The Islamic Revolution in Iran

Three Lectures Delivered in 1979 by Professor Hamid Algar
University of California
Berkeley, USA

LECTURE # 1

IRAN AND THE SHI’ISM
PROF. HAMID ALGAR, University of California, Berkeley
(Delivered in October, 1979)
THE subject of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is one whose importance hardly needs underlining. With the passage of time, its importance will become even clearer, as being the most significant and profound event in the entirety of contemporary Islamic history Already we see the impact of the Iranian Revolution manifested in different ways and different degrees across the length and breadth of the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia, from Bosnia in the heart of Europe down to Africa.
It is not surprising that in the face of the war of renewal that has been at least partly inaugurated by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the holders of power in the Islamic world, not to mention their various agents and representatives abroad, are seeking to contain the effect of the Islamic Revolution within the boundaries of Iran. They also seek to suggest that the Islamic Revolution has certain particular characteristics that do not permit of any extension beyond Iran. The easiest and most obvious way in which they attempt to accomplish this task is by branding the movement in Iran as a Shi'ia movement and Shi'ia in a divisive and exclusive sense. I do not wish to give the impression that through choosing the title for the first lecture of Iran and Shi'ism, I am in any way contributing, even unintentionally, to this campaign for putting a particular and limiting stamp on the Islamic Revolution. It is, nonetheless, the case that from a historical point of view, the Revolution in Iran and the foundation of the Islamic Republic is the culmination of a series of events that began in the sixteenth century of the Christian era with the adherence of the majority of the Iranian people to the Shi'ia school of thought in Islam. Indeed, one of the important factors that sets the Islamic Revolution apart from all the other revolutionary upheavals of the present century is its deep roots in the historical past.
Whereas the Russian, Chinese and other revolutions, at least in theory, seek to negate the past in a radical fashion, to react against it, on the contrary, the Islamic Revolution is the continuation, the culmination of an important part of the Islamic heritage of Iran. In one sense the beginning of that heritage comes with the introduction of Islam to Iran in the seventh century of the Christian era. In a more immediate and important sense, the appropriate point of departure for our examination of the historical background of the Revolution is the early part of the sixteenth century which sees the conversion of Iran into the only country in the Muslim world with a majority adhering to the Shi'ia school of thought. It is appropriate, therefore, also to say at least a few words about Shi'ism.
Shi'ia school of thought in Islam, which has an extremely complex history, has gone through many different stages of development, both in Iran and outside. It is hardly possible for me to attempt even a sketch of those developments here. What I will lay emphasis upon are those aspects within the context of Iran which have had an important political and social impact. Whatever version of Shi'ism one looks at, at whatever point it may have expressed itself in Islamic history, the crucial point has been the doctrine of the Imamate, the figure of the Imam, who is not merely the successor of the Prophet (on whom be peace) in a legislative, administrative even military capacity, but is also in some sense an extension of the spiritual dimensions of the prophetic mission. Let there be no mistake, Shi'ia Muslims like the Sunnis, accept and believe in fully the sealing of prophethood with the Prophet Muhammad (on whom be peace). However, they differ in their theory of the succession. Not merely in the identity of the successor, but also in the functions of the successor. The functions of the successor, the Imam, in Shi'ia beliefs, include the authoritative explanation of the text of the Qur'an, the authoritative interpretation and even extension of Islamic law, the guidance of the individual in his spiritual life in a fashion akin to the murshid in sufism, and the role of sole legitimate leader of the entire Muslim community -the Ummah.
Given the occultation, the ghaiba of the Imam, that is his disappearance, his absence from the plane of physical history from an early period, it can be said that in a certain sense all that is implied in the Shi'ia doctrine of the Imam has also absented itself from the worldly plane. This absence of the Imam has been one of the constant preoccupations of Shi'ia philosophy, mysticism and speculation. What we are concerned with here is chiefly its political implications. If the sole legitimate successor of the Prophet, if the sole wielder of legitimate authority after him is no longer present on the earthly plane, that means that inherently any worldly power that claims to exercise authority must be, ipso facto, illegitimate unless it can demonstrate in a clear and undisputable fashion that it exercises rule on behalf of the absent Imam. This very important belief has led the Shi'ia Muslims to assume throughout the major part of their history a stance of rejection with regard to political authority, with regard to the de facto, existing political authority, whereas for the greater part of the history of the Sunni Muslims and prevailing political theory in its classical formulation by Al-Mawardi was that the existing political power should not be disputed on condition that a few simple preconditions were observed, like the sultan performing the Friday prayers and the Shari'a, at least certain segments of the Shari'a being formally implemented.
Whereas this was the predominant theory of the Sunni Moslems, and we see traces of it even today in the Sunni Muslim countries, the Shi'ia always rejected the notion of an accommodation with the existing political system. This rejection was sometimes purely theoretical and in fact its practical implications had not been fully worked out and realized in the case of Iran right now until the Islamic Revolution itself, which, one can see, is the final implementation, or the logical implementation, of the political theory of the Shi'ia. In any event, it has been present as a powerful attitude throughout the history of the Shi'ia school of thought m Islam and most particularly in Iran.
Another theme of Shi'ism in general that we may refer to before passing on to the particular case of Iran, is the importance given to the concept of martyrdom. Martyrdom is not in any way a monopoly concern of the Shi'ia. It is a common value of all Moslems, having its archetype in the example given by the Companions of the Prophet (upon whom be peace). Nonetheless, it has acquired a certain particular flavor and importance in the context of Shi'ism. This has been through the martyrdom of Imam Husain who, we can say, is, after the Prophet and after Hazrat Ali, who from the point of view of the Shi'ia is the first Imam, after those two figures, is doubtless the most important figure in the religious consciousness of the Shi'ia. The fact that he met his death in battle that he attained martyrdom is seen by the Shi'ia not simply as a fact of history, it is seen as a fact of profound and continuing spiritual significance. In the person of Imam Husain, the whole fate of humanity when faced with overwhelming and tyrannical power is seen to have crystallized in the single significant incident and the commemoration of this incident year after year is not merely a matter of pietistic commemoration, it is not a question of remembering a certain event in human history, it is, at least implicitly, a self-identification with Imam Husain and the determination to participate to some degree, through emotion and intention, with Imam Husain in what the Shi'ia perceived as having been a struggle for justice against the overwhelming powers of tyranny. (1)
In the course of the Revolution in Iran, one of the interesting slogans that was constantly raised, and which shows clearly the importance of Imam Husain, not only for the religious but the political consciousness of the Shi'ia, was:

Every day is Ashura, and every place is Karbala.
In other words, wherever the Muslim is, is a field of struggle where the forces of justice and legitimacy are confronted by the forces of tyranny. Every day of his life is a day of battle in which he should seek either triumph or martyrdom. In addition to the important theme of the absence of the legitimate political authority, the refusal to bow before the existing political authority in the name of public order, joined to this we have an important contribution with the concept of martyrdom, as exemplified in particularly tragic and significant fashion by Imam Husain.
The combination of these two themes, the rejection of de facto authority and the belief in the virtues of martyrdom, has given Shi'ism, particularly at certain points in its history, an attitude of militancy that has been sadly lacking in a large number of Sunni segments of the Muslim Ummah. To summarize it and to quote yet another slogan of the Revolution in Iran, It was said that mihrab of the Shi'ia is a mihrab of blood.. That is, throughout the history of the Shi'ia, in their confrontation with the powers of illegitimacy, they have been pushed to martyrdom and to self-sacrifice.
Let us pass to the particular case of Iran and the historical circumstances of the emergence of Shi'ism in Iran. Shi'ism, which today appears closely mingled with the whole Iranian sense of national identity, was in its origin a total stranger to Iran. Among the various orientalist theories that have been elaborated with respect to the origins of Shi'i it has been said that this was the Iranian response to an Arab Islam. Apart from the inappropriateness of these ethnic categories, there is the simple fact that the earliest Shi'ia were themselves, with few exceptions, Arabs and Iran was for a long time an overwhelmingly Sunni country. Aside from a few centers, traditional centers such as Qom, which we shall hear more about later, and various quarters of other major cities, Shi'ism was little represented in Iran. In the aftermath of the Mongol conquest of the Muslim near-east in the thirteenth century, when the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate was shattered and destroyed, with the consequent weakening, at least in the official position of Sunni thought, a gradual increase in the influence of Shi'ism in Iran began to be noticed. The stages of this are difficult to delineate completely and in any event the process was by no means a rapid and irreversible one. On the very eve of the conversion of Iran to Shi'ism, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find that Iran was still an overwhelmingly Sunni country. Strangely, enough, despite the fact that within a short period of time a close mingling of Iranian national identity and Shi'ism had taken place, we find that there are two foreign or external factors which were crucial for the implementation of Shi'ism in Iran.
The first was the Safavid dynasty (1502-1747), originally a Turkic dynasty centered in the north-western frontier lands in Iran, which recruited a large number of its followers from outside Iran, from the Turkic nomads of Asia Minor, Syria and the southern Caucasus. Afterwards the Safavids, for political reasons, manufactured a false genealogy for themselves, seeking descent from Imam Musa Kazim, one of the Imams of the Shi'ia. Subsequently, historical research has shown this genealogy to be false and that on the contrary they are of purely Turkic descent with a possible intermingling of Kurdish elements. In any event, the military forces that brought the Safavids to power in Iran were non-Iranian and recruited from outside Iran.
We may think of the foundation of the Safavid State in Iran as being in many ways one more nomadic invasion of this country, with this difference, that unlike the Mongol invasion, it came not from the east but from the west. After these Turkic nomads had placed the Safavids on the throne of Iran and the decision had been made to convert the majority of the people, if necessary by force, to Shi'ism, it was found that there were barely any Shi'ia scholars in Iran, and very few books available on Shi'ism in the Persian language. Consequently there took place the second influx of an external element, on this occasion Shi'ia Arab scholars from traditional centers of Shi'ism in the Arab world, that is to say, Bahrain and Al-Asha on the Arabian peninsula and Jabal Amel in the southern part of Lebanon.
These scholars formed the first instance of that class of Iranian ulema that we have seen assuming a progressively more important historical role through the centuries until the culmination of that tradition in the Islamic Revolution. Despite this reliance on two external elements for the propagation of Shi'ism in Iran, the Turkic soldiery and Arab scholars, we see that in some fashion the ground must have been very well prepared. Historical research is not yet in a position to tell us how precisely this preparation took place. It is clear that for any spiritual tradition to flourish and take root, the mere process of coercion will not be sufficient. Although the Safavids did engage freely in the use of coercion leading to a large stream of emigration from Iran to neighbouring Sunni countries, nonetheless, in a few generations, Shi'ism had not only taken root in Iran, it had begun to produce one of the major intellectual and cultural flowerings of the Islamic tradition as a whole. For this to have taken place, clearly the ground must have been prepared. Shi'ism found a suitable environment to flourish in Iran.
I turn now, within the' context of this general development of Shi'ism in Iran, to the emergence of this class of Shi'ia ulema. With the hindsight provided by the Islamic Revolution it will be more appropriate to write the Iranian history of the past three or four centuries not so much in terms of dynasties as in terms of the development of the class of the Iranian ulema. Dynasties have come and gone, leaving in many cases little more than a few artifacts behind to account for their existence. But there has been a continuing development of the class of Shi'ia ulema in Iran which has been totally without parallel elsewhere in the Islamic world. The origins of the Iranian Shi'ia ulema are with those scholars imported by the Safavids from various Arab countries. Given the fact that they were dependent on royal patronage, they were initially obedient and loyal servants of the State. One finds one of the earliest among them, for example, a certain Shaykh Ahmad Karaki, even writing a treatise defending the practice which was to be found, not only in Iran, but in neighbouring Sunni countries, of prostration before the monarch. The entirety of the religious hierarchy was headed by a certain official known as the sadr ai-mamalik whose function it was to distribute patronage of the State and to ensure the obedience and loyalty of the class of ulema as a whole. Relatively swiftly, however, the matter began to change. At the very height of Safavid power, during the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1729), who was known in pre-revolutionary version of history as "The Great" although I am sure that "The Great" has now been removed we find the ulema for the first time within the context of Iranian enunciating the essential political theory of the Shi'ia, of the illegitimacy of monarchy and existing government. One of the contemporaries of Shah Abbas, Mulla Ahmad Ardabili, encountered Shah Abbas on a certain occasion and reminded him that his monarchy, his power, was held not by divine right, not as a result of any particular fitness on his part, but rather as something that was a trust on behalf of the Imam and that if the trust were violated, and the hint was there that the trust was being violated, then, the ulema had the right to remove the trust from the king. This, as far as I know, is the earliest recorded instance of the disputation of the legitimacy of the royal power in Shi'ia Iran. Towards the end of the Safavid period, we find that the relationship between the ulema and the State has changed again. It is no longer a question of the ulema reminding the monarch in a very hesitant and theoretical fashion that his power is held only on trust and not by inherent right. On the contrary, they come to establish a certain dominance over the State.
We find, precisely in the last part of the seventeenth century, the first in a long series of powerful mujtahids. This term I will explain. These people came to dominate the life of the country, whether they held effective political power or not. The first of these great mujtahids in terms of whom I would suggest Iranian history be rewritten, is Mulla Muhammed Baqir Majlisi. It cannot be said of him that he exercised his dominance over the monarchy in a creditable fashion. In fact, he can receive a large part of the blame, or credit, for the downfall of the Safavid State in the second decade of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, his historical importance is not to be disputed. He is the first of a series of important and influential mujtahids who came to dominate not merely the intellectual and religious history of the country, but its political fortunes.
With the decline of the Safavid dynasty in 1724, a period of anarchy began in Iran. At one point within the eighteenth century we find no fewer than thirteen different contestants for the throne doing battle with each other. This total disintegration of the political authority accelerated the process of divorce between the religious institutions and the monarchy. We can say that in the absence of an effective centralised monarchy throughout the eighteenth century the ulema came, in a' practical fashion, quite apart from theoretical developments that I shall discuss later, to assume the role of local governors, arbitrators of disputes, executors at law and so forth. By the end of the eighteenth century, the new dynasty had emerged that was able gradually to impose its rule on the entirety of Iran -The Qajar dynasty. However, the Qajars (1795-1924) were in no position to continue the same relationship with the ulema that the Safavids had enjoyed at the beginning of their powers. On the very eve of the rising of the Qajar dynasty, we find taking place among the religious class, an important debate on a seemingly technical matter which had the greatest of political consequences as well. This debate took place between the two schools known as the Usuli and the Akhbari. This debate was on a matter which appeared to be technical, relating to the details of Islamic jurisprudence.
To summarise briefly the positions of the two schools, the Akhbaris, as their name indicates, said that in the absence of the Imam it was not permissible for a religious scholar to engage in the use of his reason to enact a certain judgment, to apply the principles of the law to a specific; problem or situation What had to be done was merely to have recourse to Traditions, hence the word Akhbari, and on the basis of the sifting of those, to arrive at a conclusion, given any particular problem. To put it in the language of the Sunni Islam, we can say that the Akhbari held that every alim should be a scholar of hadith and that he had no legitimate competence beyond that. In other words, they tended totally to an abolition of the whole discipline of development, of the law of jurisprudence. The Usulis, by contrast, said that this was not the case and even in the absence of the Imam it was permissible to engage in independent reasoning with respect to legal questions, of course on the basis of the sources of law as defined by the Shi'ia. Hence, the designation given to them, Usuli. They were those who believe there were a certain number of principles of law, sources of law, which could be applied and expanded through the use of the individual reasoning of the qualified scholar. The qualified scholar in question is the mujtahid, that is literally, he who exercises himself in a general sense and in a technical sense, he who exercises his reasoning powers on the basis of the principles of law to arrive at a certain decision concerning a given problem. There is some confusion in that the word mujtahid has certain application in Sunni Islam, in the sense of one of the founders of the four madhhabs. Its usage in Shi'ism does not presage such a wide connotation. It is not a question of each individual putting forward a new madhhab, a whole series of legal principles. It is a question of a more limited kind of independent reasoning.
The mujtahid is not merely a legal authority, one who can give an expression of opinion in this fashion concerning a problem of Islamic law, he is also a person whose views must be followed. The Usulis believe that in the absence of Imam, the entirety of the community is divided into those who are either mujtahids or who are not mujtahids. If they are not mujtahids, if they do not have the necessary power of comprehension of the law and independent reasoning to attain that state, they must of necessity follow the guidance of one who is and this following of guidance is known as taqlid. The common connotation of the word is imitation, but it has a technical meaning of following the guidance of a qualified religious scholar.
Given the fact that Islamic law in its scope knows of no distinction between the secular and the religious, given the fact that the affairs of State and the economy and society all fall within the scope of the Islamic law, it follows that the mujtahid is bound to express himself on those matters and that the rest of the community is bound to follow his guidance. Hence it is that every Shi'ia Muslim who is not himself a mujtahid is bound to follow a mujtahid as his marja-e taqlid. This is a term difficult to translate. It means the mujtahid who is chosen by an individual Muslim as his source of authority and guidance.
Were it not for the triumph of the Usuli position in the eighteenth century, on the eve of the rise of the Qajars, there would have been no mujtahids. The religious scholars would have found themselves condemned to an extremely marginal position, to the sifting of the ahadith, the narrations and traditions of the Prophet (on whom be peace) with no ability to provide living and continuous guidance for the affairs of society and politics at large. One may say that the Revolution in Iran, at least the particular shape that it has taken, the form of leadership that it has enjoyed and continues to enjoy, would also be unthinkable without this triumph of the Usuli position in this apparently technical dispute in the eighteenth century.
To come now to the Qajar period, given this triumph of the Usuli position and the emergence of a strong class of mujtahids, convinced of their authority, not merely as the interpreters of tradition but as the executors of tradition and law, the Qajars found their position disputed from the beginning. First, this disputation of the authority of the Qajar monarchs took place sporadically with respect to certain particular issues or events. Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, we find the number of provincial governors being expelled from the cities they were supposed to rule by the people of those cities who had been empowered, or even instructed to do so by the local mujtahid. An early example of the opposition of the ulema or the mujtahids to the royal power is to be seen in 1826 when Muslims inhabiting territories that had been captured from Iran in the first Russo-Iranian war were subject to religious persecution at the hands of the Russians. The ulema then delivered a judgment to the effect that it was the duty of Iran to go to war against Russia. The monarch of the day initially showed considerable reluctance, whereupon, according to a British diplomatic dispatch of the time, the most influential of the mujtahids of the day was reported to have said that "unless this present Shah does our bidding and obeys our fatwa, we shall remove him and put another dog in his place.'
Throughout the century, antagonism between the ulema and the monarchy became more and more intense. In part this was because of the logical implications of the political theory of the Shi'ia, amplified by the emergence of the Usuli madhhab. Another important factor was the growing alliance between the Iranian monarchy and the foreign powers. Now the monarchy was seen not merely to be holding an illegitimate power, not merely to be flouting the law of Islam, to be an instrument of tyranny and injustice, it was seen to be the agent for increasing foreign encroachment upon Iran and exploitation of its resources. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that we see the first mass movement of modern Iranian history directed against foreign hegemony in Iran, led by the Shi 'ia ulema. In 1892, the production and marketing of tobacco within Iran and outside had been given to a British monopoly. The leading mujtahid of the day, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, gave a fatwa to the effect that for as long as tobacco was cultivated and marketed by this monopoly, it was forbidden to be consumed. Such was the effect of this fatwa that even the women in the royal household refrained from the use of tobacco. This movement in 1892 was followed just over a decade later by the movement in Iranian history known as the Constitutional Revolution which dates approximately as having lasted from 1905 until 1911.
