The Islamic Revolution in Iran

Three Lectures Delivered in 1979 by Professor Hamid Algar
University of California
Berkeley, USA

LECTURE # 1

IRAN AND THE SHI’ISM
PROF. HAMID ALGAR, University of California, Berkeley
(Delivered in October, 1979)
THE subject of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is one whose importance hardly needs underlining. With the passage of time, its importance will become even clearer, as being the most significant and profound event in the entirety of contemporary Islamic history Already we see the impact of the Iranian Revolution manifested in different ways and different degrees across the length and breadth of the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia, from Bosnia in the heart of Europe down to Africa.
It is not surprising that in the face of the war of renewal that has been at least partly inaugurated by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the holders of power in the Islamic world, not to mention their various agents and representatives abroad, are seeking to contain the effect of the Islamic Revolution within the boundaries of Iran. They also seek to suggest that the Islamic Revolution has certain particular characteristics that do not permit of any extension beyond Iran. The easiest and most obvious way in which they attempt to accomplish this task is by branding the movement in Iran as a Shi'ia movement and Shi'ia in a divisive and exclusive sense. I do not wish to give the impression that through choosing the title for the first lecture of Iran and Shi'ism, I am in any way contributing, even unintentionally, to this campaign for putting a particular and limiting stamp on the Islamic Revolution. It is, nonetheless, the case that from a historical point of view, the Revolution in Iran and the foundation of the Islamic Republic is the culmination of a series of events that began in the sixteenth century of the Christian era with the adherence of the majority of the Iranian people to the Shi'ia school of thought in Islam. Indeed, one of the important factors that sets the Islamic Revolution apart from all the other revolutionary upheavals of the present century is its deep roots in the historical past.
Whereas the Russian, Chinese and other revolutions, at least in theory, seek to negate the past in a radical fashion, to react against it, on the contrary, the Islamic Revolution is the continuation, the culmination of an important part of the Islamic heritage of Iran. In one sense the beginning of that heritage comes with the introduction of Islam to Iran in the seventh century of the Christian era. In a more immediate and important sense, the appropriate point of departure for our examination of the historical background of the Revolution is the early part of the sixteenth century which sees the conversion of Iran into the only country in the Muslim world with a majority adhering to the Shi'ia school of thought. It is appropriate, therefore, also to say at least a few words about Shi'ism.
Shi'ia school of thought in Islam, which has an extremely complex history, has gone through many different stages of development, both in Iran and outside. It is hardly possible for me to attempt even a sketch of those developments here. What I will lay emphasis upon are those aspects within the context of Iran which have had an important political and social impact. Whatever version of Shi'ism one looks at, at whatever point it may have expressed itself in Islamic history, the crucial point has been the doctrine of the Imamate, the figure of the Imam, who is not merely the successor of the Prophet (on whom be peace) in a legislative, administrative even military capacity, but is also in some sense an extension of the spiritual dimensions of the prophetic mission. Let there be no mistake, Shi'ia Muslims like the Sunnis, accept and believe in fully the sealing of prophethood with the Prophet Muhammad (on whom be peace). However, they differ in their theory of the succession. Not merely in the identity of the successor, but also in the functions of the successor. The functions of the successor, the Imam, in Shi'ia beliefs, include the authoritative explanation of the text of the Qur'an, the authoritative interpretation and even extension of Islamic law, the guidance of the individual in his spiritual life in a fashion akin to the murshid in sufism, and the role of sole legitimate leader of the entire Muslim community -the Ummah.
Given the occultation, the ghaiba of the Imam, that is his disappearance, his absence from the plane of physical history from an early period, it can be said that in a certain sense all that is implied in the Shi'ia doctrine of the Imam has also absented itself from the worldly plane. This absence of the Imam has been one of the constant preoccupations of Shi'ia philosophy, mysticism and speculation. What we are concerned with here is chiefly its political implications. If the sole legitimate successor of the Prophet, if the sole wielder of legitimate authority after him is no longer present on the earthly plane, that means that inherently any worldly power that claims to exercise authority must be, ipso facto, illegitimate unless it can demonstrate in a clear and undisputable fashion that it exercises rule on behalf of the absent Imam. This very important belief has led the Shi'ia Muslims to assume throughout the major part of their history a stance of rejection with regard to political authority, with regard to the de facto, existing political authority, whereas for the greater part of the history of the Sunni Muslims and prevailing political theory in its classical formulation by Al-Mawardi was that the existing political power should not be disputed on condition that a few simple preconditions were observed, like the sultan performing the Friday prayers and the Shari'a, at least certain segments of the Shari'a being formally implemented.
Whereas this was the predominant theory of the Sunni Moslems, and we see traces of it even today in the Sunni Muslim countries, the Shi'ia always rejected the notion of an accommodation with the existing political system. This rejection was sometimes purely theoretical and in fact its practical implications had not been fully worked out and realized in the case of Iran right now until the Islamic Revolution itself, which, one can see, is the final implementation, or the logical implementation, of the political theory of the Shi'ia. In any event, it has been present as a powerful attitude throughout the history of the Shi'ia school of thought m Islam and most particularly in Iran.
