The Chairman: Will Brother Dabbagh enlighten us?
Husein Dabbagh: It was newly introduced into our language. We never used such a word for a mujtahid. This is a reflection of the Islamic teaching. This means a leader, political as well as spiritual. But this is very recent. It is because usually you find that mujtahid is not sufficient.
Professor Algar: In some publications from Iran, I have seen him described as Naib a/-imam, the vice-regent of the hidden Imam. Is this very widespread?
Hussein Dabbagh: Yes. It is being used by some people to indicate to others not to confuse the real meaning of 'Imam '.
Dr. Ezzati: Ayatullah Khomeini is a mujtahid and not an Imam. The use of this term in Persian really began when he was in Paris. Since then people have started calling him Imam. But this is not new. It happened before, when he was in Iraq, because he was in an Arab environment, and 'Imam, in Arabic literature means simply 'the leader', not a traditional Shi'ia leader. They use the term for Musa Sadr, calling him Imam Musa Sadr, because he lives in Lebanon, in an Arab environment. The Shi'ia term would be mujtahid.
Professor Algar: I think this is true. In some of the literature in Arabic one finds the use of the word in early days with respect to Ayatullah Khomeini. But its introduction to Persian usage in Iran seems more recent.
The Chairman: About eighteen months ago we had a course on the political thought of Islam, and, as in all our courses, we had both Sunni and Shi'ia participants. As individuals, we are Sunnis and Shi'ites, but as an institution we are just Moslem. During the discussion on the political thought of Islam, it emerged that if and when Muslims came to the point of establishing a modern Islamic state, the Shi'ia and Sunni positions would be identical, that in its operational, practical form there would be no difference. Would you agree with this assessment?
Professor Algar: I think that in general terms this is without doubt true. If one were to list the major differences of belief or outlook between Sunnis and Shi'ites, one would see that the most important relate to matters that have no immediate practical application. The whole question of the imamate, even though it is of-great importance for our Shi'ia brothers, as long as the ghaiba continues would not arouse any problems of political collaboration with Sunnis.
If one looks at the other differences of a minor variety relating to the details of fiqh, one will see that some of the differences between the four madhhabs are greater than the differences that separate them from Ja'fari fiqh.
Therefore, as you phrase it, in the operational details of a functioning Islamic state there need be no fundamental difference between Sunni and Shi'ia. If there be any, they will arise from the differing provisions not merely between Sunni and Shi'ite but the four schools of the Sunni Moslems, in so far as we choose to bind ourselves by the four schools.
Dr. Ezzati: Though there. is certainly a historical and ideological difference between the imamate and caliphate, between Shi 'ia and Sunni schools, as far as the modern situation is concerned I do not think there are any ideological differences between the two. The question of leadership is the most important issue regarding the political affairs of a Muslim state. The basis of leadership in Shi'ia jurisprudence is the religious social responsibility (wajib al-kafai), which is shared currently by the Sunnis. They both base their authority on the doctrine of the 'Amr bi al-Ma'uroof wa al-Nahy an al-Munkar'.
The Chairman: This is a point that is not generally understood, and it needs to be brought home clearly.
Dr. Ezzati: I agree, it should be explained. But the difficulty is this. How can we introduce a Khomeini-type leadership into Sunni communities?
The Chairman: Since the Revolution in Iran I have been moving around some of the Sunni countries -some of the most reactionary Sunni countries, if I may put in that way. I can assure you that the people of those countries have been absolutely galvanised and their imaginations have been captured by the Revolution in Iran. Some of them take the precaution of locking their doors before they talk about it. If national boundaries were taken away, probably Ayatullah Khomeini would be elected by acclamation by the Ummah as a whole as the leader of the Muslim world today. I think that the differences between Sunni and Shi'ia would disappear in one instant. They are artificially maintained by the world in which we live. Do you agree?
Professor Algar: Very definitely.
Jamil Sharif: Would you say that Ayatullah Khomeini's stay in Paris will have a discernible impact on Muslims in Francophone Africa?
Professor Algar: I am not really in a position to say anything on that subject. All I know is that for the period of about ten days that I was in Paris I saw a large number of Muslims from different countries coming to visit Imam Khomeini. I do not recall seeing among them any Muslims from Francophone Africa. There were a large number from North Africa , Egypt, coming not necessarily to talk but to pray behind him. I hear that there has been some influence of the Revolution in Nigeria, that there has been an important echo of the Revolution among the Muslims of Nigeria. Presumably the same will be the case in the Francophone countries, but whether as a result of his being in Paris, I do not know.
