The Chairman: Can I take you up on this? I detected a number of contradictions. One of them is the existence of political administrative experience among a group of people. Earlier you said that there should be no compromise with the existing system. Now you are saying that you want to rely, in the early period of the Revolution, on experience gained in the past. How do you gain experience from that political system and how is the political experience of that period relevant to this period?
My other question is that it seems that you are now saying that there will be elections in which a political party called the party of the Islamic Republic will fight an election. This assumes that there would be another party or could be, technically, another party opposing that party, which does not want an Islamic Republic. In that event you are relying on the attainment of a majority. When was an election last held in a Shi'ia political system? What is the origin of elections in the political system of the Islamic Republic? In all of this you seem to be dipping your hands back into the foreigners' basket for intellectual and technical tools.
Professor Algar: As to the first question about the acquisition of experience by members of the present provisional government, they acquired their experience not under the reign of the Shah but rather in the period of Dr. Mussadeq, which is a more relevant experience. Prime Minister Bazargan managed the Iranian oil industry immediately after its nationalization. Others in the present Cabinet have had experience not in the government as such but rather in the spheres of academia, in some cases in technical enterprises and were totally independent of the State in the period of the Shah. It is not a question of taking on people who have acquired experience of political administration under the regime of the Shah. Moreover, they are being deployed at the moment not in the formulation of policy, but in its execution. I agree that it is not entirely satisfactory that there should be this duality of authority. One must remember that this is an interim and transitional situation in which contradictions are bound to exist and which, we hope, will be resolved.
Turning now to the second question about elections, and the place of them in Shi'ism, there is no question of elections when it comes to the appointment of the Imam who is divinely appointed. Whether one be Shi'ia or Sunni, there is the simple factor of the Qur'anic injunction for consultation. An election is nothing more than a mechanism for the implementation of this general Qur'anic principle of consultation. Another point that is of importance and significance about the Islamic Revolution is that it feels secure enough of itself, sufficiently self-assured, to permit the expression of dissenting points of view. It is surely a far more effective way of combating the potential danger represented by Marxism to permit the free organization of Marxist political parties and then, in the electoral process to demonstrate their importance, than it is to jump upon them and put their members in goal, as if Muslims had something to be scared of. This anti-communist bogey that is waved in various parts of the Muslim world to frighten people into silence, should be brought into the open and shown for what it is, as something totally weak.
Moreover, there is the simple question that we cannot 'have an Islamic State based upon coercion. To permit freedom of expression, even in opposition to the principle of an Islamic Republic, seems politically wise and in accordance with the fundamental injunctions of Islam itself.
Question: In the light of the Shi'ia concept of political authority, if this concept was to be extended from a particular country, say that of Iran, who will make that political authority? Will it be a central authority? If it is a central authority, who will make it and will there be agreements upon it? If that is not the case, will it be independent local authorities and if that is the case, do you see any political differences of opinion?
Professor Algar: We have to admit that there is no single uniquely valid system of political authority. There are certain general principles which may apply in different fashions according to certain particular circumstances. Whether the forms that are in the process of emerging in Iran will be applicable without modification to other countries it is a question that remains open. Your questions are eliciting from me a number of matters which belong to later lectures. One important factor about the Iranian Revolution which makes it a real Revolution and not a coup d 'etat, is that the people before the Revolution evolved their own organs of government and administration. This took place before the final triumph of the Revolution. The removal of Bakhtiar was a formality because an alternative government had come into being and, moreover, this had happened while Ayatullah Khomeini was still in exile.
There is in Iran at the moment a large dispersal of authority, a decentralization. This is something valuable from which every Muslim may learn in that frequently when we have our brother Islamic movements, whether in the Arab world, Pakistan, or elsewhere, when they speak of an Islamic State and idea is of setting up a strong central authority, geared to realizing the goals of Islam and then telling the people how to implement these goals. What has happened in Iran is the opposite, namely that there has emerged in every village throughout the country a local organ of self-government and authority which functions with the mosque as its center, with the local u/ema as its leader and effectively conducts the day to day business of government. The new constitution, interestingly enough, provides for the perpetuation of this feature. The field is definitely open for experimentation. One of the valuable things that has happened in Iran is that for the first time, not on the basis of some theoretical concepts drawn up by so called Islamic research academies, but on the basis of the true and genuine revolutionary participation by the whole people, a viable model of government has come into being. Whether other Muslim countries follow this model is another question. The important thing about what is happening in Iran is that it has been a mass movement which has evolved its own form of self-government. It has not been a question of theory. Other movements elsewhere have been strong on theory and have spent lots of conference time debating this, generally abroad, in America and Europe. But they have been weak in practice. You can reproach the Iranian movement with late development of a theory, but you cannot reproach it with lack of practice. Lack of theory is the less essential factor.
The Chairman: It seems to me that in your lecture you were saying that. over 300 years in Iran there developed Shi'ia intellectual thought and there was a process of development of thought in Iran which has led to this Revolution. You rightly linked Ayatullah Khomeini and all the major figures before, who articulated Shi'ia thought or Islamic thought in Iran leading up to this Revolution. Now you appear to be saying that there was no need for the intellectual basis of the Revolution.