Another theme of Shi'ism in general that we may refer to before passing on to the particular case of Iran, is the importance given to the concept of martyrdom. Martyrdom is not in any way a monopoly concern of the Shi'ia. It is a common value of all Moslems, having its archetype in the example given by the Companions of the Prophet (upon whom be peace). Nonetheless, it has acquired a certain particular flavor and importance in the context of Shi'ism. This has been through the martyrdom of Imam Husain who, we can say, is, after the Prophet and after Hazrat Ali, who from the point of view of the Shi'ia is the first Imam, after those two figures, is doubtless the most important figure in the religious consciousness of the Shi'ia. The fact that he met his death in battle that he attained martyrdom is seen by the Shi'ia not simply as a fact of history, it is seen as a fact of profound and continuing spiritual significance. In the person of Imam Husain, the whole fate of humanity when faced with overwhelming and tyrannical power is seen to have crystallized in the single significant incident and the commemoration of this incident year after year is not merely a matter of pietistic commemoration, it is not a question of remembering a certain event in human history, it is, at least implicitly, a self-identification with Imam Husain and the determination to participate to some degree, through emotion and intention, with Imam Husain in what the Shi'ia perceived as having been a struggle for justice against the overwhelming powers of tyranny. (1)
In the course of the Revolution in Iran, one of the interesting slogans that was constantly raised, and which shows clearly the importance of Imam Husain, not only for the religious but the political consciousness of the Shi'ia, was:

Every day is Ashura, and every place is Karbala.
In other words, wherever the Muslim is, is a field of struggle where the forces of justice and legitimacy are confronted by the forces of tyranny. Every day of his life is a day of battle in which he should seek either triumph or martyrdom. In addition to the important theme of the absence of the legitimate political authority, the refusal to bow before the existing political authority in the name of public order, joined to this we have an important contribution with the concept of martyrdom, as exemplified in particularly tragic and significant fashion by Imam Husain.
The combination of these two themes, the rejection of de facto authority and the belief in the virtues of martyrdom, has given Shi'ism, particularly at certain points in its history, an attitude of militancy that has been sadly lacking in a large number of Sunni segments of the Muslim Ummah. To summarize it and to quote yet another slogan of the Revolution in Iran, It was said that mihrab of the Shi'ia is a mihrab of blood.. That is, throughout the history of the Shi'ia, in their confrontation with the powers of illegitimacy, they have been pushed to martyrdom and to self-sacrifice.
Let us pass to the particular case of Iran and the historical circumstances of the emergence of Shi'ism in Iran. Shi'ism, which today appears closely mingled with the whole Iranian sense of national identity, was in its origin a total stranger to Iran. Among the various orientalist theories that have been elaborated with respect to the origins of Shi'i it has been said that this was the Iranian response to an Arab Islam. Apart from the inappropriateness of these ethnic categories, there is the simple fact that the earliest Shi'ia were themselves, with few exceptions, Arabs and Iran was for a long time an overwhelmingly Sunni country. Aside from a few centers, traditional centers such as Qom, which we shall hear more about later, and various quarters of other major cities, Shi'ism was little represented in Iran. In the aftermath of the Mongol conquest of the Muslim near-east in the thirteenth century, when the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate was shattered and destroyed, with the consequent weakening, at least in the official position of Sunni thought, a gradual increase in the influence of Shi'ism in Iran began to be noticed. The stages of this are difficult to delineate completely and in any event the process was by no means a rapid and irreversible one. On the very eve of the conversion of Iran to Shi'ism, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, we find that Iran was still an overwhelmingly Sunni country. Strangely, enough, despite the fact that within a short period of time a close mingling of Iranian national identity and Shi'ism had taken place, we find that there are two foreign or external factors which were crucial for the implementation of Shi'ism in Iran.
The first was the Safavid dynasty (1502-1747), originally a Turkic dynasty centered in the north-western frontier lands in Iran, which recruited a large number of its followers from outside Iran, from the Turkic nomads of Asia Minor, Syria and the southern Caucasus. Afterwards the Safavids, for political reasons, manufactured a false genealogy for themselves, seeking descent from Imam Musa Kazim, one of the Imams of the Shi'ia. Subsequently, historical research has shown this genealogy to be false and that on the contrary they are of purely Turkic descent with a possible intermingling of Kurdish elements. In any event, the military forces that brought the Safavids to power in Iran were non-Iranian and recruited from outside Iran.
We may think of the foundation of the Safavid State in Iran as being in many ways one more nomadic invasion of this country, with this difference, that unlike the Mongol invasion, it came not from the east but from the west. After these Turkic nomads had placed the Safavids on the throne of Iran and the decision had been made to convert the majority of the people, if necessary by force, to Shi'ism, it was found that there were barely any Shi'ia scholars in Iran, and very few books available on Shi'ism in the Persian language. Consequently there took place the second influx of an external element, on this occasion Shi'ia Arab scholars from traditional centers of Shi'ism in the Arab world, that is to say, Bahrain and Al-Asha on the Arabian peninsula and Jabal Amel in the southern part of Lebanon.
These scholars formed the first instance of that class of Iranian ulema that we have seen assuming a progressively more important historical role through the centuries until the culmination of that tradition in the Islamic Revolution. Despite this reliance on two external elements for the propagation of Shi'ism in Iran, the Turkic soldiery and Arab scholars, we see that in some fashion the ground must have been very well prepared. Historical research is not yet in a position to tell us how precisely this preparation took place. It is clear that for any spiritual tradition to flourish and take root, the mere process of coercion will not be sufficient. Although the Safavids did engage freely in the use of coercion leading to a large stream of emigration from Iran to neighbouring Sunni countries, nonetheless, in a few generations, Shi'ism had not only taken root in Iran, it had begun to produce one of the major intellectual and cultural flowerings of the Islamic tradition as a whole. For this to have taken place, clearly the ground must have been prepared. Shi'ism found a suitable environment to flourish in Iran.