In the Constitutional Revolution, the ulema continued to play an extremely important role. We may say that throughout Iranian history the whole course of constitutionalism has been intimately linked with the role of the religious scholars.
It may be thought that constitutionalism, even the word itself, or the word that it is intended to translate, is of European origin and it may be asked how could it be that the ulema, whether in Iran or any other Islamic country, could adopt a course, a method of political reform which is obviously foreign in its ultimate origins. The answer that can be given, at least in the case of Iran, is fairly clear. It was held by the Shi'ia ulema of the day that a totally legitimate authority was, in the nature of things, impossible, given the continuing occultation, or absence of the Imam from the world. It was held that all that could be done in his absence was to limit the inevitable illegitimacy of existing rule. Therefore, it was held that a monarchical power that was limited by the existence of the constitution, by the election of an assembly of representatives, was preferable to one that was absolute and arbitrary in its exercise of power. Hence the idea 'Of constitutionalism, which had been introduced into Iran by certain western educated elements, was given a particular application and content by the ulema. They saw in it a means of limiting the royal power and lessening the illegitimacy that was almost inevitable in their view in the whole institution of the State. It is not possible or even necessary to relate to you the events of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Enough to say that the major Iranian historian of the revolution, Ahmad Kasravi, has seen in the agreement concluded by the two major mujtahids of Tehran, Sayyid Muhammad Bihbihani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, the starting point qf the revolution in December 1906. Throughout the revolution the major directives came from the ulema. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution was frustrated by the resistance of the monarchy, powerfully supported and encouraged by foreign powers. We may say that had it not been for the continued interference in Iranian affairs, first by Russia, then by Great Britain and most recently by the United States and Israel, Iran today, instead of looking back on a quarter century of struggle and a year of Revolution in which a minimum of 50,000 people were slaughtered, would be able to look back on more than half a century of constitutional and parliamentary rule. As it was, first the Russians and then the British and recently the Americans, frustrated the Constitutional Revolution. Here also we cannot go into detail. Time does not permit it. The Russians dominated in the period between approximately 1907, which saw an effective and temporary withdrawal of the British from the scene, to the end of the First World War. Then the British reappeared in force on the scene -in such force that they had no visible competitor, and brought about a change of dynasty, from the Qajar dynasty now happily defunct, to the Pahlavi dynasty. With the Pahlavi dynasty a new period was inaugurated in the history of Iran. A new and particularly sombre period in which the traditional monarchy is transformed into a modern dictatorship.
It was often said, in the United States, and probably elsewhere, that the Iranian Revolution was motivated by hostility to this glorious phenomenon known as "modernisation". In so far as the word "modernisation" has had any meaning in the Iranian context, what was modernised by the Pahlavi dynasty was the apparatus of repression. At least the Qajar dynasty and the others before it were limited in their ability to enact their will by the traditional inefficiency of Middle Eastern monarchies, but by contrast the Pahlavi dynasty, although it paid lip service to Iranian tradition, and was appointed, by King George V, to the crown of Iran, in effect ruled as dictators of a modern, European, totalitarian kind. It followed that under this kind of regime, the constitutional ideal to which the ulema from a particular point of view had subscribed was thoroughly repressed and defeated. We find, therefore, in the period of Reza Shah, the first member of the Pahlavi mafia, the coming into being of a rubber stamp parliamentary assembly. That continued effectively until the overthrow of the monarchy. Among the few individuals to resist the imposition of the Pahlavi dictatorship in an open fashion, was again one of the ulema, Sayyid Hasan Mudarris. He spoke up in the Majlis against the measures of Reza Shah and went into exile and was murdered in exile by agents of Reza Shah.
Another characteristic of the period, apart from the suppression of constitutionalism, is the imitation of the measures taken in neighbouring Turkey by Mustafa Kamal. An attempt was made to cultivate an ethnic nationalism with strong overtones of hatred against the Arabs, rejection of the Islamic heritage, glorification of the pre-Islamic past, the purging of the Persian language of Arabic loanwords and so on. For a variety of reasons the measures taken by Reza Shah in Iran were less effective than those that had taken place in Turkey, partly because imitation is always less successful than the original and partly because westernisation and secularization had a far longer prehistory in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire than in Iran. In any event, this officially sponsored nationalist ideology continued to dominate at least the surface of Iranian life for many years, so much so that a large number of western observers were happy to write off Iran as a constituent part of the Islamic world and were given to repeating the remarks made by Iranian officialdom, "Yes, we are Moslems, but remember we are not Arabs", as if there were some kind of tension between these two entities. In fact the continuing and effective loyalty of the Iranian people to Islam with all of the alignments that implies, never ceased. It was simply that the open manifestation of it became difficult if not impossible for many years under the rule of the two successive Pahlavi dictators.
In 1941, the reign of the first Pahlavi monarch came to an end. The same people who had put him in, put him on a train out of the country and then on to a ship, namely the British. On this occasion they were aided by the Americans and the Russians. As the second Shah indicates in his own memoirs, in a very interesting sentence, "It was deemed appropriate by the Allies that I should succeed my father." So this then young man who was put on the throne in 1941 commenced his rule of exploitation and murder in the service of his foreign masters. The change of dynasty in itself resulted in a temporary relaxation of the full rigour of the dynasty. In the first decade of the reign of the now deposed Shah, we see a resurgence of Islamically oriented elements in the political life of the country. The ideal pursued is again constitutionalism and the most politically important of the ulema of the time, Ayatullah Kashani, in the numerous speeches he made within the Iranian parliament and outside, would always refer to two sources of authority on the one hand the Qoran, and on the other hand the Iranian Constitution. In the name of both the Constitution and the Qoran he would call for the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry to bring to an end British imperialist domination of Iran and he would call for an effective limitation on the royal power. Outside of the Majlis, there was a large number of Islamic elements at work in this period. There were, for example, the Fidayan-e-Islam. This was an organisation an activist militant organisation, which specialised in the removal of prominent enemies of Islam in Iran. For example, one of the Prime Ministers who was a British agent, Razmara, was assassinated by the Fidayan-e-Islam. But the dominant personality of this first decade of the pre-war period was not a member of the religious class. He was a secular nationalist politician, the late Dr. Mohammad Mussadeq, who indeed enjoyed the support of the religious classes, was himself an obse1Ving Moslem, although no doubt lacking in full consciousness of Islam as a total way of life. Nonetheless, he was a sincere, patriotic and honest man.
We know now in full detail what happened to Dr. Mussadeq and the nationalist regime he headed. It was overthrown in August 1953 by the direct intervention of the United States in the form of the CIA coup of August 1953 which brought about the overthrow of Dr. Mussadeq and the return of the Shah from the exile into which he had been sent.
The return of the Shah in 1953 inaugurated the intense period of a quarter of a century of unprecedented massacre and repression, the intensive exploitation of the resources of the Iranian people by the imperialism of the East and West, the western camp being headed then by the United States rather than Britain. In that period, of course, a large number of ideological forces came into being to combat the dictatorship of the Shah and his subservience to foreign powers. But from the beginning, immediately after 1953, the coup d'etat, we see these religious elements playing an important part. We can mention what was called the “National Resistance Movement that came into being very soon after the return of the Shah from exile. Although there is no overtly religious component in the destignation of this organisation, nonetheless, it was an Islamic patriotic organisation. It was succeeded somewhat later by a movement called the Movement of God-Fearing Socialists. It should be said that at this time socialism in Iran, or at least a certain variety of socialism, enjoyed a certain vogue because of the currency in popularity of the slogan of "Islamic socialism" in the Arab world. This is not the time to go into the suitability or otherwise of this term. I mention it in passing.
Then we had in 1963 the emergence to public prominence for the first time of the present leader of the Iranian people, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. About his immediate background I will speak in much greater detail at my next lecture. To place him for the moment in the historical perspective I have attempted to sketch for you this morning, we can say that he is in many ways the culmination of a long tradition that begins with the first hesitant disputation of the legitimacy of the monarchy. That goes on, in the Qajar period, to openly contest the authority of the monarchy in a certain number of specific incidents. It then goes on to the attempt to limit the power of the monarchy through a constitution, and then sees that the whole formality of legalism, constitutionalism of itself, is not adequate and that nothing short of revolution and the complete overthrow of the existing order is acceptable. It is part of the greatness of Ayatollah Khomeini to have given a leadership and direction to the Islamic Revolution that is totally without parallel in the contemporary Islamic world. Without in any way diminishing or underestimating the importance of his personal contribution, one should bear in mind that he has behind him a long tradition upon which he draws, a tradition of assertion of the ulema as the directive force in society, a tradition of opposition to rule precisely in the name of Shi'ia Islam, a tradition of ever growing militancy and constant readiness to self-sacrifice.
These are the main points I wanted to mention today. There has, inevitably, been much omission and over-simplification, names left out and so forth. Perhaps, I can partially make up for that in the second stage.

Discussion
Question: You have attributed the preservation of the monarchy, even though it was viewed as an illegitimate institution, to the influence of external forces. To what extent is the inability to develop alternative institutions to the monarchy a reflection of an inadequate political theory or the absence of the development of an adequate political formulation within Muslim thinking in the last few centuries? Will there always be this tension between State authority and the Ayatullah within the Shi'ia tradition and what is there to prevent this tension being removed, to allow for the development of a new constitution?
Professor Algar: As to the persistence of the monarchy in Iran, to put it more precisely I should have said that the monarchy was able to defy the constitution through the support of foreign powers. The religious leaders earlier in the century might have been willing to support the continued existence of the monarchy on the condition that the constitution had been observed, and this continued to be the case for at least half a century. There was gradual evolution in the conclusions drawn from the political situation. The conclusion was first drawn that the: illegitimacy was inherent in any State in the absence of the Imam and, therefore, the illegitimacy could at best be hoped to be reduced, if not abolished, through the institution of the constitution. When the constitutional experiment failed, gradually realization dawned that the institution of monarchy should be abolished.
Moreover, one of the important contributions of Ayatollah Khomeini that I should mention is that he takes issue with this whole idea of the inalienable illegitimacy of political authority in the absence of the Imam. In a series of lectures that he gave under the title "Islamic Government", originally given largely to an audience of ulema and students of religious sciences, he says that because the Imam is absent, does this mean that the shari'a should no longer be enforced? Obviously not. If the shari'a is to be enforced, there must be those who enforce the shari'a. In other words, there must be a political authority that is firmly based upon the authority of the shari'a.
As for a tension between the Ayatullah and the secular authorities, probably you are alluding to the so-called rift between Ayatullah Khomeini and Mehdi Bazargan -a charge played up greatly in the western press, as if there was some fundamental antagonism between the two men, which is not the case. Bazargan has the unusual virtue, although in some cases it is not always an advantage, of speaking his mind in a very precise and frank fashion, whoever or whatever the audience may be. Therefore, he comments in the frankest possible way upon any problems which come up in his relations with Khomeini in the revolutionary situation. This is not a question of a fundamental antagonism between the two men on a personal or institutional level. There is no question of a continuation in the post-revolutionary period of attitudes that are somehow inalienable.
The Chairman: There appears to have been a lag in the development of Muslim political thought over this period. The lag has been taken up by Khomeini. In other words, the political thought was lying behind the actual situation.
Professor Algar: I think it is true to say that. It is justifiable to say that there was a lack of a fully articulated political theory and it was largely created by the evolution of circumstances in Iran. After the constitutional experiment essentially failed and after the auspices of the United States and Israel, people were led inevitably to have new thoughts on the matter and to take up more uncompromising, more far reaching positions than had been the case in the past.
Question: May I raise the same question? It refers to the problem of illegitimacy of any government in the absence of the Imam. I find it difficult to trace a point where, in the existence of the Imam -there are twelve Imams who have existed over two centuries -there has ever been an attempt to displace the existing monarchy. No. Imam, to my knowledge, has ever taken up arms against the rulers who are, ipso facto, considered illegitimate.
Professor Algar: There are two contradictory conclusions that may be drawn from the illegitimacy of existing power. One tends in the direction of quietism and the other in the direction of open manifestation. One important doctrine of Shi 'ism which operated in the direction of quietism was taqiya, the preservation of the community through its virtual self-effacement in a political sense. After the disappearance of the Imam, both options were open, that of quietism or revolutionary action. Progressively under the impact of particular circumstances the second course came to be chosen.
Dr. Salman: As a result of this policy of isolating Iran from the Arab world and also as a result of degeneration of scholarship in the Muslim and Arab world, and the Sunni world, the Sunnis know very little about the Shi'ia, so much so that the term "Ayatullah", when it became well known at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, was completely unknown. It would be useful for many of us, who are Sunnis, to hear something from you about this office and whether there is a structure, a hierarchy, through which the authority passes.
Professor Algar: The term 'Ayatullah' is literally translated as "a sign of God " -a person who, through his spiritual and learned attainments, is a manifestation of certain qualities which ultimately draw upon Divine perfection. It is a title given by popular usage, in other words, it is not a rank in the sense of mujtahid. It is a little conferred by popular usage on someone who has emerged as one of the major mujtahids. We cannot speak of a hierarchy within the Shi'ia other than the simple hierarchy of mujtahid and muqallid. Essentially, the Shi'ia community is composed of mujtahids and muqallid. Among the mujtahids, there are those who have the great authority and degree of learning. It sometimes happens that among the mujtahids a certain individual will emerge as the sole marja-e-taqlid. In other words, the personal attainments of that person are such that he will overshadow all of the other mujtahids and everyone will exercise taqlid in respect of him.
Dr. Salman: How many marja-e-taqlid are there? I read that there are six Ayatullahs in Iran.
Professor Algar: No, there are many more than that. The tit If: has come a little over generously used recently. There are probably about four or five marja-i-taqlid of whom Ayatollah Khomeini is a political sense is the marja-i taqlid of people who, in non-political matters, follow the guidance of other mujtahids. You find people who are in a narrower sense the followers of Ayatullah Shariatmadari but who, politically, follow Ayatullah Khomeini. His authority has gone far beyond the bounds of what is implied in this whole doctrine of taqlid, although that is the technical basis for it. He exercises a far wider authority.
The Chairman: These marja-i taqlid are not elected ? Professor Algar: No, it is in the strict sense of the word a democratic process. Since there is no machinery, no elective machinery, no machinery of appointment, it is not as though someone puts himself up for the office. It is simply that one attains the technical qualification of mujtahid, and then through piety and learning that is demonstrated, he gathers a certain following. His influence will be mediated to his following by, if you like, the second ranking members of the ulema. Here is where you can speak of a network in Iran. I do not like the word "hierarchy", but one can speak of a network.
When I was in Paris with Ayatullah Khomeini at the end of last year, it was interesting to see how the various proclamations and instructions of Ayatullah Khomeini were conveyed. A telephone call was made from Paris to a number of provincial cities in Iran. Every individual seated at his telephone in each of those cities would have a tape recorder ready. The message would be recorded, transcribed and given into the hands of the mullahs for distribution within that city. In turn, the students of those mullahs would take it out into the villages. This is one of the things I should have spoken of, but did not get the chance to. The work of Ayatullah Khomeini was preceded in an organizational sense and made possible by the work of the Ayatullah Burujirdi. Although he was politically inactive, when there was the struggle against the oil industry, when there was the American coup d'etat against Dr. Mussadeq, he remained silent. That silence earned him the reproaches of many people. One important achievement that is to his credit is the reorganization of what is called Hauza-yi Ilmiya, the teaching institute in Qum. He established a network for the dissemination of religious knowledge throughout Iran as well as the collection of zakat and khums. The same network established by him was used lately by Ayatullah Khomeini and other leaders.
Question: The world press is rather contradictory. Some people say we cannot shut up our eyes at the prosperity and achievement brought about. by the Shah of Iran, for example, m education, industry, and even in the number of doctors. There are more doctors in Iran than in Pakistan or other countries. This was done in the reign of the king himself. Second, this killing which continues by Ayatullah Khomeini -it is judicial or unjudicial assassination. What do you call it? There is a long list of killings. In spite of the world press which says that this should be stopped in the interests of Iran because there should be a reconciliation between the people working under the regime of the Shah and others because the target is almost achieved, the king is expelled from the soil. The killing is almost meaningless. There should be complete reconciliation and unity to bring about co-operation in Islamic structure.
Professor Algar: Since this question has been raised, I think that I should answer it. I have to say that I think it is unfortunate that a Muslim should raise this kind of question and put forward these ideas. You speak of a continuation of the killings. If you equate the cold-blooded slaughter of 50,000 people in the single year -I am not speaking of the entire career of the Shah -with the execution of 300 murderers by the Islamic Revolutionary regime in Iran, you must have a strange conception of justice in general and Islamic justice in particular. It is not a question of judicial assassination -I am not quite sure what that means -surely in Islam a murder is accountable for his crimes and someone who is guilty of multiple murder should also be accountable. You speak about unity. Unity between who and who and on what basis? There can be no unity between on the one hand, the people who have offered thousands of sacrifices and martyrs, whose blood is hardly yet dry on the streets of Iran, and on the other hand those who, for the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Israel and other centers of corruption and intrigue around the world, have been continually slaughtering and murdering their own fellow countrymen. How can there be unity between them? On the contrary, the number of people executed in Iran since the Revolution has been extremely small and extremely restrained. In the United States, the Zionist idiots and hypocrites who control the media talk about a blood bath in Iran. Where were these people when on a single day in Iran, September 8, 1978, 4,000 people were shot down, a minimum of 4,000 people were shot down in a single day. Now you want to have forgiveness and reconciliation. No. These butchers should be put to death. Those of them who have fled to other countries, these thieves, embezzlers, these drug merchants, if they be in Britain or anywhere else, as the Chief of the Revolutionary Council said, they should be cut down and killed. This is the duty of all Moslems, not simply Iranians.
Question: As we know, the western press and the media are controlled by Zionists, imperialists and intriguers. Justice has to be seen to be done and to be carried out as regards the perpetrators of injustices and the western people who have been committing murders against the people of Iran. Will we be cowed down by the western media and the intriguers as regards the carrying out of justice in Iran.
Professor Algar: One thing we should remember as Muslims is that we have our own form of judicial procedure in Islam. The Iranian people did not suffer the sacrifices that they did to have a replica, a pale imitation of some western form of government, whether a judicial system, political organization, or anything else. For us, as Moslems, the only relevant question is whether the trials and executions that have taken place in Iran are in conformity with Islamic practice and standards. Very clearly they are. Every individual who has been accused and brought before a court in Iran has had the chance of calling witnesses for and against. I know of an individual at Tehran University who testified in favour of one former Savak agent. Those who have a direct interest in the case have been permitted to attend, representatives of the foreign press have attended certain of the trials, although not an of them. We hear of this hasty justice by some segments of the western press. What is meant by this? In America, and probably in Britain too, the delay that occurs between the pronouncement of a judgment and its execution is intended above all to enrich the lawyers. That is an there is to it. The agony of the prisoner is prolonged when lawyers make a fortune for themselves. However, in Islam, if a judgment is given that is fully supported by the evidence there is no logical or human reason to delay the execution of the judgment. It is more merciful.
Question: We have discussed the tradition and leadership of the Iranian movement and the Revolution which is the outstanding event in the Muslim world. Would you consider such background developments to be a prerequisite or otherwise for the Islamic Revolution?