Professor Algar: No, I am not saying that.
The Chairman: I am looking at it as a criticism of intellectual pursuit in Islam. You would not mean to do that, I am sure. Being a professor, you would not like to be out of a job.
Professor Algar: I do not know. Sometimes I would like a more honourable job. No one disputes the necessity of intellectual pursuit, but an intellectual pursuit that is carried on in isolation or at the expense of actual practice and actual involvement in the day to day problems of Moslems, the Muslim masses, is something else. That is something totally useless.
Question: The Islamic Revolution in Iran has brought about a change in the role of leadership in the Islamic system as compared to other systems. Could you briefly comment on how the leadership role differs in different systems?
Professor Algar: This is a generalized question. Rather than attempt a comparison, I would say that Ayatullah Khomeini has emerged as the leader of the Iranian people. I do not like this word 'leader' because it carries a certain kind of connotation with it, That is, it does so in English, where we are obliged to make compromises. He has emerged, for want of a better word, as the leader of the Iranian people. Here again, I may be sounding anti-intellectual, but it is not because of a question of theory. All this theory I have elaborated, has been of importance but it is not a question of what Ayatullah Khomeini has done and is doing, it is a question of what the man is. Anyone who has come into the presence of Ayatullah Khomeini has realized that this man is a kind of embodiment of the human ideal. It is by exercising this combination of moral, intellectual, political and spiritual ability that he has come to have this tremendous role in Iran. He has gone much beyond the traditional bounds of authority of the marja-i taqlid. He has become a symbol, an incorporation of the whole Iranian concept of self identity. If Muslims look at him, non-Iranian Moslems, they will see in him a precious example of the human ideal of Islam also.
This is a man who today can have a demonstration of millions of people on the streets in Iran in a few minutes. Yet when you see him in his place of work, and his residence, he is sitting on the floor with a little lectern in front of him. That is the entirety of his office equipment. Yet you can go to so called Muslim leaders -this is the relevant comparison -and see them in their comfortably appointed offices. I recall visiting an apartment in Ankara belonging to a prominent leader of a party which with some justice calls itself an Islamic party. Unfortunately, it fails far short of what is should be. This was an apartment overstuffed with all kinds of souvenirs of trips to western Europe, with pseudo-French furniture and gold-plated telephones. Yet this was one of the people who claimed to represent Islam. I am not saying that Ayatullah Khomeini is totally unique in his personal way of life. There have been others and there are others in the Islamic world who have at least approached the same ideal. But if you are speaking in general about the qualities of leadership, it is not a question of a particular theory of leadership or a certain organization or network, it is to do with the peculiarity of this man, the spiritual and moral dimension which must be there. With Ayatullah Khomeini, obviously and overwhelmingly it is there. I read an interesting article in a Turkish secularist newspaper who, before the Iranian Revolution, like many other writers in the Turkish daily press, had written all kinds of nonsense about Imam Khomeini, had gone to see Khomeini. It was interesting. He said he went in the presence of Imam Khomeini with a whole list of idiotic questions, such as, "What about religious minorities?", "What about women?", "Are you going to dismantle the factories?", and that kind of junk. Instead of putting forward this series of questions, he found himself reduced to complete silence and a great sense of shame and embarrassment. In the end the only question he could ask Imam Khomeini was to give him some guidance in his personal life. Where upon he advised him to study Islam and begin making his prayers, and so on.
Anyone who has the honour of seeing Imam Khomeini has the same story. It is what the man is. All too often in this pseudo-intellectualism, the Muslims waste their time and energy. You totally lose sight of the end.. You sit around arguing about words. You lose sight of those spiritual and moral qualities. It is not a matter of sentimentalism or spiritualism. This is a demonstrable reality. How else can we explain the success of the Iranian Revolution? These people who had no material resources at their disposal whatever, faced with one. of the best equipped armies in the world, opposed by all the major powers, and some of the lesser ones, nevertheless triumphed. How? The historians will still be scratching their heads 100 years from now wondering how it happened. But the Moslem, when he sees this, will see the kind of leadership provided by Imam Khomeini and the moral and spiritual dimensions which he gave to the Iranian Revolution.
Question: What is the relationship between the ulema and the existing rulers of Iraq compared to the ulema of Iran?
Professor Algar: This is a subject on which I am not well informed. Recently, there has been considerable antagonism between the Ba'athist regime in Iraq and Ayatullah Sadr, who has been a close associate of Ayatullah Khomeini and was an acquaintance of his during his long years of exile. There are many reports of large scale demonstrations in Iraq against the Ba'athist regime, which led to the killing of a large number of people and the arrest of many more, including the personal emissary of Ayatullah Khomeini. I believe that he was later released. There is a danger when we talk about the coming influence or even the present influence of the Iranian Revolution to think only in terms of Shi'ia communities. Obviously Shi'ia communities have a particular interest in what is going on in Iran, particularly those in Iraq which is next door. But the influence of the Revolution is in no way confined to the various Shi'ia communities.
Questioner (as above): I am talking in a historical sense.