I turn now, within the' context of this general development of Shi'ism in Iran, to the emergence of this class of Shi'ia ulema. With the hindsight provided by the Islamic Revolution it will be more appropriate to write the Iranian history of the past three or four centuries not so much in terms of dynasties as in terms of the development of the class of the Iranian ulema. Dynasties have come and gone, leaving in many cases little more than a few artifacts behind to account for their existence. But there has been a continuing development of the class of Shi'ia ulema in Iran which has been totally without parallel elsewhere in the Islamic world. The origins of the Iranian Shi'ia ulema are with those scholars imported by the Safavids from various Arab countries. Given the fact that they were dependent on royal patronage, they were initially obedient and loyal servants of the State. One finds one of the earliest among them, for example, a certain Shaykh Ahmad Karaki, even writing a treatise defending the practice which was to be found, not only in Iran, but in neighbouring Sunni countries, of prostration before the monarch. The entirety of the religious hierarchy was headed by a certain official known as the sadr ai-mamalik whose function it was to distribute patronage of the State and to ensure the obedience and loyalty of the class of ulema as a whole. Relatively swiftly, however, the matter began to change. At the very height of Safavid power, during the reign of Shah Abbas (1587-1729), who was known in pre-revolutionary version of history as "The Great" although I am sure that "The Great" has now been removed we find the ulema for the first time within the context of Iranian enunciating the essential political theory of the Shi'ia, of the illegitimacy of monarchy and existing government. One of the contemporaries of Shah Abbas, Mulla Ahmad Ardabili, encountered Shah Abbas on a certain occasion and reminded him that his monarchy, his power, was held not by divine right, not as a result of any particular fitness on his part, but rather as something that was a trust on behalf of the Imam and that if the trust were violated, and the hint was there that the trust was being violated, then, the ulema had the right to remove the trust from the king. This, as far as I know, is the earliest recorded instance of the disputation of the legitimacy of the royal power in Shi'ia Iran. Towards the end of the Safavid period, we find that the relationship between the ulema and the State has changed again. It is no longer a question of the ulema reminding the monarch in a very hesitant and theoretical fashion that his power is held only on trust and not by inherent right. On the contrary, they come to establish a certain dominance over the State.
We find, precisely in the last part of the seventeenth century, the first in a long series of powerful mujtahids. This term I will explain. These people came to dominate the life of the country, whether they held effective political power or not. The first of these great mujtahids in terms of whom I would suggest Iranian history be rewritten, is Mulla Muhammed Baqir Majlisi. It cannot be said of him that he exercised his dominance over the monarchy in a creditable fashion. In fact, he can receive a large part of the blame, or credit, for the downfall of the Safavid State in the second decade of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, his historical importance is not to be disputed. He is the first of a series of important and influential mujtahids who came to dominate not merely the intellectual and religious history of the country, but its political fortunes.
With the decline of the Safavid dynasty in 1724, a period of anarchy began in Iran. At one point within the eighteenth century we find no fewer than thirteen different contestants for the throne doing battle with each other. This total disintegration of the political authority accelerated the process of divorce between the religious institutions and the monarchy. We can say that in the absence of an effective centralised monarchy throughout the eighteenth century the ulema came, in a' practical fashion, quite apart from theoretical developments that I shall discuss later, to assume the role of local governors, arbitrators of disputes, executors at law and so forth. By the end of the eighteenth century, the new dynasty had emerged that was able gradually to impose its rule on the entirety of Iran -The Qajar dynasty. However, the Qajars (1795-1924) were in no position to continue the same relationship with the ulema that the Safavids had enjoyed at the beginning of their powers. On the very eve of the rising of the Qajar dynasty, we find taking place among the religious class, an important debate on a seemingly technical matter which had the greatest of political consequences as well. This debate took place between the two schools known as the Usuli and the Akhbari. This debate was on a matter which appeared to be technical, relating to the details of Islamic jurisprudence.
To summarise briefly the positions of the two schools, the Akhbaris, as their name indicates, said that in the absence of the Imam it was not permissible for a religious scholar to engage in the use of his reason to enact a certain judgment, to apply the principles of the law to a specific; problem or situation What had to be done was merely to have recourse to Traditions, hence the word Akhbari, and on the basis of the sifting of those, to arrive at a conclusion, given any particular problem. To put it in the language of the Sunni Islam, we can say that the Akhbari held that every alim should be a scholar of hadith and that he had no legitimate competence beyond that. In other words, they tended totally to an abolition of the whole discipline of development, of the law of jurisprudence. The Usulis, by contrast, said that this was not the case and even in the absence of the Imam it was permissible to engage in independent reasoning with respect to legal questions, of course on the basis of the sources of law as defined by the Shi'ia. Hence, the designation given to them, Usuli. They were those who believe there were a certain number of principles of law, sources of law, which could be applied and expanded through the use of the individual reasoning of the qualified scholar. The qualified scholar in question is the mujtahid, that is literally, he who exercises himself in a general sense and in a technical sense, he who exercises his reasoning powers on the basis of the principles of law to arrive at a certain decision concerning a given problem. There is some confusion in that the word mujtahid has certain application in Sunni Islam, in the sense of one of the founders of the four madhhabs. Its usage in Shi'ism does not presage such a wide connotation. It is not a question of each individual putting forward a new madhhab, a whole series of legal principles. It is a question of a more limited kind of independent reasoning.