Professor Algar: You are anticipating something which forms the topic of a later lecture; In my last lecture to you I want to consider this question of the applicability of the Iranian model to other Muslim countries. To give a partial and preliminary answer, the emergence of an ulema class in the form we have seen in Iran is not a prerequisite for the success of the Islamic movement in other parts of the Islamic world because this would in effect mean that they all accept Shi'ism which, of course, they are free to do, but I do not think we can say that this in itself is a prerequisite. There are other lessons to be drawn from the Iranian experience which are to be designated as,-prerequisites. On the one hand there is the clear identification of the existing order as being totally opposed to Islam, the refusal of any co-operation with it or to be absorbed into it, the total and realistic and serious opposition that brings with it a readiness to sacrifice, a shunning of the various forms of pseudo-Islamic activities, such as attending conferences in Saudi Arabia, and so forth. Ayatullah Khomeini has never attended a single conference sponsored by the Saudi regime and yet we see him today not merely the de facto ruler of Iran, but the source of inspiration of millions of Muslims throughout the world. These and other lessons of the Iranian Revolution I would like to draw on later.
Question: The question of the struggle of the Iranian ulema seems to be one of turning back to the role of religious counsellors or advisers during the post-revolutionary period. How far is this true? The ulema played the role of religious counsellors, but now Khomeini has not put these men as secretaries of State or as Prime Minister.
Professor Algar: I understand the reason for your question, but I think it implies a number of things which are not true. You talk about a Secretary of State. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran is by no means a secularist. I am sure you would agree that for a Muslim to avoid being a secularist it is not necessary for him to wear a turban. The Government is made up of people who are fully committed to Islam. I do not think that Ayatullah Khomeini, has withdrawn from a prominent, indeed, a leading role in Iran. There is a duality of authority that we now see in Iran. The Revolutionary Council is composed mainly, if not exclusively, of religious authorities. The Provisional Revolutionary Government is made up of people who have political administrative experience which, for obvious reasons, members of the religious class lack. On the other hand, the wise decision was made by Imam Khomeini not to put religious leaders in a position of obvious prominence so as to avoid the accusation that an Islamic State means rule by the ulema, which obviously it does not. There is this temporary arrangement which will come to an end once the constitution has been ratified and, on the basis of the constitution, elections have been held. Then the government which emerges on the basis of elections may be composed exclusively of. non-ulema elements. It might be composed exclusively of ulema elements or more like a mixture of the two. There is a party called the party for the Islamic Republic, the governing body of which, composed of six individuals, belongs exclusively to the ulema. There is a great likelihood that when the elections take place, it will win an absolute majority.
The Chairman: Can I take you up on this? I detected a number of contradictions. One of them is the existence of political administrative experience among a group of people. Earlier you said that there should be no compromise with the existing system. Now you are saying that you want to rely, in the early period of the Revolution, on experience gained in the past. How do you gain experience from that political system and how is the political experience of that period relevant to this period?
My other question is that it seems that you are now saying that there will be elections in which a political party called the party of the Islamic Republic will fight an election. This assumes that there would be another party or could be, technically, another party opposing that party, which does not want an Islamic Republic. In that event you are relying on the attainment of a majority. When was an election last held in a Shi'ia political system? What is the origin of elections in the political system of the Islamic Republic? In all of this you seem to be dipping your hands back into the foreigners' basket for intellectual and technical tools.
Professor Algar: As to the first question about the acquisition of experience by members of the present provisional government, they acquired their experience not under the reign of the Shah but rather in the period of Dr. Mussadeq, which is a more relevant experience. Prime Minister Bazargan managed the Iranian oil industry immediately after its nationalization. Others in the present Cabinet have had experience not in the government as such but rather in the spheres of academia, in some cases in technical enterprises and were totally independent of the State in the period of the Shah. It is not a question of taking on people who have acquired experience of political administration under the regime of the Shah. Moreover, they are being deployed at the moment not in the formulation of policy, but in its execution. I agree that it is not entirely satisfactory that there should be this duality of authority. One must remember that this is an interim and transitional situation in which contradictions are bound to exist and which, we hope, will be resolved.
Turning now to the second question about elections, and the place of them in Shi'ism, there is no question of elections when it comes to the appointment of the Imam who is divinely appointed. Whether one be Shi'ia or Sunni, there is the simple factor of the Qur'anic injunction for consultation. An election is nothing more than a mechanism for the implementation of this general Qur'anic principle of consultation. Another point that is of importance and significance about the Islamic Revolution is that it feels secure enough of itself, sufficiently self-assured, to permit the expression of dissenting points of view. It is surely a far more effective way of combating the potential danger represented by Marxism to permit the free organization of Marxist political parties and then, in the electoral process to demonstrate their importance, than it is to jump upon them and put their members in goal, as if Muslims had something to be scared of. This anti-communist bogey that is waved in various parts of the Muslim world to frighten people into silence, should be brought into the open and shown for what it is, as something totally weak.
Moreover, there is the simple question that we cannot 'have an Islamic State based upon coercion. To permit freedom of expression, even in opposition to the principle of an Islamic Republic, seems politically wise and in accordance with the fundamental injunctions of Islam itself.
Question: In the light of the Shi'ia concept of political authority, if this concept was to be extended from a particular country, say that of Iran, who will make that political authority? Will it be a central authority? If it is a central authority, who will make it and will there be agreements upon it? If that is not the case, will it be independent local authorities and if that is the case, do you see any political differences of opinion?
Professor Algar: We have to admit that there is no single uniquely valid system of political authority. There are certain general principles which may apply in different fashions according to certain particular circumstances. Whether the forms that are in the process of emerging in Iran will be applicable without modification to other countries it is a question that remains open. Your questions are eliciting from me a number of matters which belong to later lectures. One important factor about the Iranian Revolution which makes it a real Revolution and not a coup d 'etat, is that the people before the Revolution evolved their own organs of government and administration. This took place before the final triumph of the Revolution. The removal of Bakhtiar was a formality because an alternative government had come into being and, moreover, this had happened while Ayatullah Khomeini was still in exile.
There is in Iran at the moment a large dispersal of authority, a decentralization. This is something valuable from which every Muslim may learn in that frequently when we have our brother Islamic movements, whether in the Arab world, Pakistan, or elsewhere, when they speak of an Islamic State and idea is of setting up a strong central authority, geared to realizing the goals of Islam and then telling the people how to implement these goals. What has happened in Iran is the opposite, namely that there has emerged in every village throughout the country a local organ of self-government and authority which functions with the mosque as its center, with the local u/ema as its leader and effectively conducts the day to day business of government. The new constitution, interestingly enough, provides for the perpetuation of this feature. The field is definitely open for experimentation. One of the valuable things that has happened in Iran is that for the first time, not on the basis of some theoretical concepts drawn up by so called Islamic research academies, but on the basis of the true and genuine revolutionary participation by the whole people, a viable model of government has come into being. Whether other Muslim countries follow this model is another question. The important thing about what is happening in Iran is that it has been a mass movement which has evolved its own form of self-government. It has not been a question of theory. Other movements elsewhere have been strong on theory and have spent lots of conference time debating this, generally abroad, in America and Europe. But they have been weak in practice. You can reproach the Iranian movement with late development of a theory, but you cannot reproach it with lack of practice. Lack of theory is the less essential factor.
The Chairman: It seems to me that in your lecture you were saying that. over 300 years in Iran there developed Shi'ia intellectual thought and there was a process of development of thought in Iran which has led to this Revolution. You rightly linked Ayatullah Khomeini and all the major figures before, who articulated Shi'ia thought or Islamic thought in Iran leading up to this Revolution. Now you appear to be saying that there was no need for the intellectual basis of the Revolution.
Professor Algar: No, I am not saying that.
The Chairman: I am looking at it as a criticism of intellectual pursuit in Islam. You would not mean to do that, I am sure. Being a professor, you would not like to be out of a job.
Professor Algar: I do not know. Sometimes I would like a more honourable job. No one disputes the necessity of intellectual pursuit, but an intellectual pursuit that is carried on in isolation or at the expense of actual practice and actual involvement in the day to day problems of Moslems, the Muslim masses, is something else. That is something totally useless.
Question: The Islamic Revolution in Iran has brought about a change in the role of leadership in the Islamic system as compared to other systems. Could you briefly comment on how the leadership role differs in different systems?
Professor Algar: This is a generalized question. Rather than attempt a comparison, I would say that Ayatullah Khomeini has emerged as the leader of the Iranian people. I do not like this word 'leader' because it carries a certain kind of connotation with it, That is, it does so in English, where we are obliged to make compromises. He has emerged, for want of a better word, as the leader of the Iranian people. Here again, I may be sounding anti-intellectual, but it is not because of a question of theory. All this theory I have elaborated, has been of importance but it is not a question of what Ayatullah Khomeini has done and is doing, it is a question of what the man is. Anyone who has come into the presence of Ayatullah Khomeini has realized that this man is a kind of embodiment of the human ideal. It is by exercising this combination of moral, intellectual, political and spiritual ability that he has come to have this tremendous role in Iran. He has gone much beyond the traditional bounds of authority of the marja-i taqlid. He has become a symbol, an incorporation of the whole Iranian concept of self identity. If Muslims look at him, non-Iranian Moslems, they will see in him a precious example of the human ideal of Islam also.
This is a man who today can have a demonstration of millions of people on the streets in Iran in a few minutes. Yet when you see him in his place of work, and his residence, he is sitting on the floor with a little lectern in front of him. That is the entirety of his office equipment. Yet you can go to so called Muslim leaders -this is the relevant comparison -and see them in their comfortably appointed offices. I recall visiting an apartment in Ankara belonging to a prominent leader of a party which with some justice calls itself an Islamic party. Unfortunately, it fails far short of what is should be. This was an apartment overstuffed with all kinds of souvenirs of trips to western Europe, with pseudo-French furniture and gold-plated telephones. Yet this was one of the people who claimed to represent Islam. I am not saying that Ayatullah Khomeini is totally unique in his personal way of life. There have been others and there are others in the Islamic world who have at least approached the same ideal. But if you are speaking in general about the qualities of leadership, it is not a question of a particular theory of leadership or a certain organization or network, it is to do with the peculiarity of this man, the spiritual and moral dimension which must be there. With Ayatullah Khomeini, obviously and overwhelmingly it is there. I read an interesting article in a Turkish secularist newspaper who, before the Iranian Revolution, like many other writers in the Turkish daily press, had written all kinds of nonsense about Imam Khomeini, had gone to see Khomeini. It was interesting. He said he went in the presence of Imam Khomeini with a whole list of idiotic questions, such as, "What about religious minorities?", "What about women?", "Are you going to dismantle the factories?", and that kind of junk. Instead of putting forward this series of questions, he found himself reduced to complete silence and a great sense of shame and embarrassment. In the end the only question he could ask Imam Khomeini was to give him some guidance in his personal life. Where upon he advised him to study Islam and begin making his prayers, and so on.
Anyone who has the honour of seeing Imam Khomeini has the same story. It is what the man is. All too often in this pseudo-intellectualism, the Muslims waste their time and energy. You totally lose sight of the end.. You sit around arguing about words. You lose sight of those spiritual and moral qualities. It is not a matter of sentimentalism or spiritualism. This is a demonstrable reality. How else can we explain the success of the Iranian Revolution? These people who had no material resources at their disposal whatever, faced with one. of the best equipped armies in the world, opposed by all the major powers, and some of the lesser ones, nevertheless triumphed. How? The historians will still be scratching their heads 100 years from now wondering how it happened. But the Moslem, when he sees this, will see the kind of leadership provided by Imam Khomeini and the moral and spiritual dimensions which he gave to the Iranian Revolution.
Question: What is the relationship between the ulema and the existing rulers of Iraq compared to the ulema of Iran?
Professor Algar: This is a subject on which I am not well informed. Recently, there has been considerable antagonism between the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and Ayatullah Sadr, who has been a close associate of Ayatullah Khomeini and was an acquaintance of his during his long years of exile. There are many reports of large scale demonstrations in Iraq against the Ba'athist regime, which led to the killing of a large number of people and the arrest of many more, including the personal emissary of Ayatullah Khomeini. I believe that he was later released. There is a danger when we talk about the coming influence or even the present influence of the Iranian Revolution to think only in terms of Shi'ia communities. Obviously Shi'ia communities have a particular interest in what is going on in Iran, particularly those in Iraq which is next door. But the influence of the Revolution is in no way confined to the various Shi'ia communities.
Questioner (as above): I am talking in a historical sense.
Professor Algar: Historically, the Shi'ia element of Iraq led a long struggle against the British mandate. Ayatullah Kashani and his father, Mustapha Kashani, were sentenced to death by the British in Iraq for their role in opposing the imposition of a British regime there. Further, the Shi'ia ulema also opposed the British in Iraq. There is a long and protracted jihad against the British regime. In the post-war period there was activism against the Hashimites and even more recently against the Ba'athists. But I am not in a position to go into details in the case of Iraq.
Question: The mujtahids can arrive at different conclusions based on different interpretations. Both might be correct. No one can claim that he is right. You mentioned that various Imams said that no one should follow blindly a ruler. They should know what the reason was behind their rulings. How does that apply to what you have said about the mujtahid, the marja-i taqlid?
Professor Algar: Taqlid is not following blindly. Taqlid is a recognition of the limits of one's own knowledge and competence, in the sense of the prophetic hadith, that Allah has mercy on the man who knows his limits and stops at them. There is a great exercise of judgment here when it comes to the choice of a particular mujtahid, or the choice of a Marja-i taqlid. Having made that choice, you follow the guidance of someone who has more authority when he gives his reasons. There is no question of blind following. Within the Shi'ia school it is true that whatever result is arrived at has no claim to infallibility. It is a reasoned supposition. What is essential is not to follow the guidance of any given mujtahid, it is essential from the viewpoint of the Usuli school of thought that one should choose a certain mujtahid. To my mind this is one reason why our brethren in Iran have a far clearer understanding and sense of direction in their Islamic lives, because they have this comprehensive leadership and guidance. The rest of us in the Sunni Muslim world unfortunately under the influence of Wahabism and other related misfortunes, tend to reject taqlid without in any way approaching the position of the mujtahid. It is not a question and direction given by one who is obviously better qualified.
The Chairman: We shall now conclude this session.

LECTURE # 2

Ayatullah Khomeini
The Embodiment of a Tradition
PROF. HAMID ALGAR, University of California, Berkeley
(Delivered in October, 1979)
To recapitulate some of the major themes that I attempted to evoke last week, the Islamic Revolution differs from other events of the present century that have been given that designation by being firmly rooted in history. Far from being a radical break with the essential and profound developments of the Iranian nation, it is, on the contrary, a continuation and fruition of long years of political, spiritual and intellectual development.
I laid particular stress last week on the development of the institution of the Shi'ia ulema, beginning with their importation into Iran in the Safavid period. Then I described their gradual emergence as a class providing not only religious leadership in the narrow and technical sense but also leadership of a national and political nature, given increasingly to contesting the legitimacy of the monarchical institution.
Inevitably, I was obliged to omit certain topics and names, and by way of introduction to today's topic -the culminating figure of the whole tradition of the ulema, Ayatullah Khomeini -I would like to make more detailed reference to some aspects of what I briefly touched upon last week.
First, it would obviously be a distortion of the institution of the ulema to regard it simply from the viewpoint that most interests us -namely, the political. We should also bear in mind that the ulema, not only within the Shi'ia and Iranian context, have been the guardians of the certain body of traditional learning and devotion which has been the whole underpinning and basis of social and political action.
If we look at the specific case of Shi'ia school of thought in Iran, we see that again since the Safavid period -the sixteenth century of the Christian period -the ulema have studied and cultivated a wide variety of different disciplines. These have included not merely the familiar theological disciplines -Qur'an, hadith, tafsir, fiqh and so on -but philosophy, a certain form of philosophy appropriate to the Islamic context, and mysticism, again a certain form of mysticism appropriate to the Islamic and specifically the Shi'ia context.
Indeed, if we look at the person of Ayatullah Khomeini and his achievement, we find that he is the culmination of the tradition of the Shi'ia ulema in Iran, not merely in exercising an unusually comprehensive, wide and profound influence in political and social affairs, but also with respect to the pure learned dimension of the tradition. Here, too, he is an unparalleled figure.
This, then, is one thing. In order to understand the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the role played in it by the ulema, particularly Ayatullah Khomeini, it is necessary to regard not merely their political theory, not merely their sensibility and strategy and their identification with popular aspirations, but also the background of cultivation of Islamic learning and piety from which they sprang.
Secondly, as a footnote to last week's presentation, I would like to go into more detail on two figures who provide the immediate background to the emergence of Ayatullah Khomeini. The first is Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi and the second is Ayatullah Burujirdi. The first is of great importance as the founder of the religious learning institution in Qum, from which Ayatullah Khomeini went forth and which has become in a certain sense the main stronghold of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and also the spiritual capital of the country, given the residence there of Ayatullah Khomeini.
The dates of Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi are from 1859 and 1936, Qum is one of the oldest centers of Shi'ia school of thought in Iran. Not coincidentally, it is also one of the few cities founded in Iran by the Arab Muslim conquerors of the country. It has traditionally been a stronghold of Shi'ia learning. However, until the present century the major centers of Shi'ia learning that exercised great authority within Iran also were situated outside the country, in the cities known as the 'atabat -that is, the cities of Iraq, where certain of the Imams are buried: Karbala, Najaf and Kazimayn, and to a certain extent some others. Almost all the prominent ulema received their education there. Many, even though Iranian by birth, would spend most of their lives there.
This situation has continued to a certain extent, but in Iran the city of Qum came to great prominence as a result of the activities of a succession of important ulema, the first of whom was Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi. In 1922 he founded in the city what is known as the Hauze-ye Ilmiye, which roughly translated is the teaching institution. It is a conglomerate of different colleges and institutions of learning, informally organized and containing a number of teachers, offering the entire spectrum of the traditional religious sciences, joined by philosophy and mysticism.
There is a tradition, attributed to the sixth Imam of the Shi'ia, that in latter times knowledge would arise in Qum and be distributed from there to the rest of Iran and to the rest of the world. Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi, in fulfillment of this tradition, consciously decided to revitalize Qum as a center of religious learning and teaching. This took place in 1922, a date almost the same as the date of the foundation of the Pahlavi dictatorship. Although Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi, in fulfillment of this tradition, consciously decided to revitalize Qum as a center of religious learning and teaching. This took place in 1922, a date almost the same as the date of the foundation of the Pahlavi dictatorship.
Although Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi was apolitical, it can be said that his achievement indirectly contributed ultimately to the overthrow and destruction of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Although he failed to exercise any effective opposition to Reza Khan and the institution of the Pahlavi dictatorship, Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi came to repent his inactivity in this respect, and is reputed to have died in a state of great sorrow.
The second of these two figures who form the immediate background of the emergence of Ayatullah Khomeini, is, of course, Ayatollah Borujerdi (1875-1961). He is the major mujtahid and marja-i taqlid of the immediate post-war period. He continued the twin emphasis of Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi -the strengthening of the teaching institution in Qum as the center of spiritual and religious direction, and a certain quietism in political affairs. He organized a network throughout Iran for the collection of zakat, khums and other religious-sanctioned taxes, which gave a greater financial independence and stability to the religious institution in Qum. This network, established for these purposes, later became of great utility in the course of the Islamic Revolution.