Professor Algar: Historically, the Shi'ia element of Iraq led a long struggle against the British mandate. Ayatullah Kashani and his father, Mustapha Kashani, were sentenced to death by the British in Iraq for their role in opposing the imposition of a British regime there. Further, the Shi'ia ulema also opposed the British in Iraq. There is a long and protracted jihad against the British regime. In the post-war period there was activism against the Hashimites and even more recently against the Ba'athists. But I am not in a position to go into details in the case of Iraq.
Question: The mujtahids can arrive at different conclusions based on different interpretations. Both might be correct. No one can claim that he is right. You mentioned that various Imams said that no one should follow blindly a ruler. They should know what the reason was behind their rulings. How does that apply to what you have said about the mujtahid, the marja-i taqlid?
Professor Algar: Taqlid is not following blindly. Taqlid is a recognition of the limits of one's own knowledge and competence, in the sense of the prophetic hadith, that Allah has mercy on the man who knows his limits and stops at them. There is a great exercise of judgment here when it comes to the choice of a particular mujtahid, or the choice of a Marja-i taqlid. Having made that choice, you follow the guidance of someone who has more authority when he gives his reasons. There is no question of blind following. Within the Shi'ia school it is true that whatever result is arrived at has no claim to infallibility. It is a reasoned supposition. What is essential is not to follow the guidance of any given mujtahid, it is essential from the viewpoint of the Usuli school of thought that one should choose a certain mujtahid. To my mind this is one reason why our brethren in Iran have a far clearer understanding and sense of direction in their Islamic lives, because they have this comprehensive leadership and guidance. The rest of us in the Sunni Muslim world unfortunately under the influence of Wahabism and other related misfortunes, tend to reject taqlid without in any way approaching the position of the mujtahid. It is not a question and direction given by one who is obviously better qualified.
The Chairman: We shall now conclude this session.

LECTURE # 2

Ayatullah Khomeini
The Embodiment of a Tradition
PROF. HAMID ALGAR, University of California, Berkeley
(Delivered in October, 1979)
To recapitulate some of the major themes that I attempted to evoke last week, the Islamic Revolution differs from other events of the present century that have been given that designation by being firmly rooted in history. Far from being a radical break with the essential and profound developments of the Iranian nation, it is, on the contrary, a continuation and fruition of long years of political, spiritual and intellectual development.
I laid particular stress last week on the development of the institution of the Shi'ia ulema, beginning with their importation into Iran in the Safavid period. Then I described their gradual emergence as a class providing not only religious leadership in the narrow and technical sense but also leadership of a national and political nature, given increasingly to contesting the legitimacy of the monarchical institution.
Inevitably, I was obliged to omit certain topics and names, and by way of introduction to today's topic -the culminating figure of the whole tradition of the ulema, Ayatullah Khomeini -I would like to make more detailed reference to some aspects of what I briefly touched upon last week.
First, it would obviously be a distortion of the institution of the ulema to regard it simply from the viewpoint that most interests us -namely, the political. We should also bear in mind that the ulema, not only within the Shi'ia and Iranian context, have been the guardians of the certain body of traditional learning and devotion which has been the whole underpinning and basis of social and political action.
If we look at the specific case of Shi'ia school of thought in Iran, we see that again since the Safavid period -the sixteenth century of the Christian period -the ulema have studied and cultivated a wide variety of different disciplines. These have included not merely the familiar theological disciplines -Qur'an, hadith, tafsir, fiqh and so on -but philosophy, a certain form of philosophy appropriate to the Islamic context, and mysticism, again a certain form of mysticism appropriate to the Islamic and specifically the Shi'ia context.
Indeed, if we look at the person of Ayatullah Khomeini and his achievement, we find that he is the culmination of the tradition of the Shi'ia ulema in Iran, not merely in exercising an unusually comprehensive, wide and profound influence in political and social affairs, but also with respect to the pure learned dimension of the tradition. Here, too, he is an unparalleled figure.
This, then, is one thing. In order to understand the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the role played in it by the ulema, particularly Ayatullah Khomeini, it is necessary to regard not merely their political theory, not merely their sensibility and strategy and their identification with popular aspirations, but also the background of cultivation of Islamic learning and piety from which they sprang.
Secondly, as a footnote to last week's presentation, I would like to go into more detail on two figures who provide the immediate background to the emergence of Ayatullah Khomeini. The first is Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi and the second is Ayatullah Burujirdi. The first is of great importance as the founder of the religious learning institution in Qum, from which Ayatullah Khomeini went forth and which has become in a certain sense the main stronghold of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and also the spiritual capital of the country, given the residence there of Ayatullah Khomeini.
The dates of Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi are from 1859 and 1936, Qum is one of the oldest centers of Shi'ia school of thought in Iran. Not coincidentally, it is also one of the few cities founded in Iran by the Arab Muslim conquerors of the country. It has traditionally been a stronghold of Shi'ia learning. However, until the present century the major centers of Shi'ia learning that exercised great authority within Iran also were situated outside the country, in the cities known as the 'atabat -that is, the cities of Iraq, where certain of the Imams are buried: Karbala, Najaf and Kazimayn, and to a certain extent some others. Almost all the prominent ulema received their education there. Many, even though Iranian by birth, would spend most of their lives there.