The mujtahid is not merely a legal authority, one who can give an expression of opinion in this fashion concerning a problem of Islamic law, he is also a person whose views must be followed. The Usulis believe that in the absence of Imam, the entirety of the community is divided into those who are either mujtahids or who are not mujtahids. If they are not mujtahids, if they do not have the necessary power of comprehension of the law and independent reasoning to attain that state, they must of necessity follow the guidance of one who is and this following of guidance is known as taqlid. The common connotation of the word is imitation, but it has a technical meaning of following the guidance of a qualified religious scholar.
Given the fact that Islamic law in its scope knows of no distinction between the secular and the religious, given the fact that the affairs of State and the economy and society all fall within the scope of the Islamic law, it follows that the mujtahid is bound to express himself on those matters and that the rest of the community is bound to follow his guidance. Hence it is that every Shi'ia Muslim who is not himself a mujtahid is bound to follow a mujtahid as his marja-e taqlid. This is a term difficult to translate. It means the mujtahid who is chosen by an individual Muslim as his source of authority and guidance.
Were it not for the triumph of the Usuli position in the eighteenth century, on the eve of the rise of the Qajars, there would have been no mujtahids. The religious scholars would have found themselves condemned to an extremely marginal position, to the sifting of the ahadith, the narrations and traditions of the Prophet (on whom be peace) with no ability to provide living and continuous guidance for the affairs of society and politics at large. One may say that the Revolution in Iran, at least the particular shape that it has taken, the form of leadership that it has enjoyed and continues to enjoy, would also be unthinkable without this triumph of the Usuli position in this apparently technical dispute in the eighteenth century.
To come now to the Qajar period, given this triumph of the Usuli position and the emergence of a strong class of mujtahids, convinced of their authority, not merely as the interpreters of tradition but as the executors of tradition and law, the Qajars found their position disputed from the beginning. First, this disputation of the authority of the Qajar monarchs took place sporadically with respect to certain particular issues or events. Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, we find the number of provincial governors being expelled from the cities they were supposed to rule by the people of those cities who had been empowered, or even instructed to do so by the local mujtahid. An early example of the opposition of the ulema or the mujtahids to the royal power is to be seen in 1826 when Muslims inhabiting territories that had been captured from Iran in the first Russo-Iranian war were subject to religious persecution at the hands of the Russians. The ulema then delivered a judgment to the effect that it was the duty of Iran to go to war against Russia. The monarch of the day initially showed considerable reluctance, whereupon, according to a British diplomatic dispatch of the time, the most influential of the mujtahids of the day was reported to have said that "unless this present Shah does our bidding and obeys our fatwa, we shall remove him and put another dog in his place.'
Throughout the century, antagonism between the ulema and the monarchy became more and more intense. In part this was because of the logical implications of the political theory of the Shi'ia, amplified by the emergence of the Usuli madhhab. Another important factor was the growing alliance between the Iranian monarchy and the foreign powers. Now the monarchy was seen not merely to be holding an illegitimate power, not merely to be flouting the law of Islam, to be an instrument of tyranny and injustice, it was seen to be the agent for increasing foreign encroachment upon Iran and exploitation of its resources. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that we see the first mass movement of modern Iranian history directed against foreign hegemony in Iran, led by the Shi 'ia ulema. In 1892, the production and marketing of tobacco within Iran and outside had been given to a British monopoly. The leading mujtahid of the day, Mirza Hasan Shirazi, gave a fatwa to the effect that for as long as tobacco was cultivated and marketed by this monopoly, it was forbidden to be consumed. Such was the effect of this fatwa that even the women in the royal household refrained from the use of tobacco. This movement in 1892 was followed just over a decade later by the movement in Iranian history known as the Constitutional Revolution which dates approximately as having lasted from 1905 until 1911.
In the Constitutional Revolution, the ulema continued to play an extremely important role. We may say that throughout Iranian history the whole course of constitutionalism has been intimately linked with the role of the religious scholars.