At the same time, Ayatullah Borujerdi on the purely religious plane instituted an important development which has not received sufficient attention -a deliberate attempt by the leading authorities of Shi'ia Muslims to effect a rapprochement with the Sunni Islamic world. Through his efforts and those of the then Shaykh al-Azhar, Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, an institution was established for the taqrib, the rapprochement between the different schools thought in Islam.
This theme has also been taken up by Ayatullah Khomeini, who has repeatedly expressed the need for collaboration and unity between the different segments of the Islamic world.
Politically, however, Ayatullah Borujerdi has been open to considerable criticism. Throughout the tumultuous events of the first decade of the post-war period, years which saw the rise of a large and threatening communist party in Iran, the Tudeh Party, the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry, the rise of Dr. Mussadeq, the CIA coup d'etat, we find complete silence on the part of Ayatullah Borujerdi. Even after e royalist coup d'etat of August 1953, he received emissaries of the Shah's regime at his residence in Qum.
This seemed in the eyes of many Iranians to exclude any role for the ulema, for the religious leaders, in the opposition to the Shah's regime that was not intensifying after the downfall of the Mussadeq regime. Particularly because the role of Ayatullah Kashani (d. 1962), one of the previous supporters of Dr. Mussadeq and the campaign for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, also was ambiguous in many points.
In the first years after the downfall of Dr. Mussadeq and the institution of the royal dictatorship, under American patronage, we find a certain current of religiously-inspired opposition to the Shah's regime. But it has no leading personality; it is relatively weak; and it is overshadowed by secular and leftist forms of opposition to the Shah 's regime.
However, a decade after the overthrow of Mussadeq, in March 1963, there emerges for the first time in prominence on the Iranian scene the great figure of Ayatullah Khomeini. He overshadows not only all his predecessors in this tradition of ulema that I have attempted to sketch for you but also the figure of Mussadeq himself and certainly all other secular politicians and potential leaders of opposition to the royal regime.
The life of Ayatullah Khomeini before his emergence for the first time to the wider public eye in 1963 deserves some attention. As the final element in his name indicates, he was born in the little town of Khomein in 1902, of a family that for many generations had cultivated religious knowledge and learning. His grandfather was a certain Sayid Ahmad, who was also known as Sayid Ahmad Hindi, because he had spent a number of years in India.
As far as is known to me, the family is of Iranian origin for many generations, although ultimately, since he is a Sayid -a descendant of the Prophet -the ultimate origins of the family go beyond Iran. But throughout recent generations the family is Iranian. It is simply that the grandfather spent a certain time in India. There are, apparently, even now, a number of relatives of the family who are still resident in India, somewhere near Lucknow.
His father was a Sayid Mustafa Khomeini, who was killed by a mayor of Khomein in the last days of the Qajar dynasty, because of his protests against the exactions and the unjust taxes and other oppressive practices carried out by the mayor against the local population.
The learned and religious career of Ayatullah Khomeini began when he was 17, in the year 1919, when he went to study in the city of Arak. After a brief stay, he left this relatively small and unimportant city to go to the main center of religious learning in Iran, namely, Qum. His arrival shortly preceded the establishment there of the -Hauze-ye Ilmiye by Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi. Ayatullah Khomeini swiftly emerged as one of his most prominent and important pupils. Under, his guidance, Ayatullah Khomeini studied the disciplines of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, and at the same time he learnt philosophy and mysticism under the guidance of another of the prominent teachers of the day, Mirza Muhammad Ali Shahabadi.
I would like to make a brief diversion to speak of the place of philosophy and mysticism in the learned and even the political career of Ayatullah Khomeini. It is one of the remarkable facts about him that his political role in leading a revolution, unparalleled in recent history, has come totally to overshadow his achievements as a scholar, philosopher and mystic. All too frequently in the modernist Muslim mentality philosophy and mysticism are held to represent a retreat from reality, a total abdication of any kind of political and social role, as if they were merely abstract matters that had no real connection with the existing problems of Muslims and the Islamic world. Ayatullah Khomeini is living proof that these two subjects, correctly conceived and pursued, are on the contrary the mainspring for a form of activity that is profoundly correct, guided by a clear insight that is not merely political and strategic but is also at the same time an insight that is metaphysically correct and well-guided.
As for mysticism, it may be said that it is precisely the moral and spiritual qualities that Ayatullah Khomeini has cultivated that have made him what he most obviously is -a complete embodiment of the human ideal of Islam. This is the revolutionary leader who lives not in comfortable apartments, who spends his nights in prayer and supplication, whose daily sustenance consists of the simplest and most elementary foods. It seems to me that his very thorough ground in philosophy and mysticism has. been even of political relevance and effectiveness.
The earliest fame of Ayatullah Khomeini in the teaching institution at Qum was precisely as an exponent of these two disciplines. He gave a number of well-attended lectures on some of the major texts of Islamic philosophy and developed great eloquence and a forceful teaching style. He has also written from this period a number of texts, particularly original and partly commentaries upon existing texts, which for the most part have remained on his orders unpublished, since he holds that their publication at the present juncture would not be helpful but would divert from more pressing tasks. He also wrote a large number of books on Fiqh, and came to be regarded as an authority in that field. Had his attainments been restricted to these relatively traditional areas -Fiqh on the one hand and philosophy and mysticism on the other he would not doubt have entered the spiritual history of Iran as a great personality. But although in many respects he is the perpetuator, the culminator, of a tradition, he also broke sharply with the existing tradition of the learned institution by cultivating, from a very early point, radical political interests.
During the period of Reza Khan, Ayatullah Khomeini authored a book in criticism of the Pahlavi dictatorship, entitled Kashfal-Asrar, "The Uncovering of Secrets". It was uncompromising and clear, written in a style that characterizes all h pronouncements. He vigorously criticized the regime of Reza Khan and laid open its dependence upon and subordination to foreign powers, at that time primarily Britain. He clearly saw that the hostility of the Pahlavi regime to Islam was not merely the idiosyncratic desire of a single dictator but rather part of a comprehensive strategy for the elimination of Islam as a social and political force throughout the Islamic world, and as such had been conceived by the major centers of imperialism and entrusted to the various local agents of imperialism.
In the course of the Kashf ai-Asrar, he wrote, for example, criticizing Reza Khan:
"All the orders issued by the dictatorial regime of the bandit Reza Khan have no value at all. The laws passed by his Parliament must be scrapped and burned. All the idiotic words that have proceeded from the brain of that illiterate soldier are rotten and it is only the law of God that will remain and resist the ravages of time."
This form of expression, totally uncompromising and marked by a radical insight into the realities of politics, gave rise to misgivings, interestingly enough not only on the part of the Pahlavi regime but within the religious institution itself. For all its strength, like any other institution, it had as its primary interest self-preservation and the promotion of its institutional interests.
In the period when Ayatullah Borujerdi was the dominant figure in Qum, Ayatullah Khomeini enjoyed a position of prominence, but the view entertained of him by certain of the other scholars surrounding Borujerdi was ambivalent. In the period between the downfall of Reza Khan in 1941 and the overthrow of Mussadeq in 1953, Ayatullah Khomeini did not attempt an open denunciation of the regime in the same fashion as he did after 1963. He has more recently expressed regret that he did not earlier begin on the course that for many years now he has seen to be his clear and manifest duty. It should be said, however, that throughout this period he sought to induce a measure of political realism and commitment in Ayatullah Borujerdi. If his efforts in this respect were largely frustrated, there is no doubt that he exercised his influence upon a large number of the younger ulema in Qum and elsewhere, who later came to form part of the directive force of the Revolution. Even before the expulsion of Ayatullah Khomeini from Iran, he had built up a certain following -among the younger ulema in Qum, many of whom are now among the important leaders of the Revolution. It is highly probable that the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iran consists largely if not entirely of the pupils of Ayatullah Khomeini. In other words, they are people whom he has been training for years, both in the traditional religious sciences and in the tasks of political struggle and guidance and leadership. A list of the major students of Ayatullah Khomeini would take many pages. We can mention briefly simply two names that come to mind Imam Musa Sadr, the leader of the Shi'ia community in Lebanon, and Ayatullah Montazeri, who was one of the major I strugglers against the Shah's regime in Iran.
Ayatullah Khomeini's emergence to prominence began in the years following the overthrow of Mussadeq and the ii emergence of an intensified form of dictatorship in Iran. In f 1963, the Shah inaugurated what became known in the western press, and of course in domestic propaganda, as the White Revolution. It has been appositely said of the White Revolution that the only white thing about it was that it was conceived in the White House. It was certainly not white in the sense that it was bloodless, and it was hardly a revolution, On the contrary, it was an attempt to forestall revolution and make it impossible.
The so-called White Revolution consisted of a package of measures allegedly designed to reform Iranian society to promote the welfare of the peasantry and the industrial workers and to "emanicipate" the women. Among the various measures included in it there were two that assumed particular prominence in the propaganda of the Shah's regime and his foreign supports -land reform and women's rights. It may be appropriate to dwell a little on the nature of these two measures before continuing with my narrative of Ayatullah Khomeini's activities.
The slogan of land reform in Iran was the disguise for the total disruption of the agrarian economy in a manner designed to assure maximum profit for the royal family, a certain oligarchy tied to the royal family and foreign agri-business interests, including companies headquartered in the United States,. Europe and, above' all, Israel. It is true that a certain amount of property was distributed among the peasantry, but the land that was distributed was a barely cultivatable nature, and moreover, it was not distributed free of charge; it was distributed against monetary payments that had to be made to banks controlled by the royal family. Moreover, a large number of lands were totally excluded from the scope of the law and were passed instead either to the direct ownership of the royal family, under the title of the Pahlavi Foundation, which was the cover for the financial operations of the royal family, or certain foreign agri-business interests that used the agrarian land of Iran for the cultivation of certain crops that are not consumed in Iran but were destined for the foreign market. For example, wide areas of Iran were given over to the cultivation of asparagus, an item totally missing from the Iranian diet. At the same time, Iranian produced butter became increasingly unavailable, so that in a Tehran supermarket you could find only Danish butter.
This destruction of the agrarian economy caused massive depopulation of the countryside and the coming to the cities of peasants forced to seek work there. The former landowning class were transformed into speculators on urban real estate and import-export merchants, and in pure financial terms they gained from the transformation rather than losing from it.
As for women’s rights, this was a measure designed more for foreign consumption than for domestic purposes, since the Shah's foreign advisers were well aware of the traditional western prejudices concerning Islamic attitudes towards women and thought that this was an infallible way of making the Shah appear an enlightened and benevolent person, acting on behalf of the poor oppressed women of Muslim Iran. In point of fact there has taken place a great transformation in the political-social role of Iranian women over the past twenty-five year$ in Iran -fifteen years at least -but the direction it has taken i$ against the regime. Iranian women found their emancipation not through any measures decreed by the regime but, on the contrary, in struggling against the regime, in suffering abuse, torture, imprisonment and martyrdom at the hands of the regime.
In the declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini made from March 1963 onwards against the Shah 's regime and his attempt to deceive Iranian opinion with the so-called White Revolution, we do not find consistent mention of land reform and women's rights. It is a remarkable thing that right down until last year it was said particularly in the American press -and probably the British press was not much better that these conservative, reactionary, fanatical Muslims in Iran were struggling against the Shah because of their opposition to land reform and their desire to get back what was quaintly termed "the church lands and because they wanted all women to be shrouded from head to foot again. This total absurdity has no basis, not only for the Revolution of the past year but for the preceding fifteen years.
In the earliest declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini, made, in 1963, declarations which have been preserved verbatim and are available to anyone who can read Persian, he concentrates by contrast on a number of other themes. The first is the continued violation by the Shah of the Iranian constitution and his violation of the oath that he took upon acceding to the throne to preserve and to protect Islam. Secondly, he attacks the Shah's subordination to foreign powers, mentioning primarily the United States and, following very closely upon that, Israel.
The question of Israel with respect to the Islamic Revolution is of great importance. It has not been realised, because of the embargo on news in the so-called free press of the west, that Israel has been second only to the United States as one of the major props of the Pahlavi dictatorship. It was well known in Iran that there were two items that were totally excluded from any form of public comment or criticism. It was a well-known rule of Savak, the security police established by the United States for, the Shah, that there were two items that had to be totally excluded from public comment and criticism. One was the royal family and the other was Israel. It is interesting that even the United States, in a certain form and under certain pretexts, might be subjected to criticism but even the name of Israel had not to be mentioned.
Ayatullah Khomeini, with his characteristic refusal to compromise, broke this rule in 1963 and pointed out the very close relationship on the military, political, intelligence and economic planes between the Pahlavi regime and Israel.
Of course, in press accounts of the western world in 1963 you would find not a word on this aspect of the matter.
As for the land reform and women's emancipation, which was supposedly a target of so much righteous anger, the only reference is the declaration of Ayatullah Khomeini in 1963 and subsequently are passing references denouncing them as totally fallacious, and not even worth commenting upon in detail.
After one of the talks that Ayatullah Khomeini was giving at his madrasa in Qum in March 1963, an attack took place upon the madrasa by paratroopers and members of the security police, resulting in the death of a number of people and the arrest of Ayatullah Khomeini. After a period of detention, he was released but, far from being intimidated by his imprisonment, he increased the intensity and frequency of his attacks on the government, so that by June of that year, which corresponded to the important month of Muharram, the nationwide campaign of enlightenment of public opinion by the ulema under the leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini had come into being. Throughout these declarations he continued to attack the subordination of the Shah to foreign powers, particularly the United States and Israel, and his violation of the Iranian constitution and of Islam.
One particular topic that appears to have been the catalyst for the uprising of June 1963 was the granting to Americans in Iran -American advisers, military personnel and their dependants -of total exemption from Iranian jurisdiction, in such a way that, as Ayatullah Khomeini put it, were the dog of an American soldier to bite the Shah himself, the Shah would have no legal recourse. This matter, together with the contracting of a $ 200 million loan from the United States for the purchase of military equipment, supplied a clear illustration of the subordination of the Shah's regime to foreign powers. Ayatullah Khomeini clearly said that the vote of the Majlis which had approved these and similar measures was illegitimate the contrary to the Qur'an. He issued an appeal to the Iranian army to rise up and overthrow the regime and to the people also that they should no longer tolerate a tyranny that was "working towards the total enslavement of Iran."
On the day in the Iranian calendar known as the 15th of Khurdad, corresponding to the 5th June 1963, a vast uprising took place in numerous Iranian cities, which was brutally repressed by the use of force. Not for the first time in the Shah's career, he gave the orders to his security police and to the troops to shoot to kill. It has been estimated that on this day and in the events of subsequent days a minimum of 15,000 people were killed.
Ayatullah Khomeini was arrested again and then after a short period sent into exile in Bursa, Turkey. Interestingly enough, in violation of Turkish law, he was kept under close surveillance in a house guarded by members of the Iranian security police. The Prime Minister of Turkey at the time was, a certain Suleyman Demirel, who is a well-known freemason.
In October 1965, Ayatullah Khomeini was enabled to leave his place of exile in Turkey to go to a more congenial environment, that is Najaf, one of the cities in Iraq that have traditionally been a center not only for the cultivation of Shi'ia learning but of refuge for Iranian religious leaders. This was the case, for example, in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century when a number of the important religious leaders supported the constitutional revolution or, before that, the tobacco boycott movement. They issued their directives from the relative security of the ‘atabat, which were outside Iran.
On this occasion, however, Ayatullah Khomeini by no means found an untroubled refuge there. It needs to be pointed out very plainly and strongly that, despite what was said in the western press for many years, the presence of Ayatullah Khomeini in Iraq in no way constituted any form of alliance, however slight, between himself and the Ba'athist regime in that country. He was, on the contrary, subjected to repeated harassment by the general repression enacted by the regime in Iraq, which is continuing.
From Najaf, Ayatullah Khomeini continued periodically to issue his declarations on Iranian affairs. The Shah's hope that by exiling him from the country he would also put an end to his influence and popularity was decisively frustrated. It has been said that Ayatullah Khomeini emerged to prominence in the course of the Revolution as the result of a vacuum, because there was no viable alternative in sight, but this judgment results from ignorance of the gradual development of the role of Ayatullah Khomeini during his more than fourteen years in exile. Throughout his years in Najaf, he by no means remained silent. We find him, on the contrary, issuing a wide variety of proclamations on Iranian affairs, all of which penetrated the country, were circulated and had a great effect on the formation of Iranian public opinion.
For example, in April 1967, Ayatullah Khomeini sent an open letter to the Prime Minister of Iran at that time, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, in which he denounced Hoveyda and the Shah for their continued violation both of Islam and of the constitution. He went through a comprehensive survey of all the Government policies, criticizing them one by one, warning Hoveyda that one day he would be held responsible. One may imagine the contemptuous disbelief with which Hoveyda received this letter from an exile whose followers had been slaughtered in the streets, a letter addressed to the Prime Minister at the head of one of the major repressive apparatuses in the modern world. Yet it is one of the remarkable things about Ayatullah Khomeini which contributes to the effectiveness of his leadership that every word he has said is seriously meant. This warning, given as far back as April 1967, bore its fruit with the execution of Hoveyda by the Islamic Revolutionary Court this year (1979), in the aftermath of the Revolution.
Another example of the declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini during his years in exile we can draw from a series of events in May 1970, when a consortium of American investors met in Tehran to discuss ways for the more effective penetration and exploitation of the Iranian economy. On this occasion, one of the followers of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Saidi, gave a khutba in his mosque in Tehran denouncing this conference and calling upon the Iranian people to rise up and protest against it. He was arrested and tortured to death by Savak, the Shah's security police, and Ayatullah Khomeini issued a proclamation calling on the people to renew their struggle against the Pahlavi regime.
Later we find Ayatullah Khomeini denouncing the idiotic and wasteful expenditures of the regime for the so-called celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy, a celebration conceived and planned by certain Israeli advisers of the regime. He later also condemned the inauguration of a one-party system in Iran, saying that whoever joined this party voluntarily, without pressure, was in effect a traitor to both the nation and Islam. He also issued many proclamations on the general state of Islam and in particular on the role of Israel.
It is interesting to note that on two occasions, once in 1971 and once during the Revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini also issued two appeals to the Muslim world in general,: appeals that were translated into various languages and distributed during the Hajj. In both these declarations he called solidarity among the Muslims and collaboration for the resolution of their common problems. It is interesting to note, that the so-called champions of Islam, the Saudi regime, saw fit to imprison and torture for long periods a number of those responsible for the distribution of these declarations:
Therefore, it was no surprise to anyone that the Saudi regime, despite its professed loyalty to Islam, ranged itself with Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union in opposing the Islamic Revolution. It has a long history of opposition of the revolutionary Islamic movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini.
As for the role of Ayatullah Khomeini in the Revolution itself, this is direct and immediate in the sense that the opening events of the Revolution are directly concerned with his person. The government-controlled press in January 1978 published an article insulting Ayatullah Khomeini in abusive and obscene terms. That aroused an immediate response of anger in the city of Qum. After the first uprising in Qum, which was suppressed with heavy loss of life, a series of demonstrations and protests unfurled across Iran with ever-increasing tempo, until in December of last year (1978) when probably the greatest demonstrations not merely in Iranian history but in modern history in general took place, forcing the exiling of the Shah and paving the way for the ultimate triumph of the Revolution.
