The Western and Islamic Concept of Tolerance

By: Ayatullah Professor Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi
Regarding freedom, we said that the concept of freedom used in our political culture and literature was initially the translation of the word “liberalism” prevalent in the West. Similarly, the word tahammul which is used as the antonym of khushunat is used as the equivalent of the word “tolerance” in English or French. This concept or term is prevalent in Western literature.
There is no objection to use and include in our literature an unambiguous and clear concept or term used in a foreign language, or its equivalent. But the point that must not be neglected is that sometimes these imported concepts have certain conditions, semantic loads and specific values. These concepts are laden with values suitable to their culture. That is, once a word is used in a culture, it is laden with a positive or negative value, but once this word is adopted in another culture which is foreign to the original culture, it will lose its embedded value. On the contrary, it will acquire a new value in the second language. Let us elaborate: Since “freedom” was adopted in our literature from Western culture and this term has a broad meaning in the West and is even used to mean sexual freedom which is rejected in our society, we have no such concept in our culture, so we are forced to add certain qualifications to freedom while keeping in view our Islamic and national values, to aspire for legitimate freedom within the framework of Islamic values, and to categorically declare that we do not accept absolute freedom. In the same tone, the concept of “violence” in its new sense was adopted in our culture from Western culture.
In contrast to the West which regarded it as absolutely condemnable and reproachable according to the exigency of its culture, we do not consider it as anti-value in its absolute sense just as we do not accept freedom as an absolute value. Instead, we regard violence which is devoid of underlying logic, unjustifiable and against human ethics. We believe that in some cases violence is acceptable, consistent with the dictates of reason, ensuring the interests of society, thereby not reproachable.
So, before adopting “tolerance” from Western culture and presenting it as absolutely desirable in our literature, we must pay attention to its source, investigate its root and see what it means in Western literature; which value—positive or negative—it is laden with, and for what motive it has prevailed in Western culture, and for which motive it is introduced in our political culture and literature. We also have to check whether its meaning has changed or not after its introduction.
The concept of “tolerance” is among the blessings of modern Western culture that gradually evolved after the Renaissance and gained universal acceptance. Today, it is known as one of the distinctive features of Western atheistic culture. (We have already stated that whenever we talk about Western culture, we do not mean the culture of all people in the West because there are also many monotheistic and religious people there. Instead, we mean the atheistic culture dominant in the West which is also opposed by many.)
In finding the root of the concept of tolerance, firstly, in the dominant culture of the West, all values—including moral, social, and political-legal values—are conventional affairs and have no rational and real root. In other words, values depend on the demands and preferences of people. It cannot be said that a thing, belief or conviction is valuable forever and for all. Rather, according to the Westerners, so long as a thing is accepted by society, it is valuable, and if one day the people’s preferences change, the same value turns into anti-value. Secondly, religious beliefs and convictions are also considered as conventional values and a person is deemed free in choosing or rejecting them. They are reduced into a matter of preference only.
People choose the colors of their clothes according to their preferences. For example, a person likes to wear dark-blue clothes, another, black and, a third, brown. A person cannot be reproached for choosing brown or grey because everyone is free to choose whatever he prefers. Similarly, people choose religious values and accounts according to their preferences and demands. One cannot be condemned why he professes a certain religion or why he has no belief in it, or why he slights, rejects or negates a certain religious belief.
Beyond this, if a person sets aside his religious beliefs and chooses new religious values, one cannot condemn him because his change of faith is exactly like a change of preference in choosing the color of his attire!
According to Islam and the Islamic culture, however, religious sanctities and values are much dearer than one’s life, property, honor, and relatives. Does Islam allow us to defend religious sanctities? It is true that a certain gentleman who is currently a member of the Tehran City Council permits people to demonstrate even against God, but according to the religious edicts [fatawa] of all sources of emulation [maraji‘ at-taqlid] and the consensus of opinion of Sunni and Shi‘ah fuqaha which is accepted by all Muslims, if a person treats God, the Apostle (s) and the religious sanctities and essentials of Islam with insolence, even in a desert or private place, away from the sight of the authorities and there is no opportunity to turn him over to the police or Islamic court, it is incumbent upon every Muslim to execute him for the crime of insulting the sanctities of Islam.
It was on the basis of this Islamic perspective that the late Imam (‘a) issued the death sentence to the apostate Salman Rushdie which was also affirmed by other Sunni and Shi‘ah fuqaha. This is our point of departure from Western culture—something which Islam accepts but is rejected by the West.
Religious duty and zeal do not allow us to witness any act of insolence to Islamic sanctities and keep silent. Islam has permitted violence in defending religious sanctity. Since Islam and its sanctity is dearer to us than our lives, wealth and children, we can even risk our lives in defending them. As such, if somebody slights religious sanctity, one can punish him even if he is most probably arrested, convicted for killing someone and having no “right” to do so and fails to prove the heinous crime of the killed person, and thus be condemned to death under the law of retaliation [qisas]. As his religious duty, he can still punish that wicked and impudent insulter, provided his action does not lead to further corruption.