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Convoluted Thinking: Are the Constitution and Shari’ah the same?
At first glance, it would seem that Tabatabai, Behbahani, Taqizadeh, Tehrani, Mazandrani, Khurasani and Nuri would be against a modernizing secular movement and only join it because the shari’ah and constitution was the same. Shari’ah combines the Qur’an and Hadith to form usul-ud-din, are the foundational beliefs or the roots of religion and furoo’-ud-din are the laws of the shari’ah or branches of religion.[146][81] The shari’ah dealt with matters generally of a personal nature.
There are four categories: self-evident acts, laws whose purposes are explained in Qur’an and Hadith, laws whose purpose have not been explained in Qur’an and Hadith but human knowledge has provided explanation, and laws without explanations in Qur’an and Hadith and human knowledge has not been able to provide reasoning.[147][82] It encompasses and delineates one’s relationship with God for instance in events such as birth, death, marriage, and certain daily routines are all matters of shari’ah.
The constitution dealt with matters of public law such as the responsibilities of the state, rights of the citizen, the relationship between the citizens and the state and so forth. The temporal world being separate and incompatible with the spiritual realm is an idea that developed in Western Europe. The religious scholars in Iran did not believe in this separation. From the perspective of the ‘ulama, authority was either temporal or religious, and existed side by side, and during the Qajar period, this idea had solidified.[148][83] Therefore, the ‘ulama had accepted that it was essential for the state to preserve Islam and protect Muslims from degradation.
On this assumption, they told the faithful to abide by its rule.[149][84] Since the Safavid dynasty’s zealous promotion of Shia’ism in Iran, the ‘ulama had initially supported monarchical absolutism but later turned against it adopting a quietist position.[150][85] They assumed that any reigning dynasty in Iran would be the protector of the people and the faith. By the reign of the Qajar shah, Naser al-Din (1848-1896) they realized how untrue this assumption was.[151][86] Strikingly, political involvement of the ‘ulama to gain lasting control in the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) does not appear to have been even part of why they did join the movement.[152][87] The bulk of most education in those days was exclusively religious and because of this, most of the ‘ulama were unaware of the restrictive implications of monarchy, absolutism and autocracy.[153][88]
Furthermore, those ‘ulama that did see the shari’ah in the constitution did not necessarily outline details as to how both would work. In an article, Ayatollah Mazandarani quoted (Habl al-Matin, October 3, 1910) as one constitutionionalist ‘alim from Ottoman Iraq, said to a merchant, “We participated in the movement to protect the territory of Islam and to remove aggression and tyranny, and to apply religious laws.” Mazandarani, Tehrani, Khurasani, Behbahani, Tabatabai and Taqizadeh all agreed with the view that the constitution and the shari’ah were not the same.[154][89]
Eliminating oppression, humiliation, degradation, absolutism and tyranny was the main objective and the application of the shari’ah was seen as an avenue to fulfill this objective, as was the constitution. However, granting of the constitution did not necessarily equate with the shari’ah itself, but rather made it easier to facilitate the implementation of the shari’ah.[155][90]
Since tyranny in Iran took an anti-Islamic color—public beatings of merchants and religious leaders based on false evidence, killing and whipping of innocent people by governors’ army and tax-collectors, unreasonably high taxes on harvest crops, unnecessary domestic tariffs, and other injustices—constitutionalism was natural stance against this tyranny as was the shari’ah.
The fact that some of ‘ulama did not see the shari’ah as a threat to having a constitution is worth mentioning because support of the shari’ah was used to highlight the monarchy’s moral deviations (i.e. injustice), and to make the monarch accountable for their actions. A strictly secular constitution would not have allowed exiling of government opponents solely based on irreligosity.[156][91] Along this line of thought, the shari’ah was not seen in contradiction with social dissent, political reform and public law.