Ayatullah Khomeini increased the tempo of his declarations as the movement picked up speed within Iran. In October of last year he was expelled from Iraq as a result of an agreement between the Shah's Regime and the Ba'athist regime. It is interesting to note that Ayatullah Khomeini considered a number of possible alternatives. He would have preferred to take up residence in a Muslim country but, as he has said publicly, and as I myself have heard from him, not one Muslim country offered him the possibility of a residence that would be both safe and permit him to continue his activity. This simple fact is an eloquent commentary on the nature of the regimes that rule the different Muslim countries today. The Qur'an orders the Muslims to give refuge even to a mushrik in order that he might hear the Qur'an and be informed of religion. Yet these contemporary Muslim regimes that send money for the construction of mosques, preferably in prestige places like London, New York and so on, that hold conferences in Hilton and Sheraton hotels, refuse even the elementary right of security and refuge to one whom any objective Muslim observer must regard as the greatest mujtahid of the present day.
Like so many of the stratagems of the former Iranian regime, this one also turned against it in its ultimate result, because, faced with the impossibility of finding refuge in any other Muslim country after Iraq, Ayatullah Khomeini proceeded to Paris, where he became indefinitely more accessible to Iranians from America, Europe and Iran itself. He also became immediately accessible to the world press not that the world press, of course, was in any way inclined or even intellectually and mentally equipped to reflect the f true message and aspirations of Ayatullah Khomeini. Nonetheless, from Paris his communications with Iran were infinitely easier and his visibility was far greater than had been the case in Najaf.
The study of the proclamations of Ayatullah Khomeini during the year of the Revolution would in itself be an f interesting topic. One sees throughout the year, as the Revolution reaches new peaks, a certain evolutionary style of his declarations. For example, if one looks at the declaration issued on the eve of Muharram last year (1399 H), one sees at great eloquence and forcefulness of expression that one; would say from a purely literary point of view has few parallels in contemporary Iranian expression. By the time be returned to Iran from exile at the beginning of February this year (1979), Ayatullah Khomeini, with no material resources, without the construction of a political party, without the waging of a guerilla war, without the support of a single foreign power, had established himself as the undisputed leader of a major revolutionary movement.
How is that possible? I shall try to supply part of the answer in my next lecture, in which I shall examine the events and the chronology of the Revolution and certain general conclusions that can be drawn. Now, with Khomeini, if I would suggest the following concerning his importance as a revolutionary leader.
First, the 'Revolution' for him -and I use the quotation marks because the word has all kinds of connotations which are not necessarily appropriate to the Iranian context -is one in which as a revolutionary leader he is not merely intellectually and emotionally committed to a certain cause but is totally identified with it. He has been totally unwilling to compromise. Why? It is because he has not been a politician of a familiar kind, concerned with the attainment of personal political advantage. On the contrary, he has sought to heed the commands of Allah and His Messenger is a fashion that is appropriate to Him.
One of my Iranian acquaintances who traveled to Paris to visit Ayatullah Khomeini asked him: "Do you think our present course is wise? What will happen if the army keeps on slaughtering people? Will people sooner or later not get tired and discouraged?' He responded quite simply that it is our duty to struggle in this fashion and the result is with Allah. It is precisely this apparent lack of strategy, this refusal to contemplate the precise calculations of normal political strategy, that constitute the highest form of revolutionary strategy in an Islamic context.
Secondly, we can say that Ayatullah Khomeini has been enabled to fulfill the great and unparalleled role that he has by his spiritual and moral qualities, qualities that cannot be called into doubt by even those who have ideologically no commitment to Islam. One of the remarkable things is that in the course of the Revolution, people who had no particular commitment to Islam in an ideological fashion came to rediscover Islam and at the same time made a commitment to Islam as a revolutionary force through the self-evident moral and spiritual virtues of Ayatullah Khomeini himself. It was obvious that here was a man in no way concerned with the obtaining of a personal or sectarian benefit, but one who represented the deepest aspirations of the Iranian nation.

Discussion
Dr. Salman: You mentioned the important role of philosophy and mysticism. Could you elaborate on this slightly, specifically in relation to Sufism? I do not know whether in the Shia 'ia school of thought, Sufism is organized as it is in the Sunni world. If so, the question of Ayatullah Khomeini's affiliation would be important.
Professor Algar: The word 'mysticism' is a little problematical. I used it for convenience as an English approximation. Sufism as an organized body has only a peripheral existence in Shi'ia school. We do find Sufi orders, but they are generally rejected by the Shi'ia ulema. What I mean by mysticism with respect to Ayatullah Khomeini is what is known as irfan, which is a different form of mysticism appropriate to the Shi'ia context. This is something that draws upon certain dimensions of the Qur'an, the teaching of Ibn Arabi and also the 12 Imams of Shi'ia school. This is what I mean by mysticism in this context, -a certain form of mystical devotion which gives a certain contour to the spiritual life. It has clearly given Ayatullah Khomeini --I do not like to use the expression, but for want of a better one -a certain otherworldliness. It is a paradox that here one has a man so devoid of worldly ambition who is yet on a worldly plane so eminently successful. Viewing matters at a deeper level, from the viewpoint of Islam, we see that it is not a paradox at all. The rejecting by the self of all forms of attachment to this world makes it possible to be extremely effective and active in this world.
In that sense of the hadith, he who humbles himself before God will be raised by God. This is what I intended by the reference to mysticism in Ayatullah Khomeini.
Question: Will you please explain the concept of the Imam and the concept of the caliph, and the relationship between the two, with particular emphasis on two points -the unity of the ulema and, secondly, in relation to the contemporary situation in Iran?
Professor Algar: This is a very wide question, not directly related to today's talk. I am sure that most of the audience knows what is implied in the terms "Imam" and "caliph". The Imam in Shi'ia school is the divinely appointed leader of the community, the first of whom is Ali and the last of whom is the Twelfth Imam, who is held to be in a state of ghaiba, of occultation, of absence from the physical plane, but nonetheless continues to exercise his authority.
This form of succession is in a sense hereditary. Moreover the prerogatives of the successors of the Prophet go beyond the purely political, administrative, military tasks of the caliph in Sunni thought.
I am not sure beyond that what it is possible to say without embarking on an unnecessarily detailed lecture, what is perhaps of more interest is the second part of your question -the relevance of these differences to the present day state of the Islamic world. I would say that it is minimal, if not non-existent, since we in the Sunni Muslim countries do not have a caliph, not do we have machinery or any conceivable process at present for the selection of a caliph. As far as our Shi'ia brothers are concerned, the Imam is also in a state of ghaiba so it does not pose itself as a problem.
What both Sunni and Shi'ia Muslims should direct their attention towards is collaboration on the far more numerous and important matters on which they are agreed. There is no doubt that the Islamic Revolution can be, and already to some extent has been, an important occasion for the gradual elimination of centuries of prejudice and hostility between Sunni and Shi'ia.
Imam Khomeini himself, when I had the honour of meeting him in Paris, expressed a great sorrow that when the Shi'ia Muslims of Iran were obtaining martyrdom in the streets of Tehran during the last Muharram, for the sake of establishment of an Islamic republic, Shi'ia and Sunni i Muslims in India in the same month of Muharram were engaged in slaughtering each other, because of the details of taziya.
Fortunately, as a result of the Revolution, one sees a large number of encouraging developments. For example, in c Afghanistan, a country where there have been deep and prolonged hostilities between the Sunnis and Shi'ia -probably about seventy per cent of the population are Sunni and thirty" per cent Shi'ia -one sees in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and in the course of resistance to the Soviet established Marxist regime, that historic hatreds have been overcome to a remarkable degree. They are fighting together against Soviet imperialism.
In Turkey, again a country where because of centuries of warfare between the Ottomans and the Safavids there are deep-rooted prejudices towards Shi'ia school, a positive interest has been aroused as a result of the Revolution. In many Islamic periodicals in that country now one can see articles about Sunni-Shi'ia relations, a desire to obtain objective, correct information about Shi'ia school of thought and above all to establish an effective collaboration between the Islamic movement in that country and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Therefore, rather than hashing over again the question of Imam and caliph, or whatever differences may have existed, it is far more fruitful for Muslims to spend their energies in establishing closer links of cooperation. After all, we should not forget that the Islamic Revolution has been the only' major setback to the cause of Zionism in the Middle East far more than any military undertaking attempted by any of the Arab states, far more even than the activities of the Palestinians themselves, however heroic these may have been. There can be no doubt that the only major setback suffered by Zionism and American imperialism in the entirety of the Middle East region -or, if you like, the Muslim region -has been the Islamic Revolution of Iran.
It is a Revolution which has potential in the service of all Moslems. It is up to the Muslims of the Sunni countries Arab countries, Turkey, Afghanistan and so on -to align themselves with this Revolution and give it every possible form of support and co-operation.
Question: You mentioned Israel. What was the role of the Jewish minority in Iran in collaboration with Israel, in the light of the execution of one of their leaders?
Professor Algar: We should not make the automatic assumption that the entire Jewish minority in Iran was Zionist in its aspirations or aligned with the previous regime, the Pahlavi regime. Some certainly were. The millionaires like Elghanian, who was put to death, had very close ties with Israel and also with the regime.
But apart from the existence of the Jewish community in Iran, the State of Israel had very close ties with the Pahlavi regime, not necessarily through the Iranian Jewish community. Those ties were established, I think, in 1947, shortly after the establishment of the Zionist State in Palestine, when de facto recognition was accorded to Israel by the Iranian government of the day. That was revoked by Mussadeq.
Then a more thorough-going relationship between Israel and the Iranian Government came into being after the coup d'etat in 1953. Co-operation took place on many levels, but notably in so-called intelligence and security work. After a certain point it appears that the task of staffing and training the Savak was taken over by Mossad, the Israeli security, from the CIA, although the CIA always retained the right of supervising over the operations of Savak. I know of many people who reported having been interrogated and tortured, by Israelis while in the custody of Savak. It was a deep involvement.
In return, the Israelis got a large proportion of their oil -between seventy and ninety per cent from Iran. There was also military co-operation. Iranian officers went for training in Israel. There was a certain amount of penetration of the Iranian economy, partly through Iranian Jews, but not in all cases.
There was the overwhelming similarity between the two of utter dependence on the United States or alignment with the United States. Israel is hardly independent of the United States -or rather matters are the reverse. Israel certainly commands more votes in the Senate than does the White House. There was a very close relationship between Israel and the United States and between the Shah and the United States.
This collaboration did not always go through the Jewish, community. It also went through the Bahai community. If; one is speaking of religious minorities, the most important lone with respect to staffing the Shah's regime, staffing the bureaucracy and the security police, is the Bahais, many oft whom in any case are of Jewish origin. A number of cases could be mentioned, including the former vice-chief of Savak, Sabeti. He was of Jewish origin and received his training in torture techniques in Israel. He and a number of other officers are living in Israel after the Revolution. It is the Bahais rather than the Jews as a community who should be indicated in this respect.
Israel, with its eternal search for immigrants, thought that an ideal situation was developing in Iran with the Revolution. But apart from a certain minority that profited handsomely under the Pahlavi regime, the bulk of Iranian Jewry is not showing an interest in leaving the country to go to Israel. That minority is interesting. There was a piece in the Economist, which one can hardly accuse of being anti-Semitic, describing the arrival in Israel of certain Iranian Jewish immigrants. As they unrolled their carpets at Tel Aviv airport, the gold tumbled out onto the tarmac. This was an interesting demonstration of the way in which this Jewish oligarchy was able to profit under the Pahlavi regime. However, the bulk of Iranian Jews decided to remain behind, much to the displeasures of the Jewish Agency, which, therefore, began to have recourse to the same kind of tactics as it had earlier employed in certain Arab countries, notably Iraq. It went around writing anti-Semitic slogans, throwing bombs into synagogues and so on. These tactics were uncovered and publicized by an organization in Tehran called the Society of Jewish Intellectuals, which warned members of the community against these Zionist tactics.
When I was in Paris in December and early January, visiting Ayatullah Khomeini, a delegation of Iranian Jews came to visit him, and on that occasion he assured them not merely that Iranian Jews should remain in the country but that those w had been deceived by Zionism and had migrated to Palestine -where they were receiving treatment as second-class citizens because of their Asiatic and non-East European origins -should return to Iran, where as citizens of the Islamic Republic they would enjoy rights superior to those they had in the Jewish state of Israel.
Question: What position was held by Ayatullah Khomeini after he graduated from the institute of Qum? Did he introduce changes in the curriculum and methodology? I should also like to know whether his open criticism of the Shah's regime was on behalf of the ulema or of a particular group which he founded.
Professor Algar: As regards the methodology of teaching, I think it is true to say that in effect Ayatullah Khomeini brought about a reform in that he established a close link between the subjects he was teaching and the practical concerns of the day. For this reason, he attracted a far larger audience than many of the other teachers in Qum.
One thing of interest in the aftermath of the Revolution is that after his return to Qum for the first time the systematic teaching of the four madhhabs of Sunni school in Islam has been introduced into the curriculum, both in order to further awareness among Shi'ia Muslims of the potentialities of the Sunni traditions and to draw, if it appears appropriate and necessary, on those potentialities for the solution of particular problems in Iran.
There are a number of individuals who have attained importance in Qum in reforming, in strengthening, the teaching institution. Both Khomeini and Ayatullah Shariatmadari performed great services in this respect in making the teaching syllabus of greater applicability to present-day problems.
As for your second question, I do not think that Ayatullah Khomeini in 1963 or subsequently was speaking either on behalf of the ulema or on behalf of a more narrow group. On the contrary, he saw it to be his duty, as a scholar of Islam and a citizen of Iran, to speak out on these problems. One of the constant themes of all his proclamations is that the ulema have a great importance and dignity in Islam that they cannot fulfill simply by the reading and teaching of texts, that they have a far more comprehensive duty, indicated in the tradition, and that they are the heirs of the Prophet and cannot effectively transmit the legacy of the Prophets simply by retreating into a corner of a madrasa and reading and commenting on texts. They have a far more comprehensive duty of guidance. He was speaking as an alim, conscious of the comprehensive nature of h responsibility, but this is different from speaking on behalf of the ulema as a class. On the contrary, he addressed himself to the entirety of the Iranian nation and beyond that to Muslims at large.
Question: You referred to doubts about the role of Ayatullah Borujerdi, and you mentioned Ayatullah Kashani. It seems to me that you are taking a unidirectional view of the Iranian ulema. You must have pointed this out in your last lecture -that the difficulty stems from the fact that there are various possible interpretations of the role of ulema during the ghaiba. As is evident from Ayatullah Naini's (1860-1936) work, one is faced with the question of either leaving the political field altogether and waiting for the reappearance of the Imam on the physical plane or with devising a system which is the least imperfect.
If you take the two extremes, you can see that the various ulema have taken their stance somewhere between these, and, therefore, fashioned their own activities on the political plane in accordance with their interpretation of the ghaiba. It seems to me that Ayatullah Borujerdi was very much in favour of a quiet attitude towards not taking action, although in present-day circumstances apparently that attitude may seem indefensible. But if it is viewed in the context of the responsibility of the ulema during the ghaiba of Imam it may become more explicable. I should like your comments.
Professor Algar: It is not my intention to criticize Ayatullah Borujerdi or Kashani for the roles they played. I merely wished to point out in the historical context the effect of their attitudes, or at least the perception of their attitudes. It is true that there have been differences of opinion among Shi'ia ulema as to the political implications of the ghaiba. But the general belief that has acquired increasing force since the days of Ayatullah Borujerdi is what Ayatullah Khomeini describes in his book as the vilayat of the scholar, as devolving upon him the duty of leading and guiding the community.
I feel unhappy that in the course of these lectures I am obliged to generalize and over-simplify. This is in the nature of the subject, but it should be pointed out at least that Ayatullah Khomeini's position has evolved over the years. Although he has certain very distinct characteristics from the very beginning, I would say that his political -I would not like to use the word 'philosophy' -attitude has changed and evolved.
After all in 1963 he was calling not for the institution of an Islamic Republic in Iran, but for the implementation of the existing constitution, which provided for a monarchy, however limited in its exercise of power. He was calling upon the Shah in effect to observe and fulfill the oath that he had taken to observe the constitution and to be loyal to Islam. I would say that a progressive radicalization took place of Ayatullah Khomeini's position in his years of exile, and more particularly in the course of the Revolution.
There are many things to be said here, and I would like to have had more time. But as you have raised this question of political theory, which is of importance, I think it is permissible to say that in the usage of Ayatullah Khomeini there is a difference, at least implied, between an Islamic Republic and an Islamic state. On the one hand, an Islamic Republic is intended to be a transitional form of government in which the policies of the state will be geared in a general fashion towards the objectives of Islam and the administration of the affairs of the state will be entrusted to committed Moslems. But there will not be a total implementation of Islamic law in every area of life.
At the same time as this provisional form of government, which will bear the name of republic, is in existence, a process of education and enlightenment will take place, with respect both to those who have been alienated from Islam and those whose Islam is of a narrowly traditional type -that is, based on prayer, fasting and so on, without much awareness of political and social issues.
When that process has been completed, the Islamic Republic will be succeeded by the Islamic state, there is no explicit statement to this effect by Ayatullah Khomeini, but it is an impression that can be gained from careful reading of his proclamations during the year of the Revolution and after his return. That impression is strengthened by reading of the draft of the constitution. One of the interesting things about it is that it does not have any explicit statement that the laws of the state are to be the laws of Islam. Of course, it is a draft constitution, and it may be revised before it is finally ratified, but as it stand there is no explicit stipulation that the laws of the state should be the laws of Islam. Instead, there is a provision that we find in the constitution of a number of other Muslim countries that no legislation shall be enacted that is contrary to Islam, which is quite different.
It seems to me that in the context of Iran this is intended as a transitional stage, a stage at which what is repugnant to Islam will be gradually uprooted and an effort will be made to move in the direction of a truly integral Islamic state. Where, things to that effect are to be found in other constitutions notably, that of Pakistan. It is a piece of demagoguery. But in the case of Iran -I hope I am right, only events will tell -the inclusion of this clause should be seen as a provisional measure. It would be easy to make an overnight declaration that now everything will be according to the sharia and go around spectacularly chopping off hands and so on. But I think that this is one measure of the seriousness of the Revolution and the authenticity of the liberal process of gradualness that is being embarked upon. We can sum up this gradualness as being within the concept of an Islamic Republic which will be the prelude to an Islamic state.
Question: May I ask a supplementary question? In this evolution of Ayatullah Khomeini's thought, from pure implementation of the constitution to an Islamic state, do you think he has moved to a position which was taken up by Ayatullah Nuri way back during the constitutional revolution at the turn of the century, and broken line with the constitutionalists altogether?
Professor Algar: I do not think one can equate the position of Ayatullah Khomeini with that of Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri, who was the chief among the ulema during the constitutional revolution in Iran in the first decade of the present century. Unlike his colleagues, he opposed the constitution, probably on religious grounds. He put forward certain telling arguments in a number of theoretical writings against the constitution. His slogan was 'We want Mashro'a (Sharia government), not mashru'ta (constitutional government)' Although for many years it was customary in Iran in Islamic circles to deride Nuri and to regard him as a traitor, a reactionary and so on, it is true that a certain reappraisal of him has taken place, giving him a more creditable position.
However, it is not helpful to suggest a parallel between him and Ayatullah Khomeini, for many reasons. The most obvious and most important is that he was content to see the monarchy continue and even tried to find a place for it, which is obviously not the case with Ayatullah Khomeini.