Jamil Sharif: Have other Muslim scholars, particularly Maulana Maudoodi, had any impact on the Ayatullah Khomeini or vice versa? Has he had an influence on the well-known Muslim scholars and leaders of today?
Professor Algar: I do not know whether he has read any of the works of Maudoodi. This much is certain, that the message of support from Maudoodi to Ayatullah Khomeini went, in a very belated fashion, in early January of this year, and Ayatullah Khomeini expressed regret to me not merely that all the Muslim countries had refused him admission in a suitable fashion in October 1978, but that he had had not a single expression of effective support from the Islamic movement.
It is not likely, in the nature of things that he should have concerned himself greatly with the works of Maudoodi. In a more general fashion, one could say that the Persian translation of some of the works of Maudoodi could have had an effect on people in Iran when circulated. Some may have had some effect? Whether Ayatullah Khomeini has had an influence in the other direction upon Maudoodi or other Muslim leaders, I do not know. Unfortunately, there is no sign of it. Otherwise, Maudoodi would hardly accept the so-called King Faisal award of Islamic Studies.
Question: I know that you have done work on freemasonry in Iran and Turkey. Is there any evidence to suggest a link between the Shah and the Zionism was forged through the medium of freemasonry?
Professor Algar: I think there were many channels of communication, linkages, overlapping interest and so on. Probably freemasonry was one among them. In the aftermath of the Revolution all the Masonic lodges have been closed in Iran and their entire achieves have been captured intact. A preliminary selection of documents has already been published. They confirm what was suspected some time earlier. Many of the lodges in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran were controlled by Jews or by Bahais of Jewish origin, which furnishes another avenue of communication with Israel and Zionism generally. But one should not overestimate the importance of this one medium of communication, when there were so many others available. Freemasonry played an important role on the domestic plane, but it is not necessarily connected with the question of Zionism.
Mr. Abdullah Ahmed: I want to return to the question of women. Being a Moslem, one believes in community and that one is responsible for the community first. Have you ever come into contact with Kate Millett, who was sent out of Iran and who says she went there on a women's mission? What was her mission?
Professor Algar: I have had no communication with Kate Millett. I do not know what she thought her mission in Iran was. But, irrespective of her, let me say a few words about the so-called women's demonstrations in Iran which took place for four or five days in succession. The alleged cause of the demonstrations was the curtailment of women's rights by the Revolutionary regime. They coined a nice slogan for the occasion: "In the spring of freedom there is no freedom". Ayatullah Khomeini, I think in the last public address that he gave before leaving Tehran to return to Qum, in a speech that touched on many subjects, said "Now that we have in Iran an Islamic government, women should observe Islamic criteria of dress, particularly those that work in the ministries.!"
There are two things to be noticed. First, this was a recommendation. Secondly, it was directed particularly at women in government service. It was interpreted willfully as a command to be enforced by coercive means if necessary and as meaning that all Iranian women must immediately cover themselves with the chador. The Islamic criteria of dress do not necessarily imply the chador, which is merely the traditional way of fulfilling those criteria in Iran, Seizing upon this distorted series of sentences in the speech of Ayatullah Khomeini, a weird alliance of people organised a series of demonstrations in Tehran. On the one hand there were the leftists, who, like most people who talk about equality, have a very elitist mentality. They, seeing their lack of support among the working class in Iran, have tried to seize upon a number of marginal issues and build them up as vehicles for their own attempts to gain power. One such vehicle was the women's demonstrations.
Those taking part in the demonstrations were the upper echelons of Tehran society. It was interesting to see television footage of those demonstrations. These were women dressed in the latest fashions from Paris. Many had dyed their hair, which in the context is of significance. It shows a certain kind of self-hatred. It is the same kind of thing as one ha& seen in the United States, where Afro-Americans have tried to straighten out their hair. These were the people who were parading through the streets, led by Kate Millett and calling for women's emancipation. Far larger demonstrations in support of Ayatullah Khomeini and denunciation of these intrigues of the leftists on the one hand and the upper classes on the other went largely unreported in the western press. This was a bubble that burst very quickly.