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The Knowledge of God
Knowledge is one of the attributes of beauty and perfection, and there is no doubt at all that this attribute is confirmed for God. Muslim philosophers and theologians (nay, all theists) have a consensus of opinions on this issue, although there is a difference of views and opinions on the quality and limits of the knowledge of God. #7717;uḍūrī) or acquired #7717;uṣūlī). Another [issue] is whether God’s prior knowledge of the things is general (ijmālī) or detailed (tafṣīlī). And the third [issue] is whether God’s prior knowledge pertains to the existence (wujūd) or the quiddity (māhiyyah) of things. 2.1. Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s View God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is intuitive #7717;uḍūrī) and general (ijmālī) and pertains to their existence (wujūd). This view has been adopted by Shaykh al-Ishrāq1 and his followers. According to this view, since God is knowledgeable of His Essence, and on the other hand, the Essence of God is the Cause behind the coming into existence of the creatures and knowledge of the Cause leads to the knowledge of the effect in general, it follows that God is essentially knowledgeable of all the things in the universe and His knowledge is intuitive and general. The problem with this view is that detailed knowledge is superior to general knowledge. In this case, based on the said view, God’s Essential knowledge of the creatures cannot be the most perfect knowledge. This is so while the Essence of God possesses all perfections in the highest degree possible: “To Allah belong the Best Names.”2 2.2. Mu‘tazilah View God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is acquired #7717;uṣūlī) and detailed (tafṣīlī) and pertains to their quiddity, because prior to being created, their quiddity possesses a sort of subsistence (thubūt) (māhiyyāt-e ma‘dūmah or non-existential quiddities) and subsistence includes existence (wujūd). This view has been ascribed to the Mu‘tazilah who subscribe to the notion of pre-eternity subsistents (thābitāt-e azaliyyah). In addition to the fact that as will be proved later, there is no place for acquired knowledge in God, the problem with this view is that subsistence (thubūt) is equal to existence (wujūd) and anything which does not exist has no objective subsistence. Therefore, belief in the pre-eternity subsistents is basically incorrect. 2.3. Ibn Sīnā’s View God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is a detailed and acquired knowledge which pertains to the mental existence of the quiddities. For instance, when a person wants to do certain things, prior to their realization, he has detailed knowledge of them and this knowledge pertains to the mental existence of the quiddities of his actions. Ibn Sīnā and his followers have adopted this view. The problem with this view is that acquired knowledge is related to the creatures which are in contact with matter in their essences or actions. By means of their faculties of sensory perception, they develop perception of the corporeal beings and present in themselves the quiddities of those beings and have knowledge of them. And through those mental quiddities, they also become knowledgeable of the actual existence of the things.3 And since God is immune from corporeality in terms of both Essence and Action, acquired knowledge has no place in him. God’s knowledge of His Essence or His Actions is an intuitive knowledge. 2.4. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s View God’s prior knowledge of the creatures is an intuitive knowledge and as to whether it is general or detailed, it is general as well as detailed, because in Essence, God is straightforwardly entitled to the existential perfections of all the creatures. Since existence is a single reality and has different levels, the highest level of existence is no other than God’s Being. It is evident that every perfect [being] has deficient existential levels in addition to a level of perfection which has no deficiency. Due to the fact, therefore, that God is not devoid of any of the levels of existential perfection, He automatically and solely possesses all the existential perfections which diversely and pluralistically exist in the creatures. From this perspective, therefore, God’s Essential knowledge of the creatures is a general (ijmālī) knowledge (ijmāl in the sense of simplicity and oneness in contrast to tafṣīl in the sense of multiplicity and plurality). Meanwhile, after the coming into existence of the things, nothing shall be added to the knowledge of God, because no change takes place in the Divine Essence. From this perspective, God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures is general as well as detailed. If we assume that a person is knowledgeable of all the issues within a field of science in the sense that he has mastery of that field in that he has prior knowledge and answer to any question within that field and that the answers he gives do not add anything to his knowledge, in this case the existence of multiplicity with respect to the answers he gives does not cause any change in his knowledge. He has knowledge of all the issues before and after giving his answers. That which changes is the existence of answers which have general existence (simple and identical) in the essence of the knower, while having detailed