Mr. Jamil Sharif: Nothing has been mentioned about the role of women in the Revolution. What was his view of the role of women in the Islamic struggle?
Professor Algar: There are two reasons why the role of women has not been mentioned. The first is that I have been talking about the ulema and Ayatullah Khomeini. Secondly, 'the role of women' is a phrase that I think Muslims should not use. It is a phrase that has been coined by the enemies of Islam to distract us and waste our mental energies.
Once you speak about the role of women you have the role of men, as if there were a great divide in Islam with women and men existing on the two sides of the divide, doing totally different things. All that you can say with respect to the Islamic Revolution is that Islamic women together with Iranian men played a very important role in furthering the aims of the Revolution. They participated massively in all the important demonstrations. They suffered torture, imprisonment and abuse. Since the triumph of the Revolution they have continued to play an important role.
It is interesting that a Revolution which, according to the popular image in the western press, is designed to reduce women to a status of total inferiority should see this unique picture of Muslim women in their Muslim dress on the streets participating and guarding demonstrations, holding machine guns.
It is enough to say that on Black Friday, 8 September 1978, when more than 4,000 people were slaughtered in Tehran to the applause of President Carter, among those slaughtered were a minimum of 600 women.
The Chairman: Those who write books on women in Islam should be asked: 'Where were women outside Islam?'
Question: In your course outline, you put a heading 'The Ayatullah as Ruler'. Would you like to expand on that?
Professor Algar: On reflection, I am not sure that the word 'ruler' is appropriate in the context. What he has done in the aftermath of the Revolution is to continue in the same role as he predicted before the triumph of the Revolution -that of the guide who speaks out whenever he feels it necessary on matters of policy. Since his guidance is of the nature that it will be immediately followed, he comes in effect to be the final arbiter in almost all matters that he ch0oses to speak on.
The nature of the guidance given by Ayatullah Khomeini since the triumph of the Revolution in February (1979) has been of a nature to ensure that its fundamental aims are kept intact and no major deviation takes place. Of course, the frequent complaint of the Iranian leftists and their allies, the rightist press of Britain and the United States, is that the old dictatorship has been replaced by a new one. There are a large number of fallacies in this comparison. We should point out that the authority of Ayatullah Khomeini derives entirely from the popular will and the popular choice. If he 'interferes' with the government's workings or issues directives, this should not be construed as illegitimate interference. On the contrary, the government of Bazargan derives its authority because it was nominated by Ayatullah Khomeini. The Muslim masses of Iran demanded the institution of an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini. Therefore, his authority is precisely the authority brought into being by the will of the people. This is an exceptional and transitional situation. It is not something that one can say will be institutionalized in the future.
Therefore, I do not think that the word 'ruler' in the synopsis that I prepared in haste is appropriate. He continues to be the leader. I know that this is a word that has unfortunate connotations from different contexts, but one has little choice. He continues to be the leader of the Revolution in all senses.
Question: It is in that context that you use the word 'Imam' when you talk about him?
Professor Algar: Yes. In designating him as 'Imam' we should not imagine that the word is applied to him in the same sense as the Twelve Imams of Shi'ia tradition. I am not aware of the precise time when the term came to be applied to him by the Iranian people. Maybe some of our Iranian brothers here could enlighten us on that. I think that the title was given to him in the course of the Revolution. It has come to be applied to him increasingly after the Revolution and to supplant the title which has by now become familiar to the western press -namely, "Ayatullah".
This usage of the word 'Imam' is, after all, justified on the condition that we do not confuse it with the Shi'ia concept of Imam, and because his authority, his leadership, has gone far beyond that which has been traditionally exercised by an ayatollah. One of the things that I did not give myself a chance to mention is that, of course, Ayatullah Khomeini is from one point of view a mujtahid. People have been following him because he is a mujtahid. But his authority has gone far beyond the traditional bounds of marja-i taqlid or mujtahid. He has been followed not merely in the traditional sense or taqlid, but in a far more comprehensive sense. This comprehensiveness of his leadership, which is indeed based on the whole concept of taqlid but has gone beyond it, is reflected in the use of the word "Imam".
I should be interested to know precisely what our Iranian brothers understand by the word when they apply it to him.
The Chairman: Will Brother Dabbagh enlighten us?
Husein Dabbagh: It was newly introduced into our language. We never used such a word for a mujtahid. This is a reflection of the Islamic teaching. This means a leader, political as well as spiritual. But this is very recent. It is because usually you find that mujtahid is not sufficient.
Professor Algar: In some publications from Iran, I have seen him described as Naib a/-imam, the vice-regent of the hidden Imam. Is this very widespread?
Hussein Dabbagh: Yes. It is being used by some people to indicate to others not to confuse the real meaning of 'Imam '.
Dr. Ezzati: Ayatullah Khomeini is a mujtahid and not an Imam. The use of this term in Persian really began when he was in Paris. Since then people have started calling him Imam. But this is not new. It happened before, when he was in Iraq, because he was in an Arab environment, and 'Imam, in Arabic literature means simply 'the leader', not a traditional Shi'ia leader. They use the term for Musa Sadr, calling him Imam Musa Sadr, because he lives in Lebanon, in an Arab environment. The Shi'ia term would be mujtahid.
Professor Algar: I think this is true. In some of the literature in Arabic one finds the use of the word in early days with respect to Ayatullah Khomeini. But its introduction to Persian usage in Iran seems more recent.
The Chairman: About eighteen months ago we had a course on the political thought of Islam, and, as in all our courses, we had both Sunni and Shi'ia participants. As individuals, we are Sunnis and Shi'ites, but as an institution we are just Moslem. During the discussion on the political thought of Islam, it emerged that if and when Muslims came to the point of establishing a modern Islamic state, the Shi'ia and Sunni positions would be identical, that in its operational, practical form there would be no difference. Would you agree with this assessment?
Professor Algar: I think that in general terms this is without doubt true. If one were to list the major differences of belief or outlook between Sunnis and Shi'ites, one would see that the most important relate to matters that have no immediate practical application. The whole question of the imamate, even though it is of-great importance for our Shi'ia brothers, as long as the ghaiba continues would not arouse any problems of political collaboration with Sunnis.
If one looks at the other differences of a minor variety relating to the details of fiqh, one will see that some of the differences between the four madhhabs are greater than the differences that separate them from Ja'fari fiqh.
Therefore, as you phrase it, in the operational details of a functioning Islamic state there need be no fundamental difference between Sunni and Shi'ia. If there be any, they will arise from the differing provisions not merely between Sunni and Shi'ite but the four schools of the Sunni Moslems, in so far as we choose to bind ourselves by the four schools.
Dr. Ezzati: Though there. is certainly a historical and ideological difference between the imamate and caliphate, between Shi 'ia and Sunni schools, as far as the modern situation is concerned I do not think there are any ideological differences between the two. The question of leadership is the most important issue regarding the political affairs of a Muslim state. The basis of leadership in Shi'ia jurisprudence is the religious social responsibility (wajib al-kafai), which is shared currently by the Sunnis. They both base their authority on the doctrine of the 'Amr bi al-Ma'uroof wa al-Nahy an al-Munkar'.
The Chairman: This is a point that is not generally understood, and it needs to be brought home clearly.
Dr. Ezzati: I agree, it should be explained. But the difficulty is this. How can we introduce a Khomeini-type leadership into Sunni communities?
The Chairman: Since the Revolution in Iran I have been moving around some of the Sunni countries -some of the most reactionary Sunni countries, if I may put in that way. I can assure you that the people of those countries have been absolutely galvanised and their imaginations have been captured by the Revolution in Iran. Some of them take the precaution of locking their doors before they talk about it. If national boundaries were taken away, probably Ayatullah Khomeini would be elected by acclamation by the Ummah as a whole as the leader of the Muslim world today. I think that the differences between Sunni and Shi'ia would disappear in one instant. They are artificially maintained by the world in which we live. Do you agree?
Professor Algar: Very definitely.
Jamil Sharif: Would you say that Ayatullah Khomeini's stay in Paris will have a discernible impact on Muslims in Francophone Africa?
Professor Algar: I am not really in a position to say anything on that subject. All I know is that for the period of about ten days that I was in Paris I saw a large number of Muslims from different countries coming to visit Imam Khomeini. I do not recall seeing among them any Muslims from Francophone Africa. There were a large number from North Africa , Egypt, coming not necessarily to talk but to pray behind him. I hear that there has been some influence of the Revolution in Nigeria, that there has been an important echo of the Revolution among the Muslims of Nigeria. Presumably the same will be the case in the Francophone countries, but whether as a result of his being in Paris, I do not know.
Jamil Sharif: Have other Muslim scholars, particularly Maulana Maudoodi, had any impact on the Ayatullah Khomeini or vice versa? Has he had an influence on the well-known Muslim scholars and leaders of today?
Professor Algar: I do not know whether he has read any of the works of Maudoodi. This much is certain, that the message of support from Maudoodi to Ayatullah Khomeini went, in a very belated fashion, in early January of this year, and Ayatullah Khomeini expressed regret to me not merely that all the Muslim countries had refused him admission in a suitable fashion in October 1978, but that he had had not a single expression of effective support from the Islamic movement.
It is not likely, in the nature of things that he should have concerned himself greatly with the works of Maudoodi. In a more general fashion, one could say that the Persian translation of some of the works of Maudoodi could have had an effect on people in Iran when circulated. Some may have had some effect? Whether Ayatullah Khomeini has had an influence in the other direction upon Maudoodi or other Muslim leaders, I do not know. Unfortunately, there is no sign of it. Otherwise, Maudoodi would hardly accept the so-called King Faisal award of Islamic Studies.
Question: I know that you have done work on freemasonry in Iran and Turkey. Is there any evidence to suggest a link between the Shah and the Zionism was forged through the medium of freemasonry?
Professor Algar: I think there were many channels of communication, linkages, overlapping interest and so on. Probably freemasonry was one among them. In the aftermath of the Revolution all the Masonic lodges have been closed in Iran and their entire achieves have been captured intact. A preliminary selection of documents has already been published. They confirm what was suspected some time earlier. Many of the lodges in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran were controlled by Jews or by Bahais of Jewish origin, which furnishes another avenue of communication with Israel and Zionism generally. But one should not overestimate the importance of this one medium of communication, when there were so many others available. Freemasonry played an important role on the domestic plane, but it is not necessarily connected with the question of Zionism.
Mr. Abdullah Ahmed: I want to return to the question of women. Being a Moslem, one believes in community and that one is responsible for the community first. Have you ever come into contact with Kate Millett, who was sent out of Iran and who says she went there on a women's mission? What was her mission?
Professor Algar: I have had no communication with Kate Millett. I do not know what she thought her mission in Iran was. But, irrespective of her, let me say a few words about the so-called women's demonstrations in Iran which took place for four or five days in succession. The alleged cause of the demonstrations was the curtailment of women's rights by the Revolutionary regime. They coined a nice slogan for the occasion: "In the spring of freedom there is no freedom". Ayatullah Khomeini, I think in the last public address that he gave before leaving Tehran to return to Qum, in a speech that touched on many subjects, said "Now that we have in Iran an Islamic government, women should observe Islamic criteria of dress, particularly those that work in the ministries.!"
There are two things to be noticed. First, this was a recommendation. Secondly, it was directed particularly at women in government service. It was interpreted willfully as a command to be enforced by coercive means if necessary and as meaning that all Iranian women must immediately cover themselves with the chador. The Islamic criteria of dress do not necessarily imply the chador, which is merely the traditional way of fulfilling those criteria in Iran, Seizing upon this distorted series of sentences in the speech of Ayatullah Khomeini, a weird alliance of people organised a series of demonstrations in Tehran. On the one hand there were the leftists, who, like most people who talk about equality, have a very elitist mentality. They, seeing their lack of support among the working class in Iran, have tried to seize upon a number of marginal issues and build them up as vehicles for their own attempts to gain power. One such vehicle was the women's demonstrations.
Those taking part in the demonstrations were the upper echelons of Tehran society. It was interesting to see television footage of those demonstrations. These were women dressed in the latest fashions from Paris. Many had dyed their hair, which in the context is of significance. It shows a certain kind of self-hatred. It is the same kind of thing as one ha& seen in the United States, where Afro-Americans have tried to straighten out their hair. These were the people who were parading through the streets, led by Kate Millett and calling for women's emancipation. Far larger demonstrations in support of Ayatullah Khomeini and denunciation of these intrigues of the leftists on the one hand and the upper classes on the other went largely unreported in the western press. This was a bubble that burst very quickly.

LECTURE # 3

1398/1399 A.H., The Year of Islamic Revolution in Iran
PROF. HAMID ALGAR, University of California, Berkeley
(delivered in October, 1979)
WE came today, after considering certain of the important factors in the background of the Islamic Revolution, to consider the Revolution itself; that is, the series of events that began in January 1978, to use the Christian calendar, and terminated a little over a year later with the final removal of all traces of the Shah's regime in Iran and its substitution by a provisional Islamic revolutionary Government. We have seen how there existed in Iran with growing intensity from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards a tradition of opposition to the monarchy, the institution of the monarchy, and the foreign powers that stood behind it. This opposition was led, directed and inspired by the most prominent of the Shi'ia ulema in Iran. We have seen also, as the culmination and perfect embodiment of that tradition, that there came to the fore the unique figure of Ayatullah Khomeini in 1963.
We need some investigation to establish precisely why, at the beginning of 1978, a long tradition of agitation, discontent and opposition turned into a revolutionary situation.
We can find throughout the years of the Shah's dictatorship numerous signs of all not being well in the so-called oasis of stability in the turbulent Middle East, this being the image the Shah and his propaganda agents sought constantly to create. But the signs of discontent multiplied throughout 1977 and, to some degree, even earlier. We saw, for example, in the summer of 1977 remarkable evidence that even on the material plane the Shah's regime had failed to create the so-called civilization that was offered. There were vast electricity failures in Tehran which in a way came to symbolize the inability of the regime to create the very simple infrastructure of a modern industrial economy which had been the great promise held out by the Shah. Together w1th this, there was rising inflation, a soaring of cost of living, not merely in the capital city, but in the major provincial cities, and to some extent in the countryside, This economic discontent soon intensified the existing social and ideological discontent so that in the fall of 1977, shortly before one of the Shah's trips to the United States, there were a large number of demonstrations and open letters to the regime demanding, not yet abolition of the regime, but certain reforms.
We find, for example, that as one consequence of Carter's hypocritical election propaganda concerning human rights, people decided that this was a useful instrument to employ against the Iranian regime. It is sometimes said in America in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution that Carter somehow undermined the Iranian regime by promising people human rights and that people, encouraged by President Carter, therefore took to the streets. This is an absurdity. A more accurate version of the situation is that it was seen as a useful tactic to demand human rights, not that the regime was deemed capable by its nature of giving human rights, but simply that given this apparent verbal change in American policy, the slogan of human rights was a useful one to be used for tactical purposes against the regime. Similarly, the partial demands made by certain professional organizations, of writers and lawyers, calling for freedom of expression, the abolition of the restrictions and censorship, and the strict observance of the Iranian legal code all had the same purpose of tactically whittling away at the regime's position. None of this was new in the Iranian context and none of it was aimed at a totally comprehensive revolution, and sweeping away for the very foundations of the regime. It was a question of tactically harassing the regime in a fashion which might be thought to coincide with the new emphasis in American policy abroad.
In November 1977, the Shah of Iran visited the United States. The Shah had been visiting the United States continuously since his accession to power in 1941. In the American press at that time an interesting series of photographs appeared which showed the Shah in friendly conversation with every American president since Truman. A commentary supplied by an Iranian friend seemed apposite. He said that those pictures of the Shah shaking hands with every incoming president reminded him very much of the traditional political practice in Iran when the provincial governor, at the accession of every new king, would travel to the capital city, offer some appropriate present to the king! be confirmed by him in his position and then he sent back to the province under his control to resume plundering and looting for his own profit and that of the central government. We can say that this is a very apposite comparison for the appearance of the Shah in Washington, to swear allegiance to every new American president.
It turned out that this visit of the Shah to Washington was to be his final overshadowed by unprecedented student demonstrations in America, so much so that the tear gas employed in putting down the demonstrations drifted even across the White House lawn and caused the Shah to shed a few tears. Despite the massiveness of the Iranian protest against the Shah on the thresholds of the White House, Carter now proclaimed a total reversal of his policy and, far from criticizing the Shah or exercising pressure upon him to change his human rights policy, praised him in lavish terms, saying that there was complete identity of policy between the United States and Iran. This declaration of friendship and support to the Shah was repeated in even more exaggerated and fulsome terms when Carter visited Tehran on New Year's Eve. He said that he and the Shah saw eye to eye on the question of human rights -an interesting confession on the part of Mr. Carter. These expressions of support were to be repeated throughout the year at strategic and crucial points by the Carter administration.
We find, for example, that immediately after the great massacre in Tehran on 8 September 1978, when an estimated 4,000 people were killed, Carter left his humanitarian efforts on behalf of the so-called peace of Camp David to send a personal message of support to the Shah. It is noteworthy that Sadat and Begin and the other participants in these humanitarian efforts at Camp David also took time off to telephone their best wishes to the Shah in the aftermath of this massacre.
Given this timing of Carter's expression of support for the Shah, we can do no other than regard his visit to Tehran and his proclamation of support for the Shah at the beginning of 1978 as an implicit statement of support of the Shah and of all the acts of massacre and repression that he undertook in the year of the Revolution. It was not only a Revolution, an uprising designed to shake and destroy the tyrannical rule of the monarch; it was at the same time in a real sense a war of independence waged against a power which had successfully turned Iran into a military base and which had incorporated the military, repressive apparatus of that other country into its own strategic system.
One of the errors that proved fatal for the Shah's regime and hastened its eventual downfall, an error which we may say for a Muslim perspective was divinely determined, was that the Shah's regime, in its arrogance, caused a series of articles to be published, insulting Ayatullah Khomeini in the grossest and most obscene terms. They were published in the government-controlled press shortly after the visit of President Carter to Iran. In these articles it was claimed that Ayatullah Khomeini was guilty of sexual deviance, that he was of Indian origin, which was meant in the terms of the Shah's regime and mentality to be an insult, and that he was an agent of British intelligence.
Such a series of accusations and fabrications is a common weapon in the armory of various tyrannical regimes in the Muslim world. In documents that have recently become available in various Iranian consulates and embassies around the world, we see that the Iran regime fabricated similar allegations to discredit the late Dr. Shari'ati. In another Muslim country, to engage in a brief diversion, we can see that recently the governments of Syria and Iraq have accused the Muslim Brethren of being traitors and the servants of Zionism and United States imperialism. This is a familiar tactic. Its application in the case of Iran backfired totally against the regime. Immediately after the publication of the offending articles in the government-controlled press, demonstrations and protests broke out in Qum. This is in the same city in central Iran where Ayatullah Khomeini studied and had first risen to public prominence in 1963. The people of the city took to the streets denouncing not merely this latest affront of the Shah's regime against all sense of humanity, Islam and decency, but also against the overall record of the regime. The answer of the regime was the usual one -the massive use of force resulting in the loss of about 200 lives. In this case, as in other subsequent cases, the exact number of casualties is difficult to determine.