It may be thought that constitutionalism, even the word itself, or the word that it is intended to translate, is of European origin and it may be asked how could it be that the ulema, whether in Iran or any other Islamic country, could adopt a course, a method of political reform which is obviously foreign in its ultimate origins. The answer that can be given, at least in the case of Iran, is fairly clear. It was held by the Shi'ia ulema of the day that a totally legitimate authority was, in the nature of things, impossible, given the continuing occultation, or absence of the Imam from the world. It was held that all that could be done in his absence was to limit the inevitable illegitimacy of existing rule. Therefore, it was held that a monarchical power that was limited by the existence of the constitution, by the election of an assembly of representatives, was preferable to one that was absolute and arbitrary in its exercise of power. Hence the idea 'Of constitutionalism, which had been introduced into Iran by certain western educated elements, was given a particular application and content by the ulema. They saw in it a means of limiting the royal power and lessening the illegitimacy that was almost inevitable in their view in the whole institution of the State. It is not possible or even necessary to relate to you the events of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Enough to say that the major Iranian historian of the revolution, Ahmad Kasravi, has seen in the agreement concluded by the two major mujtahids of Tehran, Sayyid Muhammad Bihbihani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, the starting point qf the revolution in December 1906. Throughout the revolution the major directives came from the ulema. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution was frustrated by the resistance of the monarchy, powerfully supported and encouraged by foreign powers. We may say that had it not been for the continued interference in Iranian affairs, first by Russia, then by Great Britain and most recently by the United States and Israel, Iran today, instead of looking back on a quarter century of struggle and a year of Revolution in which a minimum of 50,000 people were slaughtered, would be able to look back on more than half a century of constitutional and parliamentary rule. As it was, first the Russians and then the British and recently the Americans, frustrated the Constitutional Revolution. Here also we cannot go into detail. Time does not permit it. The Russians dominated in the period between approximately 1907, which saw an effective and temporary withdrawal of the British from the scene, to the end of the First World War. Then the British reappeared in force on the scene -in such force that they had no visible competitor, and brought about a change of dynasty, from the Qajar dynasty now happily defunct, to the Pahlavi dynasty. With the Pahlavi dynasty a new period was inaugurated in the history of Iran. A new and particularly sombre period in which the traditional monarchy is transformed into a modern dictatorship.
It was often said, in the United States, and probably elsewhere, that the Iranian Revolution was motivated by hostility to this glorious phenomenon known as "modernisation". In so far as the word "modernisation" has had any meaning in the Iranian context, what was modernised by the Pahlavi dynasty was the apparatus of repression. At least the Qajar dynasty and the others before it were limited in their ability to enact their will by the traditional inefficiency of Middle Eastern monarchies, but by contrast the Pahlavi dynasty, although it paid lip service to Iranian tradition, and was appointed, by King George V, to the crown of Iran, in effect ruled as dictators of a modern, European, totalitarian kind. It followed that under this kind of regime, the constitutional ideal to which the ulema from a particular point of view had subscribed was thoroughly repressed and defeated. We find, therefore, in the period of Reza Shah, the first member of the Pahlavi mafia, the coming into being of a rubber stamp parliamentary assembly. That continued effectively until the overthrow of the monarchy. Among the few individuals to resist the imposition of the Pahlavi dictatorship in an open fashion, was again one of the ulema, Sayyid Hasan Mudarris. He spoke up in the Majlis against the measures of Reza Shah and went into exile and was murdered in exile by agents of Reza Shah.
Another characteristic of the period, apart from the suppression of constitutionalism, is the imitation of the measures taken in neighbouring Turkey by Mustafa Kamal. An attempt was made to cultivate an ethnic nationalism with strong overtones of hatred against the Arabs, rejection of the Islamic heritage, glorification of the pre-Islamic past, the purging of the Persian language of Arabic loanwords and so on. For a variety of reasons the measures taken by Reza Shah in Iran were less effective than those that had taken place in Turkey, partly because imitation is always less successful than the original and partly because westernisation and secularization had a far longer prehistory in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire than in Iran. In any event, this officially sponsored nationalist ideology continued to dominate at least the surface of Iranian life for many years, so much so that a large number of western observers were happy to write off Iran as a constituent part of the Islamic world and were given to repeating the remarks made by Iranian officialdom, "Yes, we are Moslems, but remember we are not Arabs", as if there were some kind of tension between these two entities. In fact the continuing and effective loyalty of the Iranian people to Islam with all of the alignments that implies, never ceased. It was simply that the open manifestation of it became difficult if not impossible for many years under the rule of the two successive Pahlavi dictators.
In 1941, the reign of the first Pahlavi monarch came to an end. The same people who had put him in, put him on a train out of the country and then on to a ship, namely the British. On this occasion they were aided by the Americans and the Russians. As the second Shah indicates in his own memoirs, in a very interesting sentence, "It was deemed appropriate by the Allies that I should succeed my father." So this then young man who was put on the throne in 1941 commenced his rule of exploitation and murder in the service of his foreign masters. The change of dynasty in itself resulted in a temporary relaxation of the full rigour of the dynasty. In the first decade of the reign of the now deposed Shah, we see a resurgence of Islamically oriented elements in the political life of the country. The ideal pursued is again constitutionalism and the most politically important of the ulema of the time, Ayatullah Kashani, in the numerous speeches he made within the Iranian parliament and outside, would always refer to two sources of authority on the one hand the Qoran, and on the other hand the Iranian Constitution. In the name of both the Constitution and the Qoran he would call for the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry to bring to an end British imperialist domination of Iran and he would call for an effective limitation on the royal power. Outside of the Majlis, there was a large number of Islamic elements at work in this period. There were, for example, the Fidayan-e-Islam. This was an organisation an activist militant organisation, which specialised in the removal of prominent enemies of Islam in Iran. For example, one of the Prime Ministers who was a British agent, Razmara, was assassinated by the Fidayan-e-Islam. But the dominant personality of this first decade of the pre-war period was not a member of the religious class. He was a secular nationalist politician, the late Dr. Mohammad Mussadeq, who indeed enjoyed the support of the religious classes, was himself an obse1Ving Moslem, although no doubt lacking in full consciousness of Islam as a total way of life. Nonetheless, he was a sincere, patriotic and honest man.