Instead, it was to have coexisted with the new constitution.[157][92] For example when the parliament opened in October 1906, Tabatabai and Behbahani attended consistently. They were not elected but attended as leaders of the nation, often intersecting sessions to offer their views equally important were other moderate religious leaders from other parts of the country that spoke in parliament. Even at the culmination of the movement, records fail to reveal the ‘ulama holding a common agenda; they voiced views of their contacts and did not initiate policies. Despite traditional treatment of the ‘ulama in historiography as uniform group, this is strikingly far from the truth. In fact, they often kept the movement alive defending against conservative royalists and mediating between the people and the government.[158][93]
Islamic Ideology backing Constitutionalism
As Shaykh Muhammad Isma’il Garavi Mallahati, one of the assistants of the well-known Iraqi ‘ulama writes that during this time of the ghaybat there can only be three types of government. The first preferred is the rule of the Imam, but this is not possible. The second is absolute monarchy and the third, limited and constitutional government. He concludes that any rational person would pick the third kind because it “ends oppressive rule over people” and “protects the territory of Islam [equated with Iran] against infidels [referring to the British, Russians and Ottomans].”[159][94] The ‘ulama of Iran and Iraq knew that the shari’ah could not be entirely be carried out, the absence of the Imam meant constitutionalism was the best option available, the Prophetic tradition of consultation supported their cause.
The ‘ulama of Iraq and Iran throughout the movement never failed to recognize that religion and government should work together in harmony and always addressed the shah in respectful terms regardless of motives.[160][95] Most of the ‘ulama agreed that the full implementation of the shari’ah and a truly just government was not possible at during the time of ghaybat (spiritual occultation) of the Imam Mehdi. Islamic eschatology says that a messiah will come during the last days on earth, prior to the Day of Judgment.
He will fight against evil on earth, freeing the oppressed and redeeming those that believe in God. In Islam, this messiah is the last of the line of the Twelve Imams (in Shia Islam) known as the Mehdi.[161][96] In addition, believed by Muslims (both Shia and Sunni alike), to be in the state of spiritual occultation until his reappearance, which is unknown but will be in the End of Time. They all held the belief that during the time of the ghaybat the political aspect of the shari’ah could not be fulfilled but that the constitution should try to abide by it as much as possible.[162][97]
When Amir Bahadur, a military leader from the Bakhtiyari tribe active during the movement asked Tabatabai why the ‘ulama supported a cause against their own interests. Tabatabai replied, the Prophet had enjoined in consultation and hence establishing a parliament would institutionalize a long-held tradition. Bahadur agreed but pressed further as to why the ‘ulama agreed to it, Tabatabai replied that religion could be used as a pretext to exile government opponents while a strictly secular constitution would not allow such tactics.[163][98]
The tradition of taqlid gave the ‘ulama another advantage over the Qajars. When a person who is not an expert in legal matters, is required by Shia Islam to follow the advice of an expert who is, a mujtihad[164][99] this process is called taqlid.[165][100] As mentioned before, advanced education gave them considerable advantage over most people. However, even with this education they did not have the skills to have changed totally, since they were unfamiliar with the ingredients that made up political life and did not help their understanding of problems from Western impact on the region.[166][101]
Who were the participating ‘ulama?
“One remarkable feature of this revolution here… is that the [‘ulama] have found themselves on the side of progress and freedom. This… is almost unexampled in the world’s history.”
—Edward G. Browne, Persian Revolution, 1909. [167][102]
A powerful group emerged in the 19th century that escaped class distinction. They were not part of civil service, military activity or commercial enterprises and received their education in a madrassa.[168][103] Much of what we know about the ‘ulama during the Constitutional Revolution come from limited number of primary sources and those are often very difficult to access. Very few religious scholars actually wrote anything themselves. The higher-ranking ‘ulama like ayatollahs[169][104] and mujtahids[170][105] had their own staff of students and assistants working under them and would transcribe for them. During the Tobacco Concessions of 1891-1892, chances are they had a student or assistant write the telegrams and another person send it.[171][106] By far, there exists no conclusive study on the background of the proconstitutionalist ‘ulama.[172][107]
Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai
“Coming from the cry from the heart of the nation… Do not hold captive the needs of 30 million people for despotism of one person.”