After the events in Qum, a cycle of recurring demonstrations, put down with heavy loss of life, began to be repeated. These gradually changed from being a series of isolated incidents in different parts of the country to a coordinated, unified movement, having not merely the negative aim of removing the Shah but the positive aim of establishing in the place of his regime an Islamic Republic. Forty days after the martyrdom of the people of Qum, demonstrations and ceremonies of remembrance took place in the north western city of Tabriz, which is the capital of the large and populous province of Azerbaijan in the north west of the country.
Tabriz has had a long history of prominence in Iranian revolutionary politics, for various reasons, partly because of its proximity to Turkey and Russia, or better to say the Caucasus, which were in the early part of this century centers of revolutionary thought and activity, and also partly because of the character of tile Azarbaijans themselves. In any event, the demonstrations and commemorative ceremonies in Tabriz soon took on the complexion of a full-scale uprising, and for at least two days the entire city of Tabriz was out of control of the government forces.
The uprising was on a scale that the government had been unable to foretell. The local police and Savak proved unable to cope with the massive scale of the uprising and members of the local garrison also proved either unwilling or unable to intervene effectively. Reinforcements were then brought in from outside the city, but these were met by the people of the city themselves who pointed out that they were Muslims and it was the duty of the soldiers not to engage in the killing of their own brethren. This argument appears to have had an effect on a large number of soldiers. Finally, the uprising in Tabriz was broken not so much by the use of the police or the army as by firing on the population from the air from military helicopters, gunships of the same type that the United States used repeatedly in Vietnam. Very heavy reprisals took place. It has been estimated that a minimum of 500 people were killed in the course of the uprising in Tabriz.
In the aftermath of the Tabriz uprising, the Shah and his representatives claimed that the people of the city were in reality not participating in the uprising but that it had been a question of foreigners smuggled in massive numbers to perpetrate this plot. It seems remarkable that thousands of Azerbaijani-speaking foreigners could be infiltrated into the city without detection. Another absurdity propagated by the regime and others associated with it was that the uprising in Tabriz had as its object the suppression of the Bahai community. This was one line put out by the former American ambassador to Iran, Mr. Sullivan, who happened to visit Berkeley shortly after the Tabriz uprising. The only problem, as one member of his audience pointed out, was that there is no Bahai community in Tabriz for people to rise up in protest against. This same member of the audience further suggested that the traditional definition, by Samuel Johnson, of an ambassador or a diplomat should be revised. You may recall that Samuel Johnson defined a diplomat as a man who went abroad to lie for his country. In the case of Mr. Sullivan, it appeared that, on the contrary, the diplomat was the man who came home to lie on behalf of the government to which he had been accredited.
The uprising in Tabriz was followed soon after by the series of commemorative ceremonies in different cities of Iran. That also took on an aspect of minor insurrection. We can mention in particular the case of Yazd, where people emerging from a peaceful commemorative ceremony in one of the main mosques of the city were met with a hail of machine gun fire. A tape recording of these events was made and circulated widely throughout Iran. As anyone who has had occasion to hear this and similar tapes will know, it is a remarkable sequence of sounds which bears great witness to the brutality of the Shah's regime and its repressive methods.
On the tape one hears the termination of the Khutba end the commemorative ceremony, people emerging from the mosques into the streets and then the wail of police and army sirens, then the opening of machine gun fire and the wailing and screaming of the dying and the wounded. This tape, and the even more horrific tape made on the occasion of the government attack on the inside of a mosque several months later in Shiraz, should be required listening for all of those who have any lingering doubts concerning the nature of the Shah's regime.
We can say that the cassette tape played a role of considerable importance in the Islamic Revolution. The Shah had a technological apparatus of repression of considerable sophistication. He has an army of 400,000 men, among the best equipped in the Middle East, second in military potential only to the other agent of the United States, Israel. He had also a sophisticated repressive apparatus which had struck fear into the people for about fifteen years. In contrast to this, the Iranian people had, at their disposal, very little in the way of armaments, organizational or technological capacity. The one thing that was used and used to great effect was the cassette tape.
Not only were recordings such as those I have mentioned circulated widely throughout Iran, but the declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini in their spoken as well as their printed form were circulated throughout the country by a simple means, through the use of tape recording. I was a witness, while in Paris, to the dispatch of one such message to Iran. The simplicity of this apparatus of dispatch and transmission of recorded messages was a source of astonishment to many western observers. All that happened was the message would be recorded in Paris and read over the telephone to a number of individuals in Tehran who would have tape records held against the telephone. They would then telephone other individuals in provincial cities who were waiting with their tape recorders, and in a brief time the message would be duplicated and circulated throughout the country.
Many people in the Middle East and South Asia will know how frequent it is for taxi drivers and lorry drivers to go round with tape cassette players listening to the latest "pop" music. It was one symbol of the Islamic Revolution in Iran that the only tapes played in long-distance trucks in buses and taxis were the tapes of Ayatullah Khomeini. We can say that in one way the Revolution was a revolution of which the technological symbol was the cassette tape, just as earlier; the Constitutional Revolution was the revolution of the telegram. Telegrams were sent back and forth between the 'atabat and the various centers in Iran.
To return to the chronology of events, after the uprising in Yazd and the heavy casualties inflicted there, we find for the first time in August major disturbances occurring in Tehran also. These obliged the Shah to cancel his projected European trip. On two occasions during the Revolution the Shah was obliged to cancel foreign trips. On both occasions, the trips he had planned were to the communist states of Eastern Europe. The incongruity of this situation was not perceived by most foreign journalists and observers, who persisted in the argument that the Shah was a bulwark of the west in the strategic struggle against communism and that he was threatened by a communist-manipulated uprising at home. It was precisely communist states he had been planning to visit when the uprisings broke out in Tehran. It was also a prominent communist visitor, Hua Kuo Feng, the Chinese Premier, who saw fit to come to Tehran and to fly by helicopter from the airport over the battle-torn streets of Tehran to confer with the Shah and offer him his condolences and his encouragement in the imperial struggle for progress and emancipation.
The month of August, not only because of the occurrence of large-scale disturbances in Tehran, but as a result of other events, saw a significant rise in the level of the struggle. It was in the month of August, 1978, to be precise August 19, that there took place the most infamous of the crimes of the Shah's regime -the burning of the cinema Rex in the south west city of Abadan. You may recall that on that day the cinema was burnt to the ground, resulting in the deaths of at least 419 or 420 people who were locked. inside the cinema. This was billed in the western press as one of the fruits of the fanatical reactionary Islamic movement in the country which was annoyed when people went to the cinema during the month of Ramadan. It is true that it was the month of Ramadan, a month of intensified religious feeling and struggle. It is also true that numerous cinemas had been burnt and destroyed throughout Iran by the Islamic movement.
There are two things to be noted here. The first is in the case of the other cinemas that had been burnt, without exception, advance warning had been given to the staff of the cinema to evacuate the premises in time and a time had been chosen for the burning or the explosion when no showing was taking place and no audience was present in the cinema. Secondly, the film that was showing in Abadan was a film which obliquely and in a censored fashion referred to the activities of one of the guerilla movements in Iran. This was hardly therefore a film likely to be found obnoxious by the Islamic movement as a whole. By contrast, in all the other cinemas that had been destroyed elsewhere, the films shown were pornographic and obscene films that offended against the standards of Islamic morality.
Possibly the most telling piece of evidence -and there is a large amount of evidence pointing to the responsibility of the regime for this arson -is that not more than four days before the event, the Shah had given a speech in which he said, "I promise you the great civilization; all that our enemies are capable of offering you is the great terror, vahshat-i-kabir.” It seems remarkably convenient that a few days later an event should occur which seemed to supply confirmation of this prediction -that the great terror would be created.
The families of those burnt in the cinema Rex were in any event not deceived by the government propaganda. Such was the extent of their protest and outcry that martial law had soon be imposed on the city. In one grotesque instance of humour which one finds recurring throughout the Revolution, the cinema Rex in Abadan was bitterly nicknamed as the Pahlavi kebab house. The people who had been burnt to death there were the direct victims of the Shah's regime.
The series of events which gained momentum throughout Ramadan, including the burning of the Cinema, Reza continued without let into September so that the Shah began to make a number of outward concessions. He installed the government of Sharif Imami, who was widely praised in the western press, or at least described in the western press as a pious Muslim. You may know that this title of "pious Muslim" is given on a rather arbitrary basis by the western press. Someone who is from our point of view very obviously a Muslim and serving the interests of Islam is decried as a reactionary and a fanatical Muslim. Someone who is willing to do the ways of the west is generally described as a pious Moslem. In this context, for example, Anwar Sadat is a pious Muslim, but Ayatullah Khomeini is a fanatic or a reactionary Muslim.
In any event, Sharif Imami, because of certain family ties several generations back, was designated as a pious Muslim and the Shah went through the gesture of removing certain Bahais from his immediate entourage, abolishing the imperial calendar which he had introduced in substitution of the Islamic calendar and promised a complete purge of the administration to remove all traces of corruption. The problem was that he was the greatest instrument of corruption and thus that promise was self-contradictory. As the Turkish proverb says, "When fish stinks, it stinks from the head first."
It was soon realized that the month of Muharram would be a crucial period in Iran. In preparation for that month, which corresponded approximately to the month of December 1978, the Shah's regime made certain preparations. First of all, Sharif Imami was replaced by an outright military government under General Azhari. The immediate pretext for this was provided by successive days of riots and burning in Tehran when part of the British Embassy was burnt down and a number of other targets attacked. Shortly after, the Shah brought pressure upon the Iraqi government to expel Ayatullah Khomeini from his long-standing place in exile in Najaf. We may regard this attempt to exile anew Ayatullah Khomeini from the Islamic world as one of the great blunders of the Shah's regime. This turned out to be very much to the advantage of the Shah 's opponents.
Ayatullah Khomeini was harassed in Najaf by the Ba 'athist regime -not for the first time, by the way. There had been numerous instances over the years when he had been placed under pressure as a result of the Ba'athist regime's amenability to the Shah 's desires. On this occasion, Ayatullah Khomeini was placed under house arrest virtually.
His house was besieged and he was informed that he could continue to reside in Iraq only on two conditions: first, that he abandon all political activity; and, secondly, that he move from Najaf to somewhere else of the Iraqi government's own choosing. These conditions were rejected by Ayatullah Khomeini. The Iraqi government then proceeded to expel him from the country. The original plan, according to those in the entourage of Ayatullah Khomeini, was that he should pass through Kuwait, there to embark for a further destination. Interestingly enough, the Kuwaiti government, which has a ministry of Islamic affairs, which publishes books on Islam, which hosts conferences and sends money for various mosques abroad, was so concerned about the promotion of 'Islam' that it did not give permission to Ayatullah Khomeini even to transit through its territory. As a result of this, Ayatullah Khomeini remained for a few dangerous hours in the 'no man's land' between Iraq and Kuwait, with neither government responsible for his safety, leaving him vulnerable to any conceivable attack from Savak agents.
After a time, the Iraq government permitted him to reenter the country on condition that he leave, and he left for Paris, which one can say was a remarkably fortunate choice. That is not to say that there is any particular virtue inherent in the French government. Ayatullah Khomeini merely embarked on the plane and presented the French government with a fait accompli by arriving there with a valid Iranian passport and desiring to stay there for three months on a tourist visa. Of course, Ayatullah Khomeini had a far more important task than tourism awaiting him in Paris. He took up residence in a house in the little village of Neuple le Chateau in the Parisian suburbs which soon became a point of attraction for Iranians from Europe, North America and Iran itself as well as a large number of representatives of the world's press.
It can be said without doubt that communication between Paris and Iran was infinitely easier and swift and unimpeded than had been communication between Najaf and Iran. Also, Ayatullah Khomeini was now able to bring the cause of the Iranian people more effectively before world public opinion.
The month of Muharram was described by Ayatullah Khomeini in one of the proclamations that he issued from Neuphle le Chateau, as the month of triumph of blood over the sword. This, one may regard, in one way, as a brief description of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. But it applies most particularly to Muharram in the sense that the willingness, the eagerness even, of the Iranian people for the sake of martyrdom during the month of Muharram, manifested on a greater scale. A greater mass of people than ever before responded to the call of martyrdom which totally discredited and destroyed the basis of the Iranian regime.
From the first day of the month of Muharram a large number of people appeared in the streets of Tehran and other cities wearing their shrouds, preparing for martyrdom and advancing unarmed on the rows of machine guns ready to shoot them down. The number of victims is difficult to establish precisely, but probably in the first few days of Muharram a larger total of people were killed than on any other occasion, with the single exception of Black Friday, 8 September 1978, massacre in Tehran.
It occurs to me now that I should have accorded some separate and detailed mention to the events of 8 September. You must pardon me for this. One of the decisive turning points in the struggle after the firing of the cinema Rex in Abadan was the massacre that took place on 8 September in Tehran. This came shortly after the end of Ramadan, when a number of demonstrators were gathered in what was formerly called the Maydan-e-Jaleh and is now called the Martyrs' Square in Tehran. A curfew had been proclaimed, before there was the possibility of those gathered in the square learning of it, and abiding by it, if they had chosen so to do. No chance was given to those gathered in the square to disperse. They were closed in on all four sides and soon the Shah's troops began firing from all four directions and from the air, from military gunships. A tape recording of this horrendous occasion has also been made, or part of it.
The slaughter lasted the better part of a day. A number of incriminating photographs are also available. On that occasion it was said that Israeli troops had participated in the work of massacre. In the nature of things, it is not possible to have any decisive proof one way or the other. This much is certain. According to certain eyewitnesses of the event, one company of troops that stood in the forefront on that day had shown reluctance to fire and it was swiftly removed and replaced by fresh troops dressed in Iranian uniforms. These troops spoke a language other than Persian and had the usual unkempt appearance -long beards and semi-hippy appearance -typically associated with the Israeli soldiers. It might be said that the Shah's troops had shown little reluctance to slaughter people throughout the better part of the year and people might wonder why it should be necessary for the regime to have recourse to Israelis on this occasion. A possible answer is that in the week preceding this, from the end of Ramadan onwards, a series of huge, indeed unprecedented, demonstrations had taken place in Tehran and the Shah may have regarded this as a crucial week in his struggle for survival. It may be that he thought it best to have at his disposal troops, mercenaries virtually, whose willingness to fire, even happiness in firing when their targets were Moslem, would not be called into question.
Whether that precise accusation be true, the fact that it was circulated and widely believed is an indication of the perception of the Iranian people of the deep involvement of Israel in the repressive apparatus and policies of the Shah.
To come from Ramadan to Muharram, from September to December 1978, the massive demonstrations that had taken place at the end of Ramadan were repeated on the two most crucial days -9th and 10th of the month -which are in terms of the traditional Shi'ia commemorative ceremonies of the martyrdom, the most important days. First, it was said by Azhari, the military premier, that a dawn to dusk curfew would be imposed and that not even ceremonies would be allowed in the mosque, let alone on the streets of the city. Then, when it was made clear that the people had no intention of observing this ban, gradually it was lifted and permission was given for a vast demonstration that took place along the major thoroughfares of Tehran, concluding at the so-called Shahyad monument -the monument to the 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy. We may remark in passing on another instance of revolutionary humour in Iran, which was the renaming of the Shahyad monument as the Shayyad monument -a monument not in memory or commemoration of the Shah but in commemoration of a scoundrel. On this day the streets leading to the northern parts of Tehran, where the royal palaces and the abodes of the wealthy are situated, were sealed off and a vast number of people, estimated at 5 million and 6 million, moved along the main arteries towards the square where a manifesto was read and approved by those present.
The manifesto called for the abolition of the monarchy, for the institution of an Islamic Republic and the observance of certain points relating to internal and external policy. There was a total of sixteen points. President Carter, in one of the foolish remarks for which he is becoming increasingly celebrated, said that the fact that the day had passed off without bloodshed was somehow a triumph for the Shah's regime and somehow an indication that, after all, things would not be too bad and he could weather the storm, as he had weathered previous storms. The fact that there had been no bloodshed was uniquely the result of the non-intervention of the army on that day. It was a moral triumph for the Islamic movement and a stunning defeat for the Shah.
It became increasingly recognized by the Shah, and more important of his foreign advisers, that his was a lost cause and that the best that could be hoped for was the installation of what was called in American terminology a compromise solution -that is to say, neither the Shah nor the Islamic regime but something in between led by moderate, reasonable people; in other words, people who would be content to see a prolongation of American strategic domination in Iran.
After some hedging and looking around for a suitable candidate one was decided upon, Shahpoor Bakhtiar, the leader of the National Front, who was immediately promoted in western propaganda as being a long-standing foe of the Shah, a leading member of the opposition, a champion of human rights, and all other kinds of high-sounding titles.
It should be pointed out that the National Front, particularly as it had come to exist in recent years in Iran, was not a major organ of opposition to the Shah. It had a certain weight and represented a certain number of interests, but it was not in any way an important organization of political opposition such as it had been in the days of Dr. Mussadeq. Even within the attenuated National Front, Shahpoor Bakhtiar had a very devious standing. There were a number of incidents in which he was involved which had earned him the suspicion of his associates, so much so that when he accepted the offer of the Shah, at the prompting of the United States, to become the new Prime Minister, with the Shah going on vacation, members of the National Front and still less the Iranian people at large were not surprised.
Shahpoor Bakhtiar arranged for the departure of the Shah, which took place in January 1979, and then began the hopeless task of attempting to shore up the foundations of his own power.
Whatever the failings of Shahpoor Bakhtiar, and they are numerous, he was obviously a man not totally without intelligence. One of the intriguing questions which, to my mind, has not yet been fully answered is why Bakhtiar chose to take on this hopeless task of saving the American cause in Iran after the departure of the Shah in mid-January. The only interim answer that can be given to that question is that he was a man, first of all, totally contemptuous of religion and, therefore, like many other secularists, assumed that religion had no effective power. Because he did not believe in it, he thought ipso facto nobody else sincerely believed in it either and, therefore, it should be discounted as an effective force.
We can say that this kind of assumption is shared in general by many members of the Iranian bourgeois. They thought, "Let the revolution go through, let the rebellion be led for the time being by the ulema. After all, these people are not people of the world and they are politically naive, and we, the secular bourgeoisie, the western educated, the liberal intelligentsia, will assume our natural right of leadership in due time."
Something of the same mentality in a rather extreme form was present in Bakhtiar, I think. He was incautious enough to describe Ayatullah Khomeini as "an insane old man". It was precisely this "insane old man" who totally outmaneuvered and destroyed the regime of Bakhtiar within less than a month of its installation. You may recall that at the beginning of February 1979, after a series of political maneuvers on the part of Bakhtiar and the Iranian army, including the closure of Tehran airport for a number of days, Ayatullah Khomeini returned to a triumphal welcome from the people of Iran. It has been estimated that on this occasion about one third of the total population of Iran was in Tehran to receive him. A number of cities in the country were almost completely emptied as their inhabitants converged on Tehran to give a triumphal welcome to Ayatullah Khomeini.
He returned, and, in accordance with his proclaimed intention, proceeded immediately to the cemetery in Tehran where the martyrs of the Revolution were buried and gave one of his typically courageous and uncompromising speeches, denouncing the United States for its role during the Revolution, saying that the Iranian people had desired freedom and that they had been given in exchange by imperialism and its agents a graveyard full of martyrs as the answer to their demands. He pointed out also that the struggle was not yet over, and he summoned the Iranian people to continue in their struggle.