This situation has continued to a certain extent, but in Iran the city of Qum came to great prominence as a result of the activities of a succession of important ulema, the first of whom was Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi. In 1922 he founded in the city what is known as the Hauze-ye Ilmiye, which roughly translated is the teaching institution. It is a conglomerate of different colleges and institutions of learning, informally organized and containing a number of teachers, offering the entire spectrum of the traditional religious sciences, joined by philosophy and mysticism.
There is a tradition, attributed to the sixth Imam of the Shi'ia, that in latter times knowledge would arise in Qum and be distributed from there to the rest of Iran and to the rest of the world. Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi, in fulfillment of this tradition, consciously decided to revitalize Qum as a center of religious learning and teaching. This took place in 1922, a date almost the same as the date of the foundation of the Pahlavi dictatorship. Although Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi, in fulfillment of this tradition, consciously decided to revitalize Qum as a center of religious learning and teaching. This took place in 1922, a date almost the same as the date of the foundation of the Pahlavi dictatorship.
Although Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi was apolitical, it can be said that his achievement indirectly contributed ultimately to the overthrow and destruction of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Although he failed to exercise any effective opposition to Reza Khan and the institution of the Pahlavi dictatorship, Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi came to repent his inactivity in this respect, and is reputed to have died in a state of great sorrow.
The second of these two figures who form the immediate background of the emergence of Ayatullah Khomeini, is, of course, Ayatollah Borujerdi (1875-1961). He is the major mujtahid and marja-i taqlid of the immediate post-war period. He continued the twin emphasis of Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi -the strengthening of the teaching institution in Qum as the center of spiritual and religious direction, and a certain quietism in political affairs. He organized a network throughout Iran for the collection of zakat, khums and other religious-sanctioned taxes, which gave a greater financial independence and stability to the religious institution in Qum. This network, established for these purposes, later became of great utility in the course of the Islamic Revolution.
At the same time, Ayatullah Borujerdi on the purely religious plane instituted an important development which has not received sufficient attention -a deliberate attempt by the leading authorities of Shi'ia Muslims to effect a rapprochement with the Sunni Islamic world. Through his efforts and those of the then Shaykh al-Azhar, Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, an institution was established for the taqrib, the rapprochement between the different schools thought in Islam.
This theme has also been taken up by Ayatullah Khomeini, who has repeatedly expressed the need for collaboration and unity between the different segments of the Islamic world.
Politically, however, Ayatullah Borujerdi has been open to considerable criticism. Throughout the tumultuous events of the first decade of the post-war period, years which saw the rise of a large and threatening communist party in Iran, the Tudeh Party, the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry, the rise of Dr. Mussadeq, the CIA coup d'etat, we find complete silence on the part of Ayatullah Borujerdi. Even after e royalist coup d'etat of August 1953, he received emissaries of the Shah's regime at his residence in Qum.
This seemed in the eyes of many Iranians to exclude any role for the ulema, for the religious leaders, in the opposition to the Shah's regime that was not intensifying after the downfall of the Mussadeq regime. Particularly because the role of Ayatullah Kashani (d. 1962), one of the previous supporters of Dr. Mussadeq and the campaign for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, also was ambiguous in many points.
In the first years after the downfall of Dr. Mussadeq and the institution of the royal dictatorship, under American patronage, we find a certain current of religiously-inspired opposition to the Shah's regime. But it has no leading personality; it is relatively weak; and it is overshadowed by secular and leftist forms of opposition to the Shah 's regime.
However, a decade after the overthrow of Mussadeq, in March 1963, there emerges for the first time in prominence on the Iranian scene the great figure of Ayatullah Khomeini. He overshadows not only all his predecessors in this tradition of ulema that I have attempted to sketch for you but also the figure of Mussadeq himself and certainly all other secular politicians and potential leaders of opposition to the royal regime.
The life of Ayatullah Khomeini before his emergence for the first time to the wider public eye in 1963 deserves some attention. As the final element in his name indicates, he was born in the little town of Khomein in 1902, of a family that for many generations had cultivated religious knowledge and learning. His grandfather was a certain Sayid Ahmad, who was also known as Sayid Ahmad Hindi, because he had spent a number of years in India.
As far as is known to me, the family is of Iranian origin for many generations, although ultimately, since he is a Sayid -a descendant of the Prophet -the ultimate origins of the family go beyond Iran. But throughout recent generations the family is Iranian. It is simply that the grandfather spent a certain time in India. There are, apparently, even now, a number of relatives of the family who are still resident in India, somewhere near Lucknow.
His father was a Sayid Mustafa Khomeini, who was killed by a mayor of Khomein in the last days of the Qajar dynasty, because of his protests against the exactions and the unjust taxes and other oppressive practices carried out by the mayor against the local population.
The learned and religious career of Ayatullah Khomeini began when he was 17, in the year 1919, when he went to study in the city of Arak. After a brief stay, he left this relatively small and unimportant city to go to the main center of religious learning in Iran, namely, Qum. His arrival shortly preceded the establishment there of the -Hauze-ye Ilmiye by Shaykh Abd Al-Karim Hairi. Ayatullah Khomeini swiftly emerged as one of his most prominent and important pupils. Under, his guidance, Ayatullah Khomeini studied the disciplines of Fiqh and Usul al-Fiqh, and at the same time he learnt philosophy and mysticism under the guidance of another of the prominent teachers of the day, Mirza Muhammad Ali Shahabadi.