—Tabatabai in a letter to Muzaffer al-Din Shah.[173][108]
Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai (1841-1914) came from a long line of religious scholars.[174][109] Out of all the ‘ulama mentioned in this paper, he has produced the most writings and had by far, the most influence. He succeeded his father in office attaining the rank of a mujtahid and went to the shrine cities for his education. Without family connections and financial assistance it was extremely difficult to rise to the rank of a mujtahid during the Constitutional Revolution much the same today.[175][110]
His father, Sayyid Sadiq Tabatabai had ties with the secular nationalists, Mirza Malkum Khan and Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi. Sadiq Tabatabai was even part of Mirza Malkum Khan’s Faramushkhana, or ‘House of Oblivion,’ a forward-thinking, secular and nationalist school of thinkers who held goals of completely modernizing Iran following a Western secular political model, in particular, European freemasonry. He was the only member of the ‘ulama to join Malkum Khan’s school.[176][111]
Coming from a background of innovative thinking, Muhammad Tabatabai was truly a unique member of the ‘ulama. He arrived in Tehran in 1894 with the intent to establish a national assembly and constitution after lengthy discussions with his students about it.[177][112] Records show that very little of his personal reasons came in the way of constitutionalist goals.[178][113]
According to first hand accounts of an aspiring seminary student, Muhammad Nazim al-Islam Kermani, he wished to learn more about European knowledge unlike other ‘ulama that strongly rejected anything foreign, especially Western.[179][114] Though he was not a politician but knew that constitutional government provided “security and prosperity” for the people, and knew very well that establishing a courthouse and a national assembly would curb the powers of the religious establishment.[180][115]
Shia scholars over the 8th and 9th centuries developed the idea that all governments are illegitimate and inherently corrupt unless the Imam of the Age ruled.[181][116] Since this situation was not possible, Tabatabai turned to Western political thought for a solution in default of the ideal.[182][117] He believed that education awakened one from ignorance, made one realize nationality, nationhood and what is required of citizens – everything Iran was in dire need of.[183][118]
He was eagerly working towards a broader goal of nationalism and constitutionalism. Tabatabai’s vision combined Western political thought with Islamic ideals without seeing one in contradiction with the other. The former served to fulfill concrete goals such as restricting the monarch’s power, elections, parliamentary system of governance, anjumans (political parties), and the rise of national consciousness interlinked with the nation’s sovereignty.
The latter served ideological goals of social justice, reminder of the higher authority of God, the infallibility of the Imams, the transmitted knowledge of ‘ulama but at the same time, imperfection of humankind. He believed that nationalism, as in the unifying of the Iranian nation as Iranians, could be achieved though studying the sciences, law, mathematics and foreign languages.
He regretted the fact that the ‘ulama did not know these subjects because if they had, they would have understood “the real meaning of monarchy.”[184][119] Furthermore, he was much more progressive than his colleagues but this does not make him an all-out secularist. For example, he opposed the long-standing Persian tradition of monarchies, promoted the people choosing their monarch, wanted the all people to be treated with justice and wanted Islamic law to work “side by side” with constitutional government.[185][120] His ally, on the other hand had different goals in mind.
Sayyid Abdullah Behbahani
“The Clerical Party was led by… Sayyid ‘Abdu’llah [Behbahani] and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’i… [A] popular movement in which the Clergy played so prominent a part… could hardly fail to deprive them at least of their influence and power”
–Edward G. Browne, Persian Revolution, 1906.[186][122]
From a family of religious scholars established in Tehran, Sayyid ‘Abdullah Behbahani[187][123] played an important role alongside Tabatabai in the movement from the start until the granting of the constitution.[188][124] He and Tabatabai were key players in taking sanctuary in Shah ‘Abdul Azim’s shrine and it was from this event that their alliance was formed.[189][125] A substantial number of merchants rallied around him to protest ceasing of custom reforms and increased taxation.[190][126]
It was Behbahani’s links with the bazaar and cooperation with British officials that he often represented. Behbahani was more susceptible to bribery and conspiracy than other ‘ulama—he was known for receiving monetary gifts from British in return for his loyalty.[191][127] His relentless ambition for power overshadowed Tabatabai, and his sincerity to the cause was less visible than Tabatabai’s.[192][128]
Upon granting of the constitution and Majlis, Tabatabai and Behbahani attended parliamentary sessions and were treated as though they were part of the assembly. One example is when Taqizadeh, the Azerbaijan deputy informed him of two sections to be added in the Constitution, administration of justice and the penal code, that were to be reviewed so that one is different from the other. He plainly refused to distinguish the two. The parliament were suppose to review the sections but Behbahani insisted that the ‘ulama examine them.
His argument was that the parliament had no right to restrict the shari’ah because it was not subject to limitations and the implementation of the shari’ah had to be carried out by the judiciary.[193][129] As this paper will later elaborate, not all ‘ulama held this view. Clearly, Behbahani stayed in the movement because of the power and prestige that it brought him.[194][130]
Though he did not agree with the Majlis’s functions and saw himself more qualified as a mujtahid to assume a legitimatizing position. On the other hand, he was not in a position to oppose the Majlis given his investment in it and in return, how far the movement had advanced him.[195][131] To illustrate, he and Tabatabai attended parliamentary sessions and the deputies would wait for his signal to begin.