We know now in full detail what happened to Dr. Mussadeq and the nationalist regime he headed. It was overthrown in August 1953 by the direct intervention of the United States in the form of the CIA coup of August 1953 which brought about the overthrow of Dr. Mussadeq and the return of the Shah from the exile into which he had been sent.
The return of the Shah in 1953 inaugurated the intense period of a quarter of a century of unprecedented massacre and repression, the intensive exploitation of the resources of the Iranian people by the imperialism of the East and West, the western camp being headed then by the United States rather than Britain. In that period, of course, a large number of ideological forces came into being to combat the dictatorship of the Shah and his subservience to foreign powers. But from the beginning, immediately after 1953, the coup d'etat, we see these religious elements playing an important part. We can mention what was called the “National Resistance Movement that came into being very soon after the return of the Shah from exile. Although there is no overtly religious component in the destignation of this organisation, nonetheless, it was an Islamic patriotic organisation. It was succeeded somewhat later by a movement called the Movement of God-Fearing Socialists. It should be said that at this time socialism in Iran, or at least a certain variety of socialism, enjoyed a certain vogue because of the currency in popularity of the slogan of "Islamic socialism" in the Arab world. This is not the time to go into the suitability or otherwise of this term. I mention it in passing.
Then we had in 1963 the emergence to public prominence for the first time of the present leader of the Iranian people, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini. About his immediate background I will speak in much greater detail at my next lecture. To place him for the moment in the historical perspective I have attempted to sketch for you this morning, we can say that he is in many ways the culmination of a long tradition that begins with the first hesitant disputation of the legitimacy of the monarchy. That goes on, in the Qajar period, to openly contest the authority of the monarchy in a certain number of specific incidents. It then goes on to the attempt to limit the power of the monarchy through a constitution, and then sees that the whole formality of legalism, constitutionalism of itself, is not adequate and that nothing short of revolution and the complete overthrow of the existing order is acceptable. It is part of the greatness of Ayatollah Khomeini to have given a leadership and direction to the Islamic Revolution that is totally without parallel in the contemporary Islamic world. Without in any way diminishing or underestimating the importance of his personal contribution, one should bear in mind that he has behind him a long tradition upon which he draws, a tradition of assertion of the ulema as the directive force in society, a tradition of opposition to rule precisely in the name of Shi'ia Islam, a tradition of ever growing militancy and constant readiness to self-sacrifice.
These are the main points I wanted to mention today. There has, inevitably, been much omission and over-simplification, names left out and so forth. Perhaps, I can partially make up for that in the second stage.

Discussion
Question: You have attributed the preservation of the monarchy, even though it was viewed as an illegitimate institution, to the influence of external forces. To what extent is the inability to develop alternative institutions to the monarchy a reflection of an inadequate political theory or the absence of the development of an adequate political formulation within Muslim thinking in the last few centuries? Will there always be this tension between State authority and the Ayatullah within the Shi'ia tradition and what is there to prevent this tension being removed, to allow for the development of a new constitution?
Professor Algar: As to the persistence of the monarchy in Iran, to put it more precisely I should have said that the monarchy was able to defy the constitution through the support of foreign powers. The religious leaders earlier in the century might have been willing to support the continued existence of the monarchy on the condition that the constitution had been observed, and this continued to be the case for at least half a century. There was gradual evolution in the conclusions drawn from the political situation. The conclusion was first drawn that the: illegitimacy was inherent in any State in the absence of the Imam and, therefore, the illegitimacy could at best be hoped to be reduced, if not abolished, through the institution of the constitution. When the constitutional experiment failed, gradually realization dawned that the institution of monarchy should be abolished.
Moreover, one of the important contributions of Ayatollah Khomeini that I should mention is that he takes issue with this whole idea of the inalienable illegitimacy of political authority in the absence of the Imam. In a series of lectures that he gave under the title "Islamic Government", originally given largely to an audience of ulema and students of religious sciences, he says that because the Imam is absent, does this mean that the shari'a should no longer be enforced? Obviously not. If the shari'a is to be enforced, there must be those who enforce the shari'a. In other words, there must be a political authority that is firmly based upon the authority of the shari'a.
As for a tension between the Ayatullah and the secular authorities, probably you are alluding to the so-called rift between Ayatullah Khomeini and Mehdi Bazargan -a charge played up greatly in the western press, as if there was some fundamental antagonism between the two men, which is not the case. Bazargan has the unusual virtue, although in some cases it is not always an advantage, of speaking his mind in a very precise and frank fashion, whoever or whatever the audience may be. Therefore, he comments in the frankest possible way upon any problems which come up in his relations with Khomeini in the revolutionary situation. This is not a question of a fundamental antagonism between the two men on a personal or institutional level. There is no question of a continuation in the post-revolutionary period of attitudes that are somehow inalienable.
The Chairman: There appears to have been a lag in the development of Muslim political thought over this period. The lag has been taken up by Khomeini. In other words, the political thought was lying behind the actual situation.
Professor Algar: I think it is true to say that. It is justifiable to say that there was a lack of a fully articulated political theory and it was largely created by the evolution of circumstances in Iran. After the constitutional experiment essentially failed and after the auspices of the United States and Israel, people were led inevitably to have new thoughts on the matter and to take up more uncompromising, more far reaching positions than had been the case in the past.
