawqi, the ‘King of Egypt’s Poets’, was especially fond of the Ottomans and even Turks as the supporters of Islam and Islamism. In his divan, Ash-Shawqiyyat, one can find numerous poems full of epics and feelings that were said on different occasions in praise of the Ottomans and Turks.
For example, somewhere he praises Turks and calls them the ‘noblemen of all nations’, asking them not to follow the thoughts of the Young Turks and not remain backward and tired and rather be dynamic, active and determined people (pp. 206-7) while some other place in his poems he rejoices at the sight of their navy with the flag of Islam waving (pp. 208-11). He greatly admires the war of Turks against the Greeks and calls their commander, Mustafa Kamal, ‘the Turkish Khalid’ (pp. 44, 258).
Even where Sharif Husayn claims to be the caliph, he sends a long poem to Sultan ‘Abdu’l-Majid (1194) and asks him as the main master of Mecca and Medina to eliminate Sharif (p. 194). One of his most attractive and emotional poems was said when caliphate was terminated by Ata Turk, which begins like this, “The wedding songs have turned into dirges and the message of death was brought in the cheers of happiness.” In this poem, he asks the Muslims to remind Ata Turk to stop what he is doing (pp. 90-93). Compare these poems with those in praise of Sharif Husayn, the Arab Empire, and in criticism of the Ottomans and Turks. Thawrah al-‘Arab didd al-Atrak, p. 354 and onwards.
126. Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm with an introduction by Muhammad ‘Amarah, p. 8.
127. Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, p. 9, citing the newspaper Al-Ahram of 12 May 1925, the magazine Al-Minar of 23 April 1925, p. 31. Concerning the excitement following the fall of caliphate, and the supports that were given to the Assembly, see ibid., pp. 7-14.
128. Ibid., p. 17, citing Al-Minar, vol. 2, issue of 21 July 1925, p. 100.
129. Ibid., p. 13, citing the newspaper As-Siyasah, issue of 22 July 1925.
130. See Charles D. Smiths, Islam and the Search of Social Order in Modern Egypt, p. 1.
131. In those days, some were tempted to take the position of the caliph, including the king of Egypt, Malik Fu’ad. Introduction to Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, pp. 35-145. Another of them was Sharif Husayn in Mecca. Thawrah al-‘Arab didd al-Atrak, pp. 312-53. The interesting thing is that Rashid Rida and his fellow thinkers nominated the Imam of Yemen for caliph as they saw that he had the entire politico-religious conditions necessary. Andisheh-ha-ye Siyasi dar Islam-e Mu‘asir (Political Thoughts in Contemporary Islam), p. 137.
132. “Caliphate is usually understood as meaning ruling over an Islamic government. It must even be said that ‘caliphate’ means an Islamic government. The consensus is that the head of the government can be called a caliph”. Ma‘alim al-Khilafah fi’l-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami, p. 30.
133. For example, see Al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith fi Muwajihah al-Afkar al-Gharbiyyah, pp. 7-42.
134. See the response of Hasan al-Banna when he was asked what he wanted. Min Usul al-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami, p.11. His response provides the primary signs of the realization of the concept of Islamic government and its idealization.
135. Concerning the nature and history of western influence and laws in Islamic countries, especially within the Ottoman and Indian territories, see Islamic Surveys, A History of Islamic Law, pp. 149-62.
136. Al-Islam bayn al-‘Ulama’ wa’l-Hakimun, pp. 15-25.
137. H. A. Gibband Harebd Brown, Islamic Society and the West, vol. 1.
138. For example, see the various issues of the newspaper Qanun (Law) published by Mirza Malkam Khan.
139. ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz al-Badri thus explains the story of the influence of the new laws in the Ottoman territory, “… In 1957, new laws including criminal and civil laws began to influence. However, these laws were not practiced before the Shaykh al-Islam agreed to them, who issued a fatwa that they did not contradict the shari‘ah. The cleric scholars did not deem the entrance of the new civil laws into Islamic countries as religiously acceptable. Therefore, they compiled the book Al-Majallah, which was a collection of laws relating to transactions, which the authors considered to be documenting the shari‘ah. Al-Islam bayn al-‘Ulama’ wa’l-Hakimun, p. 17, and also Tahrir al-Majallah, vol. 1.
140. William Shepard, The Faith of a Modern Intellectual.
141. Ibid., p. 4.
142. One of the first people who began political and somehow revolutionary activities in the Sunni world was Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin movement. He taught his followers, “If you are asked, ‘What do you call the people to?’, tell them, ‘To the Islam that was revealed to the Prophet (S), part of which is the government, and freedom is a duty of its duties. If they say, ‘This is politics.’, say, ‘This is Islam and we do not make such divisions.’ If they say, ‘You are calling to a revolution.’, say, ‘We claim the truth and peace, which we believe in and are proud of. Then, if you stand against us and want to stop us from fulfil our calling our call, know that God has allowed us to defend ourselves and you will be oppressors.’” Min Usul al-Fikr as-Siyasi al-Islami, p. 11, citing Hasan al-Banna’s book, Bayn al-Ams wa’l-Yawm.
143. Ma‘alim fi’t-Tariq, 8-11.
144. Even a committed independent sholar like the author of the book Ma‘alim al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah, who in his book criticizes the views of many before him concerning caliphate, its qualifications, how it can be established and the necessity or non-necessity of opposing it, is not willing to oppose the ruling system although his definition of caliphate is more logical and progressive than those of many of his predecessors and even contemporaries, “Ruling over all the Muslims in the world in order to administer the shari‘ah and carry out the call of Islam to the world”, ibid., p. 30.