His politics led one unconventional member of the ‘ulama, Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri to the royalist camp. According to Bayat, he had carried the past rivalry from the madrasa[196][132] to the parliament and caused Iran much grief.[197][133] Religious scholars from the outside dealt with different aspects of the movement.
‘Ulama from Ottoman Iraq
“The people applied to us asking for our intercession because they supposed that the [shari’ah] was to be obeyed and the word of its people ought to be listened to.”
—Iraqi Mujtahids to Haji ‘Ali Pasha, First Chamberlain of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 1908. [198][134]
Very little attention has been given to individual ‘ulama, as we know, as is the case with the Iraqi ‘ulama. They were ethnically Persian, but were educated in the shrine cities of Najaf, Samarra and Kerbala in Iraq. During this time, Iraq was ruled by the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid who had a Pan-Islamic aspiration that aligned according to denomination.[199][135] Unlike Tabatabai, Behbahani, Nuri and to a lesser extent Taqizadeh, the Iraqi ‘ulama had a more transnational outlook. Hairi and Litvak are the only historians to have shed light on how the Iraqi ‘ulama contributed to the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911).
Hairi’s article focuses on ayatollahs[200][136] Tehrani and Khurasani and Shaykh Mazandarani though there were other lower-ranking ‘ulama, students and assistants that were part of this subgroup. The Tobacco Protest (1891-1892) began when a telegram from an Iraqi mujtahid was sent to Iran.[201][137] From then onwards, their opinions were the “word of command,” the main force behind the movement.[202][138]
The leader of the First and Second Majlis, Taqizadeh said (Habl al-Matin, October 3, 1910), “‘The Shah wants to [continue] his tyrannical rule even at the price of granting [Azerbaijan] to Russia. The only solution to this problem is that the [Iraqi] ‘ulama, should move to Iran to oppose the Shah’” (emphasis mine). Undoubtedly, their impact resonated with Iranians and the movement.
Through the 19th century, the Iraqi ‘ulama including their assistants, Shaykh Mallahati and Mirza Muhammad Husayn Naini did not see the Ottomans as their leaders.[203][139] Rather they rejected political legitimacy of any ruling class but this did not mean that they were unwilling to act as mediators between locals and the Ottomans. By the 20th century when political activism became more important in judging the status of the ‘ulama, and as Westerners pierced Iran, they set aside sectarian differences and their dismissive attitude towards the Ottoman sultan.[204][140]
It is apparent that the higher goal of constitutionalism motivated them to set aside dissimilarities as seen in a letter to the Sultan, “We suppliants of high Government and beseechers of the Sultan’s compassion after fulfilling our duties of prayer and expressing the praises due by us.”[205][141] They describe how the Iranian people appealed to them to persuade the Mohammad Ali Shah to adhere to his promises and to stop “disturbances between the Government and the subjects which resulted in fear and dispersion.”[206][142]
The Constitutional Revolution in Iran started in 1905 and the constitutionalist revolution of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire amplified Tehrani, Khurasani, Mazandarani, Na’ini and Mallahati politically. They contributed to the output of new ideas and were absorbed by its’ influx, changing the way people traditionally did taqlid (followed advice of the ‘ulama) according to location. According to Litvak, their key location in Iraq between Qajar Iran and Ottoman Turkey meant they confronted challenges that are more difficult than the ‘ulama from Iran.[207][143] Certainly, their motives for participating in the movement were sincere.