Question: May I raise the same question? It refers to the problem of illegitimacy of any government in the absence of the Imam. I find it difficult to trace a point where, in the existence of the Imam -there are twelve Imams who have existed over two centuries -there has ever been an attempt to displace the existing monarchy. No. Imam, to my knowledge, has ever taken up arms against the rulers who are, ipso facto, considered illegitimate.
Professor Algar: There are two contradictory conclusions that may be drawn from the illegitimacy of existing power. One tends in the direction of quietism and the other in the direction of open manifestation. One important doctrine of Shi 'ism which operated in the direction of quietism was taqiya, the preservation of the community through its virtual self-effacement in a political sense. After the disappearance of the Imam, both options were open, that of quietism or revolutionary action. Progressively under the impact of particular circumstances the second course came to be chosen.
Dr. Salman: As a result of this policy of isolating Iran from the Arab world and also as a result of degeneration of scholarship in the Muslim and Arab world, and the Sunni world, the Sunnis know very little about the Shi'ia, so much so that the term "Ayatullah", when it became well known at the end of last year and the beginning of this year, was completely unknown. It would be useful for many of us, who are Sunnis, to hear something from you about this office and whether there is a structure, a hierarchy, through which the authority passes.
Professor Algar: The term 'Ayatullah' is literally translated as "a sign of God " -a person who, through his spiritual and learned attainments, is a manifestation of certain qualities which ultimately draw upon Divine perfection. It is a title given by popular usage, in other words, it is not a rank in the sense of mujtahid. It is a little conferred by popular usage on someone who has emerged as one of the major mujtahids. We cannot speak of a hierarchy within the Shi'ia other than the simple hierarchy of mujtahid and muqallid. Essentially, the Shi'ia community is composed of mujtahids and muqallid. Among the mujtahids, there are those who have the great authority and degree of learning. It sometimes happens that among the mujtahids a certain individual will emerge as the sole marja-e-taqlid. In other words, the personal attainments of that person are such that he will overshadow all of the other mujtahids and everyone will exercise taqlid in respect of him.
Dr. Salman: How many marja-e-taqlid are there? I read that there are six Ayatullahs in Iran.
Professor Algar: No, there are many more than that. The tit If: has come a little over generously used recently. There are probably about four or five marja-i-taqlid of whom Ayatollah Khomeini is a political sense is the marja-i taqlid of people who, in non-political matters, follow the guidance of other mujtahids. You find people who are in a narrower sense the followers of Ayatullah Shariatmadari but who, politically, follow Ayatullah Khomeini. His authority has gone far beyond the bounds of what is implied in this whole doctrine of taqlid, although that is the technical basis for it. He exercises a far wider authority.
The Chairman: These marja-i taqlid are not elected ? Professor Algar: No, it is in the strict sense of the word a democratic process. Since there is no machinery, no elective machinery, no machinery of appointment, it is not as though someone puts himself up for the office. It is simply that one attains the technical qualification of mujtahid, and then through piety and learning that is demonstrated, he gathers a certain following. His influence will be mediated to his following by, if you like, the second ranking members of the ulema. Here is where you can speak of a network in Iran. I do not like the word "hierarchy", but one can speak of a network.
When I was in Paris with Ayatullah Khomeini at the end of last year, it was interesting to see how the various proclamations and instructions of Ayatullah Khomeini were conveyed. A telephone call was made from Paris to a number of provincial cities in Iran. Every individual seated at his telephone in each of those cities would have a tape recorder ready. The message would be recorded, transcribed and given into the hands of the mullahs for distribution within that city. In turn, the students of those mullahs would take it out into the villages. This is one of the things I should have spoken of, but did not get the chance to. The work of Ayatullah Khomeini was preceded in an organizational sense and made possible by the work of the Ayatullah Burujirdi. Although he was politically inactive, when there was the struggle against the oil industry, when there was the American coup d'etat against Dr. Mussadeq, he remained silent. That silence earned him the reproaches of many people. One important achievement that is to his credit is the reorganization of what is called Hauza-yi Ilmiya, the teaching institute in Qum. He established a network for the dissemination of religious knowledge throughout Iran as well as the collection of zakat and khums. The same network established by him was used lately by Ayatullah Khomeini and other leaders.
Question: The world press is rather contradictory. Some people say we cannot shut up our eyes at the prosperity and achievement brought about. by the Shah of Iran, for example, m education, industry, and even in the number of doctors. There are more doctors in Iran than in Pakistan or other countries. This was done in the reign of the king himself. Second, this killing which continues by Ayatullah Khomeini -it is judicial or unjudicial assassination. What do you call it? There is a long list of killings. In spite of the world press which says that this should be stopped in the interests of Iran because there should be a reconciliation between the people working under the regime of the Shah and others because the target is almost achieved, the king is expelled from the soil. The killing is almost meaningless. There should be complete reconciliation and unity to bring about co-operation in Islamic structure.