Six days after his return, Ayatullah Khomeini named his own government --the provisional Government headed by Mehdi Bazargan. Progressively, ministers were named to complete the Cabinet. This was a process which continued after the final triumph of the Revolution. In the two weeks between the return of Ayatullah Khomeini and the final overthrow of the regime the crucial question appeared to many people to be the possibility of an American-inspired and directed military coup d'etat. The great fear of numerous people was precisely this. After all, the United States had been heavily involved in Iran to a degree unparalleled virtually in any other country. Doubtless it must have had some contingency planning for a day such as that now dawning in Iran. Would the United States easily abandon the strategic, economic and military advantages that it had enjoyed in Iran for a quarter of a century?
Anxiety was increased by the arrival in Tehran of the commander of the American land forces in Europe, General Hauser. The ostensible purpose of his visit to Tehran was to discuss the problems of arms supply in the aftermath of the disturbance and uprising in Iran, and also to dissuade the Iranian military from attempting a coup d 'etat. It seems that the time, just over a month, which he spent in Tehran was rather a generous period of time for dealing with these limited objectives.
Since the triumph of the Revolution, documentary evidence has been uncovered to the effect that the purpose of Hauser's visit to Tehran was, on the contrary, to undertake a contingency study of the possibility of a military coup d 'etat. His departure from the country should be taken as a sign that the study had yielded negative results, that at least in the short term the possibility of a military coup d 'etat successfully imposing itself was extremely limited. The Iran of 1979 was no longer the Iran of 1953. After all, the Iranian army had become subjected to increasing desertions by its recruits, considerable psychological pressure had been exerted by the religious leadership headed by Ayatullah Khomeini, who repeatedly called for the army to return to the people, to which it essentially belonged. At the same time, it was known that the people were arming in such a fashion that a military coup d'etat would not have been unopposed.
It was, strangely enough, the most recalcitrant elements in the army which brought about the final downfall of the last vestiges of the Shah's regime. On 10 February 1979, in one of the airforce barracks in Tehran, airforce cadets were engaged in watching an Iranian television replay of the newsreel film showing the return to Tehran of the Ayatullah Khomeini. As a result of watching this film, they broke out into demonstrations demanding the installation of an Islamic government under Ayatullah Khomeini. Their officers insisted that they return to barracks, instead of which they raided the armory and resisted by armed forces. The commanders of the garrison called in the Imperial Guard, the so-called eternal or immortal guard, the so-called crack troops of the Shah, to aid in the task of repression. A number of tanks arrived very quickly at the airforce garrison.
The beginning of this battle was the sign for an armed uprising throughout Tehran which resulted in the overrunning, one after another, of all the major installations of power, the Prime Minister's office, radio and television, the parliament building, the headquarters of Savak and its various interrogation and torture centers throughout the city, so that after two or three days, which saw a minimum of 700 to 800 further casualties, the regime of the Shah was finally swept away in the last bloodbath.
This has been an approximate retelling of the important events of the Revolution. Of course, details have been left out, but I think that I have given you a sketch of the most important events of the Black Friday, 8 September. It is time now, by the way of conclusion to this lecture and the series of lectures generally, to try to draw a few conclusions which are, I think, of particular relevance to Muslims and which will, I hope, illustrate the contention I made at the beginning of my first lecture, namely, that the events in Iran are the most important and significant events for the entire Muslim world in recent history. They are not in any way an isolated series of events determined by the circumstances of Iran.
First of all, I point out that the movement of the Iranian Muslim people was opposed unanimously by all the major superpowers and their agents in the region. One can think of this as a simple and automatic test of the authenticity of any Islamic movement. If any Islamic movement finds itself allying, even circumstantially and unintentionally, with a certain major power, there is a certain problem. It means that there is some willingness to compromise, to settle, to collaborate with a non-Islamic power, or there is the perception that it is willing to do so.
The Islamic Revolution in Iran was opposed by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, West Germany -by all these major centers of power and corruption in the world. Within the Middle Eastern region, it was opposed in varying degrees of active engagement by the so-called reactionary regimes and so-called progressive regimes alike. It was opposed by King Hasan of Morocco, who described the Ayatullah Khomeini as a naive old man and who sent his special envoy to speak to some of the Iranian ulema to persuade them that they should not fall into the trap of communism. It was opposed by President Sadat of Egypt, who had displayed to the world now his policy--of capitulation in his search for a personality and identity, something which he clearly lacks and has little chance of finding.
The movement was opposed by the Saudi regime which, for all its sponsorship of Muslim conferences and for all its mismanagement of the Haramayn is clearly at the service of the United States and opposed to all manifestations of Islam in the Islamic world. On the side of the so-called progressive regimes, it was opposed by the Iraqi government, the Ba'athists, who are meant to be the ultra hard-Line rejectionists in terms of the current political jargon. It was opposed by Libya; let there be no doubt about that. Mr. Qadhafi was opposed to the Shah, but he was not in any way favourable to the Islamic movement in Iran until it became clear that it was about to triumph. The only support given by Mr. Qadhafi was to a Marxist guerilla group called Fidaiyan-e-Khalq and to the separatist movement in Kurdistan. It is interesting that recently Mr. Qadhafi has also come out in favour of Kurdish nationalism, the secession of Kurdish areas of Iraq and Iran to form a separate and independent state.
In short, there was this alliance of the great powers and their regional satellites arrayed against the Islamic Revolution. We may say that this is at once a proof of the authenticity of the Revolution and a warning that when any genuine Islamic movement comes into being it will be faced with similar opposition. Yet it was precisely in the face of such opposition that the Islamic movement in Iran triumphed. To find an explanation for this in terms purely of the familiar means of political and historical analysis is impossible. When Ayatullah Khomeini was asked, concerning the causes for the success of the Revolution, he said simply that it was the will of God. The will of God manifests itself through causes which are capable of being analysed, but we as Muslims believing in Islam as a total view of reality, a set of methods for the understanding of reality, should say that the triumph of the Islamic Revolution was simply the fulfillment of God's promise, which remains eternally valid to those who struggle in His path.
At one point, some Iranian friends of mine who were visiting Imam Khomeini in Paris asked him, "Do you not think there is a danger of this continual bloodshed and sacrifice on the part of our people inducing despair and weariness in them so that the point of our movement will become lost? Might it not be better to pause, to have some temporary arrangement seeking a reform of the existing regime?", to which Ayatullah Khomeini replied simply that it is our task to do that which Allah tells us to do and it is then up to Allah whether He supplies the results in our lifetime or in a future lifetime. It was as a result of this trust in Allah, of this solitude with Allah, this deprivation of any form of worldly support and this reliance on the support of Allah -a reliance which was clearly testified through the martyrdom of not less than 100,000 people in the year of struggle -that ultimately the Revolution in Iran was able to succeed.
The second general conclusion we as Muslims should draw from the Revolution is the fact that the crucial factor in the success of the movement is not sophistication of organization. It is not the working out of any precise strategic plan that is crucial, although at various points in the struggle questions of strategy assume importance. It has often been said that in Iran we have a hierarchy of Shi'ia ulema that is lacking elsewhere in the Muslim world and, therefore, this triumph is not easily to be duplicated elsewhere.
What is meant by this so-called hierarchy of Shi'ia ulema? All one has is the simple mechanism of taqlid, which I attempted to describe for you in my first lecture, whereby the individual believer regards himself as duty bound to follow the guidance of a religious leader. This guidance is given, not through any formal channel, but on the basis of a moral and spiritual authority that is gained exclusively on the basis of popular assent. There is no electoral process for the choice of the marja or the mujtahid. It is simply that an individual, or series of individuals, emerge, who in themselves come to embody the aspirations or the desires of the people so that they obtain a freely given consent which is willing to' offer itself in a blood sacrifice.
The same process, although in a different fashion, may exercise itself outside the Shi'ia context, i.e. in the Sunni Muslim world. If there emerges a leader of a movement which clearly presents itself as a totally uncompromising and radical alternative to the existing system or systems, if it shows itself not concerned merely in a theoretical sense but in a practical sense with the actual, tangible problems of the people, there is no reason why it should not be able to elicit the same response as that which was elicited by Imam Khomeini from the Iranian people.
Why is it that in Iran today we see the only genuine experiment in the foundation of an Islamic state in which we can have some confidence and hope? It is not because the Iranians, as compared with other Muslim peoples, are gifted with a superior degree of piety. It is not because they have discovered some particular secret that is inaccessible to the rest of the Muslim world. Certainly, it is not so. Let us not forget that Islam remains the motive force, at least in potentiality if not in actuality, of all the Muslim peoples without exception, whether they be Arabs, Turks, the peoples of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, South-East Asia, Africa or any other group of Moslems. Ultimately, it is not possible to eradicate Islam from the hearts of the Moslems. It is possible only to annihilate the Muslims themselves. Given that, what is necessary is to activate this resource of faith, belief, and readiness to struggle and sacrifice. This is something which is present within the hearts of all the Muslim peoples and even within the hearts of individuals who are apparently secularized.
One of the things which happened in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the rediscovery of Islam by those who were partially secularized. I have described one aspect of this process in a lecture on Dr. Shari'ati, but it was not merely an intellectual process. It was also a question of an individual return to the self, to the deepest self, to a realization of what is after all fundamentally a mystery. It is possible to evoke this realization in any Muslim country, in any Muslim society, with the overwhelming majority of people, including those who apparently are lost to Islam. This is possible by the presentation of a clear, radical and complete series, a conscientious alternative which has no connection with the existing system, which does not wish to participate in it, does not enter it on the pretext of reforming it, but stands totally apart from it.
This leads me to one more conclusion concerning the Islamic Revolution -that an Islamic movement will not only be automatically opposed by all the major superpowers and their local agents, but also, to be authentic and to have any chance of success, such a movement must be uncompromising. There comes a time when to be uncompromising is the only realistic course. It is not realistic to be moderate and compromise for an Islamic movement. For an Islamic movement to enter into so-called realistic compromises means, in effect, the sacrificing of its own nature and ultimate goals. There are too many examples of this for it to be overlooked. We may mention the example of Turkey, where a so-called Islamic party, which contains many people of great sincerity, energy and devotion, has decided to enter into the parliamentary game for the sake of promoting Islamic interests. We see that precisely through entering the parliamentary game, it begins playing all the familiar parliamentary tricks, beginning with the swearing of an oath of allegiance to the secular republic. It is not possible for this party in this situation, or similar parties in a similar situation elsewhere in the Islamic world, to present itself as opposed to the system in which it participates, and, therefore, in the survival of which it has a partial interest.
There is one other conclusion. It is that the Islamic movement, if it be correctly identified with the popular interests and not kept on the plane exclusively of pure ideology, if it be an uncompromising one which refuses any form of participation in the existing sociological system, if it does this, it will be able totally to outdistance any form of secular competition. One of the great differences between 1953 in Iran and 1979 in Iran is that in 1953 there was a Mussadeq and in 1979 there was a Khomeini. There was an Islamic involvement in the events leading up to the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1953. But the secular figure -and I do not wish to imply "anti-Islam" but merely "non-religious" -of Mussadeq dominated and towered over the religious figures on the scene such as Ayatullah Kashani. Precisely because of this, the nationalist movement of Dr. Mussadeq could never be a mass movement with profound roots.
In 1978-79, we see on the contrary the so-called secular opposition, the National Front, with people like Sanjabi and the rest of them, being totally overshadowed by the religious leadership. To have any form of political influence, the secular opposition was obliged to abandon all of its positions and to conform unconditionally to the demands advanced by Ayatullah Khomeini. Similarly, in all other Muslim countries other forms of ideology and political organization, whatever inroad they may apparently have made, have failed totally to penetrate the depths of the hearts and minds of the Muslim people. Even though they may appear to be competitors for the future of the Muslim Ummah, if correctly confronted, there is nothing to be feared from them. This is something that goes also for the purveyors of the secular nationalism and ethnic-based nationalism in the Arab world, in Turkey and elsewhere. It also goes for the Marxists. It is only the Islamic movement, the potential and not necessarily the actual Islamic movement, in various Muslim countries which has the ability to call upon the deepest resources of the people and bring about a genuine revival and renewal.
Any attempt to formulate a path to the future for the Muslim peoples other than with Islam, is ultimately a waste of time and energy and a waste of the most precious of our human and material resources. To prevent that waste, the Islamic movement must learn the fundamental lessons of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Otherwise it will contribute to the state of ideological and spiritual anarchy which persists in the Muslim world. Unfortunately, the signs that the leaders, or at least the self-appointed leaders, of Islam in other countries are ready to learn from the Islamic Revolution in Iran are not very bright.
Let us take two examples. I saw recently an issue on an Islamic magazine called Hilal, from Turkey by a certain Salih Ozcan, who is significantly the representative of Turkey on the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami. This magazine was published in March, one month after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and yet it did not include a single word on the subject of Iran. Similarly, in Pakistan the magazine Criterion, which is affiliated to the Jama'at, also has been revived recently. Its first issue appeared after a long period of interruption, and it did not contain a word about the tumultuous events in Iran.
There is a great responsibility, not only upon the Muslim leaders and the Muslims at large, to learn the lessons of the Islamic Revolution but upon the leaders of the Revolution to communicate their experience to the Islamic world as a whole. There are signs that this responsibility is perceived in Iran and that steps are being undertaken to fulfill it. It is too soon to predict with any confidence the future course of events in Iran. There are grave problems now being confronted in that country, which are to be anticipated and which are not as grave or as fatal as the western press makes out. They are, nonetheless, real problems demanding real solutions.
It is also far too soon to say what will be the ultimate impact of the Revolution on other Muslim countries. Whatever be the future turn of events in Iran and other Muslim countries, there is no doubt that what has already occurred in Iran is at the same time the most unexpected and the most joyful triumph of the Islamic Ummah in the present century.

Discussion
Dr. Abdel Halim: One is very concerned about the debate in Iran. What I do not understand is the attitude of the religious leaders of the so-called minorities, the Arabs and the Kurds, and so on. These people are demanding sep3fation now. Under the Shah, they kept quiet. Now that the Islamic Revolution has taken place and we are all saying 'we are Moslems', they are going out against the Revolution. We hear, at least in the British press, that the religious leaders of these minorities are demanding emancipation. Could you comment on that?
Professor Algar: In the case of Kurdistan, the allegedly religious leader who is the most celebrated as demanding the segregation or autonomy of Kurdistan is a certain Izz ad-Din Husayni. He has been described as the Marx of Kurdistan since he is evidently on extremely good terms with the leftists in the area. More interestingly, after the Revolution documents were discovered which indicated that he was on extremely good terms with Savak before the Revolution. One of the common transformations following the Revolution is that former supporters of the monarchy have become Marxists. This is one of the forms of which the counter-revolution is now seeking to mask itself in Iran. The case of Husayni who is one of the so-called religious leaders of the Kurds in Iran is a case in point.
As to the other leaders of the Kurds in Iran, I do not think there are any persons even claiming religious prominence among them. The Kurds in Iran, as elsewhere, are fragmented. There is no single united Kurdish leadership with authority to speak for the Kurds of a single region, let alone for the Kurds or the Kurdish inhabited areas. As to Khuzistan, there is this Khaqani who is described as the religious leader of the Arab-speaking minority. I do not know anything about the history of this man, whether he was in any way active under the Shah's regime, nor do I know what effective control he exercises over those people in Khuzistan who are demanding autonomy.
The problem that has arisen in Kurdistan and Khuzistan and even in the Baluchi-inhabited areas of the south-east is that the people have legitimate grievances. They have grievances inherited from the time of the Shah. They have the same grievances as the Persian-speaking majority in Iran, that is, they were neglected and oppressed for a number of years. In addition, they have certain grievances particular to themselves. For years it was forbidden in Iran to use languages other than Persian for any purpose apart from oral communication, whether the language be Turkish, Azerbaijan, Kurdish, Arabic, Baluchi or whatever. In addition, certain minority-inhabited areas were worse off economically than others. A particularly glaring example was in Khuzistan, which was the source of the major wealth of the country through the oil industry. One finds that the oil workers in Abadan, most of whom are Arab, ethnically speaking, lived in the most miserable conditions. After the Revolution, these people naturally are impatient to see that their grievances are remedied.
This type of impatience one finds not only among the ethnic minorities but among many other sectors. One of the constant appeals of both Imam Khomeini and Bazargan is for revolutionary patience -patience under the existing circumstances, with people not pressing a class or sectional grievance at a time when there are important general questions to be dealt with.
Taking advantage of this situation in the minority-inhabited areas are enemies of the Revolution, both domestic and foreign. They will move in to build up matters to a point of no return. So far matters have been more or less contained in Khuzistan and Kurdistan. In the future I do not know how soluble these problems will prove to be. I do not think it is true to say that the religious leaders, whether in Kurdistan or Khuzistan, as a whole are behind the various agitations.
Amin-uddin Adnan: Can you tell us something of the organizational aspect of the movement with regard to its membership, selection of members, training and the strategy, especially with regard to the Islamic Revolutionary Council?
Professor Algar: You are touching here on different matters. You speak about the movement, on the one hand, and the Revolutionary Council on the other. As for what we call in broad terms the movement, people should not be under the illusion that this is a question of a formally organized movement with membership criteria, and so forth. Perhaps this is another lesson of the Revolution -that it was a broad-based Islamic movement and not some kind of affair in which people sit down, as an examining body, and decide who is worthy to be admitted. What is necessary is to recruit, in an informal fashion, the massive support of the overwhelming majority of the people.
This is what happened in Iran. It is not that a secret party or organization was set up which brought more and more people into the fold. There were some organizations, the guerilla organizations, which engaged in urban warfare against the shah's regime for a number of years. This is not what made the Revolution. The Revolution was genuinely a people's movement. One can say that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was an example of mass political participation and is unique in modern times. It makes the parliamentary elections of the western countries appear as a mere game by contrast. In the United States, not more than thirty per cent of the electorate turned out at the last election, and yet that is celebrated as the expression of the popular will. In Iran, in the face of massive pressure, the danger of death, dismemberment and torture, a whole nation took to the streets to enforce its demands.
This massive, almost elemental event, has more in common with some natural catastrophe than with a common political happening. This cannot be the result of any broad strategic plan.
As I attempted to indicate, the organizational structure of the Revolution is extremely simple. It was a question of the directives being given by Ayatullah Khomeini, being distributed throughout Iran and then evoking an immediate response of obedience from the mass of the people. This is what it comes down to. Then we have the logistics involved, the planning of mass demonstrations. There were mass demonstrations where people were organized and arrangements were made for feeding them, and so on.
The Shah, in one interesting comment after the demonstrations, said: "This superb organization with which these demonstrations have been planned shows that there is foreign and communist involvement." He had such a low opinion of his own people that he thought they could not organize a demonstration without foreign involvement. He was reflecting his own mentality. He could not take a single step without instructions from Washington, London or Moscow.
There is no organizational strategic mystery. The mosque was the fundamental unit of the organization. Perhaps this is a conclusion that I should have worked into my body of conclusions. One of the important elements in the success of the Revolution was the revival of the mosque, of the full dimensions and functions of the mosque, not simply as a retreat from society where people go to be away from the world and pray and make their ablutions and listen to the recitation of the Qur'an; on the contrary, it becomes a center of struggle, an organization of command. In short, it was all that it was in the time of the Prophet.
Dr. Abdel Halim: This is an important point, because the difference between the Shi'ia areas and what we have in the Sunni countries is marked. In the latter, the mosque is led by the man who is employed by the governm