I would like to make a brief diversion to speak of the place of philosophy and mysticism in the learned and even the political career of Ayatullah Khomeini. It is one of the remarkable facts about him that his political role in leading a revolution, unparalleled in recent history, has come totally to overshadow his achievements as a scholar, philosopher and mystic. All too frequently in the modernist Muslim mentality philosophy and mysticism are held to represent a retreat from reality, a total abdication of any kind of political and social role, as if they were merely abstract matters that had no real connection with the existing problems of Muslims and the Islamic world. Ayatullah Khomeini is living proof that these two subjects, correctly conceived and pursued, are on the contrary the mainspring for a form of activity that is profoundly correct, guided by a clear insight that is not merely political and strategic but is also at the same time an insight that is metaphysically correct and well-guided.
As for mysticism, it may be said that it is precisely the moral and spiritual qualities that Ayatullah Khomeini has cultivated that have made him what he most obviously is -a complete embodiment of the human ideal of Islam. This is the revolutionary leader who lives not in comfortable apartments, who spends his nights in prayer and supplication, whose daily sustenance consists of the simplest and most elementary foods. It seems to me that his very thorough ground in philosophy and mysticism has. been even of political relevance and effectiveness.
The earliest fame of Ayatullah Khomeini in the teaching institution at Qum was precisely as an exponent of these two disciplines. He gave a number of well-attended lectures on some of the major texts of Islamic philosophy and developed great eloquence and a forceful teaching style. He has also written from this period a number of texts, particularly original and partly commentaries upon existing texts, which for the most part have remained on his orders unpublished, since he holds that their publication at the present juncture would not be helpful but would divert from more pressing tasks. He also wrote a large number of books on Fiqh, and came to be regarded as an authority in that field. Had his attainments been restricted to these relatively traditional areas -Fiqh on the one hand and philosophy and mysticism on the other he would not doubt have entered the spiritual history of Iran as a great personality. But although in many respects he is the perpetuator, the culminator, of a tradition, he also broke sharply with the existing tradition of the learned institution by cultivating, from a very early point, radical political interests.
During the period of Reza Khan, Ayatullah Khomeini authored a book in criticism of the Pahlavi dictatorship, entitled Kashfal-Asrar, "The Uncovering of Secrets". It was uncompromising and clear, written in a style that characterizes all h pronouncements. He vigorously criticized the regime of Reza Khan and laid open its dependence upon and subordination to foreign powers, at that time primarily Britain. He clearly saw that the hostility of the Pahlavi regime to Islam was not merely the idiosyncratic desire of a single dictator but rather part of a comprehensive strategy for the elimination of Islam as a social and political force throughout the Islamic world, and as such had been conceived by the major centers of imperialism and entrusted to the various local agents of imperialism.
In the course of the Kashf ai-Asrar, he wrote, for example, criticizing Reza Khan:
"All the orders issued by the dictatorial regime of the bandit Reza Khan have no value at all. The laws passed by his Parliament must be scrapped and burned. All the idiotic words that have proceeded from the brain of that illiterate soldier are rotten and it is only the law of God that will remain and resist the ravages of time."
This form of expression, totally uncompromising and marked by a radical insight into the realities of politics, gave rise to misgivings, interestingly enough not only on the part of the Pahlavi regime but within the religious institution itself. For all its strength, like any other institution, it had as its primary interest self-preservation and the promotion of its institutional interests.
In the period when Ayatullah Borujerdi was the dominant figure in Qum, Ayatullah Khomeini enjoyed a position of prominence, but the view entertained of him by certain of the other scholars surrounding Borujerdi was ambivalent. In the period between the downfall of Reza Khan in 1941 and the overthrow of Mussadeq in 1953, Ayatullah Khomeini did not attempt an open denunciation of the regime in the same fashion as he did after 1963. He has more recently expressed regret that he did not earlier begin on the course that for many years now he has seen to be his clear and manifest duty. It should be said, however, that throughout this period he sought to induce a measure of political realism and commitment in Ayatullah Borujerdi. If his efforts in this respect were largely frustrated, there is no doubt that he exercised his influence upon a large number of the younger ulema in Qum and elsewhere, who later came to form part of the directive force of the Revolution. Even before the expulsion of Ayatullah Khomeini from Iran, he had built up a certain following -among the younger ulema in Qum, many of whom are now among the important leaders of the Revolution. It is highly probable that the Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iran consists largely if not entirely of the pupils of Ayatullah Khomeini. In other words, they are people whom he has been training for years, both in the traditional religious sciences and in the tasks of political struggle and guidance and leadership. A list of the major students of Ayatullah Khomeini would take many pages. We can mention briefly simply two names that come to mind Imam Musa Sadr, the leader of the Shi'ia community in Lebanon, and Ayatullah Montazeri, who was one of the major I strugglers against the Shah's regime in Iran.