Madrassa–educated, Azerbaijani Leader of the First and Second Majlis: Taqizadeh
“Iran is alive, and I do not believe that she is destined to die. However hopeless the situation may seem…”
—Taqizadeh, after defeating Nuri’s anticonstitutionalist protest outside the First Majlis.[208][144]
Taqizadeh (1878-1970) was an influential politician under the reign of Mohammad Ali Shah, in the second phase of the Constitutional Revolution known as the Lesser Autocracy and is known as a modern Iranian nationalist.[209][145] His father was a member of the ‘ulama, and following in his father’s footsteps he initially took the same route and earned the rank of a mullah. He came from a different background than the other members of the ‘ulama, having a mercantile and religious background.[210][146]
He received his education from a religious seminary since in those days learned and scholarly people usually did but also was familiar with the other subjects such as religious and cultural calendars, German philosophy and the French language.[211][147] He grew up in Tabriz[212][148] where the heir to the Qajar throne lived. Incompetence of the Qajars along with a thriving Westernized intellectual community in the Azerbaijan province influenced him to join politics.[213][149]
During the Constitutional Revolution, it was one of the few cities in Iran open to novel ideas since it was the gateway into Iran from the Caucaus. The most progressive, famous diplomats came this province providing intellectual fuel for the movement, and like Taqizadeh were known for their revolutionary spirit.[214][150] He believed that Iran needed to become European in order to progress, but later toned down this view.[215][151]
He moved to Tehran were he proved to be a talented and powerful figure being elected twice as the Leader of the Majlis.[216][152] The merchants of Tabriz who backed him were convinced that with his knowledge of constitutionalism and parliamentary form he could single-handedly take down the Qajar dynasty. Since the ‘ulama were sympathetic to the people, he realized how important they were in making constitutionalism work in Iran.[217][153] Nevertheless, being part of the ‘ulama did not stop him from criticizing other members.[218][154] This was the case when Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri and anticonstitutionalists protested erecting of the parliament.
After they lost, Taqizadeh addressed the large crowd of people, “Fanaticism is dead in Persia. The reactionary mullas, with Shaykh Fazlu’llah at their head, raised the cry of ‘Babism,’ ‘Islam in danger,’ ‘Infidels,’ etc. etc., but their appeals to the popular fanaticism fell on deaf ears.”[219][155] Taqizadeh was not the only one to have discord with Nuri.
Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri
“[On the] topic of seditious ideas, and… duty of defending [faith] against them… in the time of the Prophet, the duty of regulating… affairs of the community (umur-i ‘amma) was in [the hands of one person].”
—Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri, 1893[220][156]
Nuri was one member of the ‘ulama who had attained a high level of learning.[221][157] He started out proconstitutionalist but clashes with Behbahani led him to become the conservative royalist camp.[222][158] An inspired follower of Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, his eccentric views earned him his fanatical reputation. Al-Afghani, a problematic figure, is known as one of the founders of Pan-Islamic movement.[223][159] Proposed by some to be one of the instigators of constitutionalism in Persia, he used the name of Islam as a mask to further his own agenda. [224][160] Which Nuri also did. Quickly he started propagating his own ideas of religion, which can be alternatively called blasphemy. He gained a considerable number of followers including Mirza Muhammad Reza Kermani the assassin of Naser al-Din Shah, and Shaykh Fazlallah Nuri.[225][161]
Nuri was on the side of the royalists because he saw himself superior to Tabatabai and Behbahani and maybe even jealous of them.[226][162] He was an opportunist who twisted religion into a political game. He supported the monarchy and its’ absolutism equating it with the time of the Prophet when “affairs of the community” were in the “hands of one person.” And this method guarded and preserved religion and “the world of worshippers so that the roots of Islam may be protected in absence of the Imam.” [227][163] His schemes were a thin veneer of false devotion under agnosticism. His contemporaries accused him of lacking faith because his duplicity of character.[228][164] He had created such annoyance that the mild-mannered Tabatabai gave him an ultimatum to behave or he, and his supporters, would be kicked out of Tehran. On the other hand, Taqizadeh found him to be a dangerous traditionalist that used mudslinging to alienate constitutionalist ‘ulama-leaders.[229][165]
Defining Categories: Democracy and Constitutionalism
The political ideology of constitutionalism during the early 1900s differs from that of democracy. If one defines, democracy as having a constitution that ensures universal suffrage, then, according to this definition not all constitutionalist ‘ulama believed in democracy. Tabatabai and Taqizadeh did but Behbahani and Nuri most likely joined to further their own prestige. The Iraqi ‘ulama aligned with the movement because they were a discriminated minority in rival empire. Iranian constitutionalists did believe in justice, stability and security for their nation. However, democracy would have been a far too radical and unrealistic political agenda for turn-of-the-century Iran due to high levels of social stratification based on urban/rural divide, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and gender.[230][166] The ‘ulama, whether they supported the Constitutional Revolution or not, were one group that varied in their views; and because they belonged to the same social class did not mean they all were uniform in their views.[231][167] The ‘ulama did not agree with government policy of favoring European nations and at the same time advocated political reform along European lines without being fully aware of what it entailed.
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