Professor Algar: Since this question has been raised, I think that I should answer it. I have to say that I think it is unfortunate that a Muslim should raise this kind of question and put forward these ideas. You speak of a continuation of the killings. If you equate the cold-blooded slaughter of 50,000 people in the single year -I am not speaking of the entire career of the Shah -with the execution of 300 murderers by the Islamic Revolutionary regime in Iran, you must have a strange conception of justice in general and Islamic justice in particular. It is not a question of judicial assassination -I am not quite sure what that means -surely in Islam a murder is accountable for his crimes and someone who is guilty of multiple murder should also be accountable. You speak about unity. Unity between who and who and on what basis? There can be no unity between on the one hand, the people who have offered thousands of sacrifices and martyrs, whose blood is hardly yet dry on the streets of Iran, and on the other hand those who, for the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Israel and other centers of corruption and intrigue around the world, have been continually slaughtering and murdering their own fellow countrymen. How can there be unity between them? On the contrary, the number of people executed in Iran since the Revolution has been extremely small and extremely restrained. In the United States, the Zionist idiots and hypocrites who control the media talk about a blood bath in Iran. Where were these people when on a single day in Iran, September 8, 1978, 4,000 people were shot down, a minimum of 4,000 people were shot down in a single day. Now you want to have forgiveness and reconciliation. No. These butchers should be put to death. Those of them who have fled to other countries, these thieves, embezzlers, these drug merchants, if they be in Britain or anywhere else, as the Chief of the Revolutionary Council said, they should be cut down and killed. This is the duty of all Moslems, not simply Iranians.
Question: As we know, the western press and the media are controlled by Zionists, imperialists and intriguers. Justice has to be seen to be done and to be carried out as regards the perpetrators of injustices and the western people who have been committing murders against the people of Iran. Will we be cowed down by the western media and the intriguers as regards the carrying out of justice in Iran.
Professor Algar: One thing we should remember as Muslims is that we have our own form of judicial procedure in Islam. The Iranian people did not suffer the sacrifices that they did to have a replica, a pale imitation of some western form of government, whether a judicial system, political organization, or anything else. For us, as Moslems, the only relevant question is whether the trials and executions that have taken place in Iran are in conformity with Islamic practice and standards. Very clearly they are. Every individual who has been accused and brought before a court in Iran has had the chance of calling witnesses for and against. I know of an individual at Tehran University who testified in favour of one former Savak agent. Those who have a direct interest in the case have been permitted to attend, representatives of the foreign press have attended certain of the trials, although not an of them. We hear of this hasty justice by some segments of the western press. What is meant by this? In America, and probably in Britain too, the delay that occurs between the pronouncement of a judgment and its execution is intended above all to enrich the lawyers. That is an there is to it. The agony of the prisoner is prolonged when lawyers make a fortune for themselves. However, in Islam, if a judgment is given that is fully supported by the evidence there is no logical or human reason to delay the execution of the judgment. It is more merciful.
Question: We have discussed the tradition and leadership of the Iranian movement and the Revolution which is the outstanding event in the Muslim world. Would you consider such background developments to be a prerequisite or otherwise for the Islamic Revolution?
Professor Algar: You are anticipating something which forms the topic of a later lecture; In my last lecture to you I want to consider this question of the applicability of the Iranian model to other Muslim countries. To give a partial and preliminary answer, the emergence of an ulema class in the form we have seen in Iran is not a prerequisite for the success of the Islamic movement in other parts of the Islamic world because this would in effect mean that they all accept Shi'ism which, of course, they are free to do, but I do not think we can say that this in itself is a prerequisite. There are other lessons to be drawn from the Iranian experience which are to be designated as,-prerequisites. On the one hand there is the clear identification of the existing order as being totally opposed to Islam, the refusal of any co-operation with it or to be absorbed into it, the total and realistic and serious opposition that brings with it a readiness to sacrifice, a shunning of the various forms of pseudo-Islamic activities, such as attending conferences in Saudi Arabia, and so forth. Ayatullah Khomeini has never attended a single conference sponsored by the Saudi regime and yet we see him today not merely the de facto ruler of Iran, but the source of inspiration of millions of Muslims throughout the world. These and other lessons of the Iranian Revolution I would like to draw on later.
Question: The question of the struggle of the Iranian ulema seems to be one of turning back to the role of religious counsellors or advisers during the post-revolutionary period. How far is this true? The ulema played the role of religious counsellors, but now Khomeini has not put these men as secretaries of State or as Prime Minister.
Professor Algar: I understand the reason for your question, but I think it implies a number of things which are not true. You talk about a Secretary of State. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Iran is by no means a secularist. I am sure you would agree that for a Muslim to avoid being a secularist it is not necessary for him to wear a turban. The Government is made up of people who are fully committed to Islam. I do not think that Ayatullah Khomeini, has withdrawn from a prominent, indeed, a leading role in Iran. There is a duality of authority that we now see in Iran. The Revolutionary Council is composed mainly, if not exclusively, of religious authorities. The Provisional Revolutionary Government is made up of people who have political administrative experience which, for obvious reasons, members of the religious class lack. On the other hand, the wise decision was made by Imam Khomeini not to put religious leaders in a position of obvious prominence so as to avoid the accusation that an Islamic State means rule by the ulema, which obviously it does not. There is this temporary arrangement which will come to an end once the constitution has been ratified and, on the basis of the constitution, elections have been held. Then the government which emerges on the basis of elections may be composed exclusively of. non-ulema elements. It might be composed exclusively of ulema elements or more like a mixture of the two. There is a party called the party for the Islamic Republic, the governing body of which, composed of six individuals, belongs exclusively to the ulema. There is a great likelihood that when the elections take place, it will win an absolute majority.