existence (multiple and diverse) in his action. Yet, no change has found its way in the essence of the knower and his knowledge. Once it occurs that such an assumption is possible in the case of the human being, why is it not acceptable with respect to God who is the Necessary Being in essence? This view has been put forth by Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and accepted by all followers of the Transcendental School of Philosophy #7717;ikmat al-muta’āliyah), and it is the best interpretation ever presented to explain God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures. Traditions (aḥādith) also confirm this view. For instance, it is thus stated in some traditions: “His knowledge of it prior to its existence is like His knowledge of it after its existence.”4 Ayyūb ibn Nūḥ asked Imām al-Ḥādī (‘a) in a letter, thus: “Was God knowledgeable of the creatures prior to their creation, or not?” The Imām (‘a) thus wrote in reply to him: “God was knowledgeable of the creatures before creating them, just as He has knowledge of them after their creation.”5 As such, God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of essence prior to their creation necessitates God’s knowledge of His Essence, just as the existence of the creatures depends on the existence of the Divine Essence:6 God’s Present Knowledge of the Creatures in the Present The Divine Proofs #7717;udur), whenever that Being is self-existent and does not depend on other beings, His existence is present for Himself. The reality of knowledge is also nothing except presence #7717;udūr) and exposure (inkishāf). The proof of God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of essence (prior to their creation) is that the Essence of God is the Cause of the creatures and He has knowledge also of His Essence. Therefore, He has knowledge of the creatures and knowledge of the cause necessitates knowledge of the effect; hence, God has knowledge of the creatures. Moreover, the creatures are actions of God, the Exalted, and at the same time, they have rules and stability, order and harmony, and once an action has such characteristics, it is a proof of its agent’s knowledge and awareness. The rules and stability of the universe, therefore, is a proof of God’s prior knowledge of it [and its components]. The proof of God’s knowledge of the creatures in the realm of action (knowledge after creating them) is that the creatures are actions and effects of God, and the essence of action is nothing but the link and attachment to the essence of its agent (fā‘il), and as a result, it is present before its agent and cause. The reality of the universe, therefore, is present before God and He has intuitive knowledge of it. In his Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, Muḥaqqiq al-Ṭūsī has expressed the said argument in these words: That is to say that the laws and stability of the universe, the immateriality of the Divine Essence and emanation of the existence of all beings from God are proofs of God’s knowledge [of His Essence and the creatures].8 The All-hearing, the All-seeing and the Perceiver Review Questions #7717;udūrī) or acquired #7717;uṣūlī)? Why? 3. Write down the view of Shaykh al-Ishrāq about God’s prior knowledge along with the criticism to it. 4. Write down the view attributed to the Mu‘tazilah about God’s prior knowledge along with the criticism to it. 5. What is Ibn Sīnā’s view about God’s prior knowledge? And what is the problem with it? 6. Write down Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s view about God’s prior knowledge. 7. Explain God’s eternal knowledge of the creatures by citing a tradition #7717;adīth). 8. What type of knowledge is God’s knowledge of the creatures after creating them? 9. Write down two proofs of God’s knowledge. 10. What is the meaning of God’s being the All-hearing (al-sami‘) and the All-seeing (al-baṣīr)? Notes: 1. Shaykh al-Ishraq refers to Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (b. 1155), a towering figure of the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) School of Islamic Philosophy. [Trans.] 2. Sūrat al-A‘rāf 7:180. 3. Refer to the discussion on knowledge, knower and known in the books of philosophy. 4. Uṣūl al-Kāfī, vol. 1, “Kitāb al-Tawḥīd,” section (bāb) on the Attributes of the Essence, ḥadīth 2. 5. Ibid., ḥadīth 4. 6. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, Al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah, vol. 6, p. 179. For further information in this regard, see ‘Alī Rabbānī Gulpāygānī, Ayḍāḥ al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 544-547. 7. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn and ‘Allāmah al-Ṭabāṭabā’ī have made a distinction between immaterial and material beings. Accordingly, the presence of the immaterial beings is by themselves without any medium while the presence of the material beings is through the medium of the presence of their immaterial forms in the immaterial world. That which is stated in the text is the pertinent viewpoint of Ḥakīm Sabziwārī which seems to be stronger. See Ayḍāḥ al-Ḥikmah, vol. 2, pp. 547-548. 8. Kashf al-Murād, station (maqṣad) 3, chap. 2, issue 2. 9. The descriptions al-samī‘ and al-baṣīr as Attributes of God have been mentioned 41 and 42 times, respectively, in the Qur’an. 10. Qawā’id al-Murād, p. 90. 11. Sūrat al-An‘ām 6:103. 12. Fāḍil Miqdād, Irshād al-Ṭālibīn, pp. 206-207. 13. Ibid. |