Ayatullah Khomeini's emergence to prominence began in the years following the overthrow of Mussadeq and the ii emergence of an intensified form of dictatorship in Iran. In f 1963, the Shah inaugurated what became known in the western press, and of course in domestic propaganda, as the White Revolution. It has been appositely said of the White Revolution that the only white thing about it was that it was conceived in the White House. It was certainly not white in the sense that it was bloodless, and it was hardly a revolution, On the contrary, it was an attempt to forestall revolution and make it impossible.
The so-called White Revolution consisted of a package of measures allegedly designed to reform Iranian society to promote the welfare of the peasantry and the industrial workers and to "emanicipate" the women. Among the various measures included in it there were two that assumed particular prominence in the propaganda of the Shah's regime and his foreign supports -land reform and women's rights. It may be appropriate to dwell a little on the nature of these two measures before continuing with my narrative of Ayatullah Khomeini's activities.
The slogan of land reform in Iran was the disguise for the total disruption of the agrarian economy in a manner designed to assure maximum profit for the royal family, a certain oligarchy tied to the royal family and foreign agri-business interests, including companies headquartered in the United States,. Europe and, above' all, Israel. It is true that a certain amount of property was distributed among the peasantry, but the land that was distributed was a barely cultivatable nature, and moreover, it was not distributed free of charge; it was distributed against monetary payments that had to be made to banks controlled by the royal family. Moreover, a large number of lands were totally excluded from the scope of the law and were passed instead either to the direct ownership of the royal family, under the title of the Pahlavi Foundation, which was the cover for the financial operations of the royal family, or certain foreign agri-business interests that used the agrarian land of Iran for the cultivation of certain crops that are not consumed in Iran but were destined for the foreign market. For example, wide areas of Iran were given over to the cultivation of asparagus, an item totally missing from the Iranian diet. At the same time, Iranian produced butter became increasingly unavailable, so that in a Tehran supermarket you could find only Danish butter.
This destruction of the agrarian economy caused massive depopulation of the countryside and the coming to the cities of peasants forced to seek work there. The former landowning class were transformed into speculators on urban real estate and import-export merchants, and in pure financial terms they gained from the transformation rather than losing from it.
As for women’s rights, this was a measure designed more for foreign consumption than for domestic purposes, since the Shah's foreign advisers were well aware of the traditional western prejudices concerning Islamic attitudes towards women and thought that this was an infallible way of making the Shah appear an enlightened and benevolent person, acting on behalf of the poor oppressed women of Muslim Iran. In point of fact there has taken place a great transformation in the political-social role of Iranian women over the past twenty-five year$ in Iran -fifteen years at least -but the direction it has taken i$ against the regime. Iranian women found their emancipation not through any measures decreed by the regime but, on the contrary, in struggling against the regime, in suffering abuse, torture, imprisonment and martyrdom at the hands of the regime.
In the declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini made from March 1963 onwards against the Shah 's regime and his attempt to deceive Iranian opinion with the so-called White Revolution, we do not find consistent mention of land reform and women's rights. It is a remarkable thing that right down until last year it was said particularly in the American press -and probably the British press was not much better that these conservative, reactionary, fanatical Muslims in Iran were struggling against the Shah because of their opposition to land reform and their desire to get back what was quaintly termed "the church lands and because they wanted all women to be shrouded from head to foot again. This total absurdity has no basis, not only for the Revolution of the past year but for the preceding fifteen years.
In the earliest declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini, made, in 1963, declarations which have been preserved verbatim and are available to anyone who can read Persian, he concentrates by contrast on a number of other themes. The first is the continued violation by the Shah of the Iranian constitution and his violation of the oath that he took upon acceding to the throne to preserve and to protect Islam. Secondly, he attacks the Shah's subordination to foreign powers, mentioning primarily the United States and, following very closely upon that, Israel.
The question of Israel with respect to the Islamic Revolution is of great importance. It has not been realised, because of the embargo on news in the so-called free press of the west, that Israel has been second only to the United States as one of the major props of the Pahlavi dictatorship. It was well known in Iran that there were two items that were totally excluded from any form of public comment or criticism. It was a well-known rule of Savak, the security police established by the United States for, the Shah, that there were two items that had to be totally excluded from public comment and criticism. One was the royal family and the other was Israel. It is interesting that even the United States, in a certain form and under certain pretexts, might be subjected to criticism but even the name of Israel had not to be mentioned.
Ayatullah Khomeini, with his characteristic refusal to compromise, broke this rule in 1963 and pointed out the very close relationship on the military, political, intelligence and economic planes between the Pahlavi regime and Israel.
Of course, in press accounts of the western world in 1963 you would find not a word on this aspect of the matter.
As for the land reform and women's emancipation, which was supposedly a target of so much righteous anger, the only reference is the declaration of Ayatullah Khomeini in 1963 and subsequently are passing references denouncing them as totally fallacious, and not even worth commenting upon in detail.
After one of the talks that Ayatullah Khomeini was giving at his madrasa in Qum in March 1963, an attack took place upon the madrasa by paratroopers and members of the security police, resulting in the death of a number of people and the arrest of Ayatullah Khomeini. After a period of detention, he was released but, far from being intimidated by his imprisonment, he increased the intensity and frequency of his attacks on the government, so that by June of that year, which corresponded to the important month of Muharram, the nationwide campaign of enlightenment of public opinion by the ulema under the leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini had come into being. Throughout these declarations he continued to attack the subordination of the Shah to foreign powers, particularly the United States and Israel, and his violation of the Iranian constitution and of Islam.