He also says, “The ummah has power and, when it pledges allegiance to a caliph for the latter’s ruling over the government and to match Islam to the everyday life scientifically, the caliph will represent the ummah in its power because the ummah wishes to enforce the laws of Islam and the caliph represents the ummah in doing so. Therefore, one is appointed caliph only if the ummah pledges allegiance to him willingly and voluntarily, which constitutes a reason for the caliph’s representing the ummah.” Ibid., p. 38.
Regarding rising up against the ruler, he says, “If the uprising results in bloodshed between Muslims, it is not allowed as disturbing the country is religiously forbidden and an action that results in a forbidden thing is forbidden based on the rule ‘The means of the forbidden is forbidden.’ Therefore, it is necessary to obey him [the ruler] and to take part in a jihad by his side in order to put down any disturbance. He will the emir but not the caliph, unless he has taken allegiance from Muslims with their satisfaction and without their reservations.” Ibid., p. 126.
145. One of the outstanding committed Sunni cleric scholars in our time, Shaykh As‘ad Bayyud at-Tamimi, says, “The purpose of the Islamic government is to enforce the shari‘ah.” This has been often quoted from him. Also see Tahawwul wa Thubat (Development and Stability), pp. 120-1.
146. For further explanation, see Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 75-192.
147. The implicit response by many to such criticisms, which are in turn the result of new expectations brought about by the newly created socio-economic developments and politico-intellectual necessities, has been provided humbly by a virtuous Sunni cleric scholar, Muhammad Diya’ ad-Din ar-Rays, many years before the criticisms were so severe. Indeed, he is addressing non-Muslim criticics or non-believer Muslims.
However, it is an answer to all those who have criticized Sunni clergy for their political position throughout the history, whether they are committed Muslims or uncommitted non-Muslims. “Some writers, and especially orientalists, accuse Sunnis and provide a picture of them that neither conforms to the reality and nor favors them. They say, ‘They were inclined towards the rulers and were in agreement with their practice and cooperated with them in what they did. People like Hasan Basri, Sha‘bi, Sa‘id ibn Jubayr and Sa‘id ibn al-Musayyib during the Umayyad and Abu Hanifah, Malik and Ahmad during the ‘Abbasid periods were in conflict with the policy of the rulers and emirs of their time and even refused to accept the governmental order with which they had reached power.” An-Nazariyyat as-Siyasiyyah al-Islamiyyah, p. 71.
Somewhere else, he explains the reasons why they were indifferent to political issues, “Sunnis and the people believed that an uprising and a revolution that is not expected to succeed will create disturbance, anarchy, bloodshed, dispersion and crimes. Therefore, they preferred to stay out of politics and, instead, have scientific activities that were more useful and stable.” Ibid., p. 71.
Providing further explanation, he says, Sunnis left it to the Rebels, Shi‘ites, Mu‘tazilites and suspensionists to discusss and contemplate imamate and the relevant issues. They did not develop, define and limit their views in this regard until later when the former gave them up. However, this does not mean that they lacked political opinions or were content with the ruling politics, whether the Umayyad or the ‘Abbasid ones.” Ibid., p. 70. For further explanation, see ibid., pp. 69-75.
148. This point and even deadlock is well explained by Gibb, “Thus, it emerges that, while one can legally depose the caliph, there is no legal means to do it. This is not only Mawardi’s problem, but a problem in Sunni political thought up to his time. This confirms that the Sunni political theory is in fact the rationalization of the history of the Islamic ummah while there is no theory without it.” For further explanation, see Nazariyyat al-Imamat ‘inda ash-Shi‘ah al-Imamiyyah, pp. 149-63.
149. Al-Fikr as-Siyasi ash-Shi‘i, pp. 116-266
150. See the book Sadd Bab al-Ijtihad wa ma Tarattab ‘alayh, pp. 5-8. The author himself is one of the religious scholars who approaches the intellectual and religious stagnation of the religious scholars and the resulting problems more honestly and sympathetically.
Also see the views of Amin concerning the need to open the doors to religious interpretation in William Shepard, The Faith of a Modern Muslim Intellectual.
151. Concerning the modernization of the religious educational system and its consequences, see the views of ‘Abduh in Al-Fikr al-Islami al-Hadith wasailathu bi’l-Isti‘mar al-Gharbi, pp. 176-81, in which he provides an interesting description of the mentality of the cleric scholars in al-Azhar, “If a book reaches the hands of these scholrs in which something is written that they do not know, or if they do not find out about the intentions of the writer, or if they find little about it, they will reject it and will refuse to accept it. If they accept it, they will interpret it with their own knowledge, which is in fact distorting it.” Also, see the views of Khalid Muhammad Khalid in Ash-Shi‘ah fi’l-Mizan, pp. 375-8, and also Wu‘‘az as-Salatin, 291-302 concerning its consequences, especially see Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 102-15; also, Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search of Social Order in Modern Egypt, pp. 109-13; and also Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity, pp. 63-70.
152. Payambar wa Fir‘un (The Prophet and the Pharaoh), pp. 273-95. Better examples can be found in the various issues of the magazine An-Nadhir, especially in years 1981-1985.