One particular topic that appears to have been the catalyst for the uprising of June 1963 was the granting to Americans in Iran -American advisers, military personnel and their dependants -of total exemption from Iranian jurisdiction, in such a way that, as Ayatullah Khomeini put it, were the dog of an American soldier to bite the Shah himself, the Shah would have no legal recourse. This matter, together with the contracting of a $ 200 million loan from the United States for the purchase of military equipment, supplied a clear illustration of the subordination of the Shah's regime to foreign powers. Ayatullah Khomeini clearly said that the vote of the Majlis which had approved these and similar measures was illegitimate the contrary to the Qur'an. He issued an appeal to the Iranian army to rise up and overthrow the regime and to the people also that they should no longer tolerate a tyranny that was "working towards the total enslavement of Iran."
On the day in the Iranian calendar known as the 15th of Khurdad, corresponding to the 5th June 1963, a vast uprising took place in numerous Iranian cities, which was brutally repressed by the use of force. Not for the first time in the Shah's career, he gave the orders to his security police and to the troops to shoot to kill. It has been estimated that on this day and in the events of subsequent days a minimum of 15,000 people were killed.
Ayatullah Khomeini was arrested again and then after a short period sent into exile in Bursa, Turkey. Interestingly enough, in violation of Turkish law, he was kept under close surveillance in a house guarded by members of the Iranian security police. The Prime Minister of Turkey at the time was, a certain Suleyman Demirel, who is a well-known freemason.
In October 1965, Ayatullah Khomeini was enabled to leave his place of exile in Turkey to go to a more congenial environment, that is Najaf, one of the cities in Iraq that have traditionally been a center not only for the cultivation of Shi'ia learning but of refuge for Iranian religious leaders. This was the case, for example, in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century when a number of the important religious leaders supported the constitutional revolution or, before that, the tobacco boycott movement. They issued their directives from the relative security of the â€کatabat, which were outside Iran.
On this occasion, however, Ayatullah Khomeini by no means found an untroubled refuge there. It needs to be pointed out very plainly and strongly that, despite what was said in the western press for many years, the presence of Ayatullah Khomeini in Iraq in no way constituted any form of alliance, however slight, between himself and the Ba'athist regime in that country. He was, on the contrary, subjected to repeated harassment by the general repression enacted by the regime in Iraq, which is continuing.
From Najaf, Ayatullah Khomeini continued periodically to issue his declarations on Iranian affairs. The Shah's hope that by exiling him from the country he would also put an end to his influence and popularity was decisively frustrated. It has been said that Ayatullah Khomeini emerged to prominence in the course of the Revolution as the result of a vacuum, because there was no viable alternative in sight, but this judgment results from ignorance of the gradual development of the role of Ayatullah Khomeini during his more than fourteen years in exile. Throughout his years in Najaf, he by no means remained silent. We find him, on the contrary, issuing a wide variety of proclamations on Iranian affairs, all of which penetrated the country, were circulated and had a great effect on the formation of Iranian public opinion.
For example, in April 1967, Ayatullah Khomeini sent an open letter to the Prime Minister of Iran at that time, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, in which he denounced Hoveyda and the Shah for their continued violation both of Islam and of the constitution. He went through a comprehensive survey of all the Government policies, criticizing them one by one, warning Hoveyda that one day he would be held responsible. One may imagine the contemptuous disbelief with which Hoveyda received this letter from an exile whose followers had been slaughtered in the streets, a letter addressed to the Prime Minister at the head of one of the major repressive apparatuses in the modern world. Yet it is one of the remarkable things about Ayatullah Khomeini which contributes to the effectiveness of his leadership that every word he has said is seriously meant. This warning, given as far back as April 1967, bore its fruit with the execution of Hoveyda by the Islamic Revolutionary Court this year (1979), in the aftermath of the Revolution.
Another example of the declarations of Ayatullah Khomeini during his years in exile we can draw from a series of events in May 1970, when a consortium of American investors met in Tehran to discuss ways for the more effective penetration and exploitation of the Iranian economy. On this occasion, one of the followers of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Saidi, gave a khutba in his mosque in Tehran denouncing this conference and calling upon the Iranian people to rise up and protest against it. He was arrested and tortured to death by Savak, the Shah's security police, and Ayatullah Khomeini issued a proclamation calling on the people to renew their struggle against the Pahlavi regime.
Later we find Ayatullah Khomeini denouncing the idiotic and wasteful expenditures of the regime for the so-called celebration of 2,500 years of monarchy, a celebration conceived and planned by certain Israeli advisers of the regime. He later also condemned the inauguration of a one-party system in Iran, saying that whoever joined this party voluntarily, without pressure, was in effect a traitor to both the nation and Islam. He also issued many proclamations on the general state of Islam and in particular on the role of Israel.
It is interesting to note that on two occasions, once in 1971 and once during the Revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini also issued two appeals to the Muslim world in general,: appeals that were translated into various languages and distributed during the Hajj. In both these declarations he called solidarity among the Muslims and collaboration for the resolution of their common problems. It is interesting to note, that the so-called champions of Islam, the Saudi regime, saw fit to imprison and torture for long periods a number of those responsible for the distribution of these declarations:
Therefore, it was no surprise to anyone that the Saudi regime, despite its professed loyalty to Islam, ranged itself with Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union in opposing the Islamic Revolution. It has a long history of opposition of the revolutionary Islamic movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini.
As for the role of Ayatullah Khomeini in the Revolution itself, this is direct and immediate in the sense that the opening events of the Revolution are directly concerned with his person. The government-controlled press in January 1978 published an article insulting Ayatullah Khomeini in abusive and obscene terms. That aroused an immediate response of anger in the city of Qum. After the first uprising in Qum, which was suppressed with heavy loss of life, a series of demonstrations and protests unfurled across Iran with ever-increasing tempo, until in December of last year (1978) when probably the greatest demonstrations not merely in Iranian history but in modern history in general took place, forcing the exiling of the Shah and paving the way for the ultimate triumph of the Revolution.
Ayatullah Khomeini increased the tempo of his declarations as the movement picked up speed within Iran. In October of last year he was expelled from Iraq as a result of an agreement between the Shah's Regime and the Ba'athist regime. It is interesting to note that Ayatullah Khomeini considered a number of possible alternatives. He would have preferred to take up residence in a Muslim country but, as he has said publicly, and as I myself have heard from him, not one Muslim country offered him the possibility of a residence that would be both safe and permit him to continue his activity. This simple fact is an eloquent commentary on the nature of the regimes that rule the different Muslim countries today. The Qur'an orders the Muslims to give refuge even to a mushrik in order that he might hear the Qur'an and be informed of religion. Yet these contemporary Muslim regimes that send money for the construction of mosques, preferably in prestige places like London, New York and so on, that hold conferences in Hilton and Sheraton hotels, refuse even the elementary right of security and refuge to one whom any objective Muslim observer must regard as the greatest mujtahid of the present day.
Like so many of the stratagems of the former Iranian regime, this one also turned against it in its ultimate result, because, faced with the impossibility of finding refuge in any other Muslim country after Iraq, Ayatullah Khomeini proceeded to Paris, where he became indefinitely more accessible to Iranians from America, Europe and Iran itself. He also became immediately accessible to the world press not that the world press, of course, was in any way inclined or even intellectually and mentally equipped to reflect the f true message and aspirations of Ayatullah Khomeini. Nonetheless, from Paris his communications with Iran were infinitely easier and his visibility was far greater than had been the case in Najaf.
The study of the proclamations of Ayatullah Khomeini during the year of the Revolution would in itself be an f interesting topic. One sees throughout the year, as the Revolution reaches new peaks, a certain evolutionary style of his declarations. For example, if one looks at the declaration issued on the eve of Muharram last year (1399 H), one sees at great eloquence and forcefulness of expression that one; would say from a purely literary point of view has few parallels in contemporary Iranian expression. By the time be returned to Iran from exile at the beginning of February this year (1979), Ayatullah Khomeini, with no material resources, without the construction of a political party, without the waging of a guerilla war, without the support of a single foreign power, had established himself as the undisputed leader of a major revolutionary movement.
How is that possible? I shall try to supply part of the answer in my next lecture, in which I shall examine the events and the chronology of the Revolution and certain general conclusions that can be drawn. Now, with Khomeini, if I would suggest the following concerning his importance as a revolutionary leader.
First, the 'Revolution' for him -and I use the quotation marks because the word has all kinds of connotations which are not necessarily appropriate to the Iranian context -is one in which as a revolutionary leader he is not merely intellectually and emotionally committed to a certain cause but is totally identified with it. He has been totally unwilling to compromise. Why? It is because he has not been a politician of a familiar kind, concerned with the attainment of personal political advantage. On the contrary, he has sought to heed the commands of Allah and His Messenger is a fashion that is appropriate to Him.
One of my Iranian acquaintances who traveled to Paris to visit Ayatullah Khomeini asked him: "Do you think our present course is wise? What will happen if the army keeps on slaughtering people? Will people sooner or later not get tired and discouraged?' He responded quite simply that it is our duty to struggle in this fashion and the result is with Allah. It is precisely this apparent lack of strategy, this refusal to contemplate the precise calculations of normal political strategy, that constitute the highest form of revolutionary strategy in an Islamic context.
Secondly, we can say that Ayatullah Khomeini has been enabled to fulfill the great and unparalleled role that he has by his spiritual and moral qualities, qualities that cannot be called into doubt by even those who have ideologically no commitment to Islam. One of the remarkable things is that in the course of the Revolution, people who had no particular commitment to Islam in an ideological fashion came to rediscover Islam and at the same time made a commitment to Islam as a revolutionary force through the self-evident moral and spiritual virtues of Ayatullah Khomeini himself. It was obvious that here was a man in no way concerned with the obtaining of a personal or sectarian benefit, but one who represented the deepest aspirations of the Iranian nation.